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INTRODUCTION
The most famous doctrine in antitrust law is the “Rule of
Reason.” And anyone who knows anything about the Rule of
Reason knows that courts and juries applying the Rule balance
the anticompetitive effects of the antitrust agreement at issue
against its procompetitive effects.1 Any antitrust practitioner
can explain that whichever side of the scale weighs heavier determines the outcome: if the court finds that the anticompetitive effects predominate, it invalidates the agreement; if the
procompetitive effects win out, it upholds the agreement.
Guess what? Everyone is wrong.
This Article takes a new look at the Rule of Reason. It surveys all of the Rule of Reason cases in the modern era and finds
that, in reality, courts rarely conduct the balancing for which
the Rule is known. The Article concludes that in an astonishing

1. This Article will henceforth refer to and consider balancing only by courts.
Instances in which courts have balanced anticompetitive and procompetitive effects or
have passed upon the validity of jury verdicts can be discovered by traditional research
tools; jury balancing cannot. That juries may play a marginally more significant role
than can be pinpointed does not affect the conclusions drawn by this Article.

CAR-FIN.DOC

4/5/00 7:24 AM

1268 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999
96% of Rule of Reason cases, courts do not balance anything.2
Instead, many recent courts have engaged in an exercise of
burden-shifting, typically dismissing the case at any one of
three stages that precedes the ultimate balancing.3 In the initial stage, the plaintiff must show a significant anticompetitive
effect resulting from the restraint.4 The plaintiff can clear this
threshold by demonstrating either an actual adverse effect,
such as a reduction of output or an increase in price, or a potential adverse effect, which requires proof of market power.5 If
the plaintiff cannot make this showing, the court will dismiss
the case. In 84% of the cases, the lawsuit is disposed of at this
stage.
If the plaintiff can demonstrate an anticompetitive effect,
the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate a legitimate
procompetitive justification for the restraint.6 The defendant’s
failure at this step will lead to the invalidation of the restraint;
this happened in 3% of the cases surveyed. If the defendant

2. This conclusion applies across the realm of antitrust cases. Courts determined the validity of restraints without balancing anticompetitive and procompetitive
effects in 98% of the cases involving vertical restraints, 99% of refusal-to-deal cases,
99% of exclusive dealing cases, 97% of tying cases, 94% of unfair competition cases, and
86% of cases involving association rules or practices. See infra notes 18-207 and accompanying text.
3. Although the burden of production shifts between the parties at each stage,
the burden of persuasion always remains on the plaintiff to show an unreasonable restraint of trade. See, e.g., Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 901 (9th Cir. 1983);
Bellam v. Clayton County Hosp. Auth., 758 F. Supp. 1488, 1493 (N.D. Ga. 1990); VII
PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND
THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1507b, at 397 (1986).
4. See, e.g., Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d
537, 546 (2d Cir. 1993); Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1413 (9th Cir. 1991);
Nationwide R.A.C. Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., No. C 96-2877 FMS, 1997 WL 88399,
at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 1997). When this Article refers to the plaintiff’s proof of “anticompetitive effect,” it implies that such effect is significant or substantial. A scintilla of
an anticompetitive effect is not enough.
5. See, e.g., Flegel v. Christian Hosp., N.E.-N.W., 4 F.3d 682, 688 (8th Cir.
1993); Capital Imaging Assocs., 996 F.2d at 546-47; Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1413. In a narrow subset of cases, those applying a “quick look” Rule of Reason, the court presumes
harm to competition in the absence of both an actual adverse effect and a lack of market power. In these cases, the parties typically have entered into a “naked” agreement
not to compete in terms of price or output. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 10910 (1984); see also Federal Trade Comm’n v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447,
460-62 (1986); National Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-93
(1978).
6. See, e.g., Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997);
K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1995);
Capital Imaging Assocs., 996 F.2d at 547; Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1413.
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meets this burden, the burden then returns to the plaintiff to
show either that the restraint is not reasonably necessary to
achieve the objectives of the restraint7 or that the objectives
could be achieved by alternatives “less restrictive” of competition;8 at most, 1% of the cases were dismissed on this ground.9
If the plaintiff satisfies this factor, then she prevails;10 if she
does not, then the court balances the restraint’s anticompetitive and procompetitive effects.11 Balancing occurred in only 4%
of Rule of Reason cases. In short, by time the court balances
anything, most cases have long since been disposed of.
Part I of this Article surveys the cases in the modern era—
since the decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc.12—in which courts have applied the Rule of Reason.13 It
7. See, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 65 (1998); Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1368 (3d Cir. 1996);
United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993); Yeager’s Fuel, Inc. v.
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 953 F. Supp. 617, 657 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
8. See, e.g., Clorox, 117 F.3d at 56; K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., 61 F.3d at 127;
Flegel, 4 F.3d at 688; Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1413.
9. Although courts in the majority of these cases found that the restraint was
reasonably necessary, they did not follow the burden-shifting approach. See infra notes
526-530 and accompanying text.
10. See VII AREEDA, supra note 3, ¶ 1507, at 397.
11. See id.
12. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
13. The Court in Sylvania held that courts are to consider vertical nonprice restraints under the Rule of Reason. See id. at 58-59. The survey’s twenty-two-year time
frame provides a complete view as to courts’ treatment of Rule of Reason cases. If anything, the period is overinclusive, as courts in 1999 have applied a marginally different
analysis—articulating more specifically the burden-shifting approach—than was applied in 1977. But to the extent these figures do not accurately portray the actions of
recent courts, they overstate the number of cases in which balancing occurs. Over the
past two decades, courts have decided fewer and fewer cases by balancing. For example, between 1978 and 1988, courts balanced in fourteen cases. In the next ten years,
balancing occurred in only six cases. See infra note 548 and accompanying text. Given
the significance of the Sylvania case, drawing the line in 1977 should not be a matter of
controversy. See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Beyond Chicago: Will Activist Antitrust Arise
Again?, XXXIX ANTITRUST BULLETIN 1, 18 (1994) [hereinafter Lande, Beyond Chicago]
(noting rise of the Rule of Reason since 1977); John E. Lopatka, Stephen Breyer and
Modern Antitrust: A Snug Fit, XL ANTITRUST BULLETIN 1, 24 (1995) (dating the modern era of antitrust from 1977). To the extent that unreported jury verdicts are based
on a proportionally higher degree of balancing, the figures may shift slightly.
A word about the procedural stage of cases meriting inclusion in this survey. The
survey includes all cases—discovered through broad searches on WESTLAW—in which
a court has entered a final judgment in an antitrust dispute that it has decided (at
least in part) under the Rule of Reason. Where courts have ruled upon jury verdicts,
the judgments are included. Also included are judgments after nonjury trials and
courts’ grants of summary judgment and motions to dismiss. All of the above observations apply only to the antitrust issues of a case; the continued vitality of non-antitrust
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separately treats cases in six categories: (1) vertical nonprice
restraints; (2) refusals to deal; (3) exclusive dealing arrangements; (4) tying arrangements; (5) unfair competition practices;
and (6) association rules and practices.14 Part I finds that, for
all six types of restraints, courts overwhelmingly dispose of the
case before balancing. In particular, courts typically conclude
that the plaintiff fails to demonstrate a significant anticompetitive effect.
Part II begins to tackle the normative questions suggested
by the descriptive survey of Part I. This Part explores whether
courts should consider the factors examined: anticompetitive
effect, procompetitive justifications, the reasonable necessity of
the restraint, the presence of less restrictive alternatives, and
balancing. Four sources inform the conclusions as to each factor: (1) the legislative history of the Sherman Act; (2) the common law preceding the Sherman Act;15 (3) an influential school
of antitrust philosophy—the “Chicago School of Economics”;
and (4) an offshoot of the Chicago School—the “Post-Chicago
School.”
Section A provides a brief overview of each of the sources. It
does not pretend to offer a comprehensive study of each source;
rather, it highlights characteristics relevant to an analysis of
the various factors. Section B examines anticompetitive effect
from the viewpoint of each of the sources. This Section concludes that all four sources recommend the inclusion of anticompetitive effect in the Rule of Reason analysis. Section C
canvasses procompetitive justifications. This Section finds that
claims does not affect the inclusion of the case in the survey. Finally, the survey does
not include cases that have not reached a final determination, such as denials of summary judgment or motions to dismiss, or grants or denials of preliminary injunctions
unaccompanied by final findings.
14. In the context of a noncategorical statute such as the Sherman Act, this
stratification is, in a sense, artificial. For example, exclusive dealing and tying arrangements could be grouped as vertical nonprice restraints. In addition, refusals to
deal and tying arrangements could possess both vertical and horizontal components.
The practices are differentiated here to gain a more precise view as to courts’ actions.
In addition, a few cases will not fall systematically into particular categories. For cases
involving claims in two or more categories, this Article groups the case in the category
that appears integral to the restraint or that provides the basis for the court’s holding.
Any disagreements at the margins as to the category in which certain cases appear do
not affect the underlying thesis. No matter how the cases are categorized, the conclusion is uniform: courts do not balance.
15. Of course, the common law did not stop in 1890. In fact, its development continues today. But the Article focuses only on the common law at the stage in which it
fleshes out the legislative history—the common law of 1890.
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three of the sources—the legislative history, Chicago School,
and Post-Chicago School—support this factor, and that the
fourth—the common law—is neutral. The Section concludes
that courts should consider procompetitive justifications as an
element of the Rule of Reason analysis.
Section D explores the inquiries as to whether a restraint is
reasonably necessary and whether there are less restrictive alternatives. This Section finds that the sources come to contrary
conclusions on the factors. The common law would provide substantial approval to courts’ consideration of both inquiries, but
the Chicago School would not. The other two sources would not
tilt the balance: the legislative history would be neutral and
the Post-Chicago School would provide, at most, marginal support. The Section concludes that the sources provide lukewarm
support for the factor. Section E addresses balancing. This Section concludes that the sources provide moderate approval for
this factor: the Chicago School would endorse a limited type of
balancing; the Post-Chicago School would champion broad balancing; and the legislative history and common law would be
neutral on the factor. The sources thus offer tentative support
for balancing.
Part III continues the normative analysis and supplements
the conclusions of Part II by examining the capacities of courts.
It first asks, as a matter of theory, whether courts can analyze
each of the four factors of a Rule of Reason analysis. It then reviews the cases in the survey to determine whether the empirical results conform to the conclusions based on hypothesis. Section A concludes that courts can, as a matter of theory and
practice, examine anticompetitive effect. Section B arrives at
the same conclusion for procompetitive justifications.
Section C finds that courts can determine whether a restraint is reasonably necessary but that they cannot conduct an
analysis based on less restrictive alternatives. This finding,
combined with the marginal support provided by the sources,
leads to the conclusion that courts should not consider the factor of less restrictive alternatives in conducting analysis under
the Rule of Reason. This Section also recommends a shift in the
burden of proving reasonable necessity from the plaintiff showing the absence of reasonable necessity to the defendant demonstrating its presence. Such a shift would conform with the
parties’ varying levels of access to evidence and would remedy
the courts’ misunderstanding of the nature of the burden. As a
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result of the shift, this Article recommends combining the second and third stages of the current Rule of Reason analysis,
thus requiring the defendant to demonstrate that the restraint
is reasonably necessary to achieve a legitimate procompetitive
objective. Section D hesitantly concludes that courts can balance. This conclusion would be strengthened if courts continually referenced the overriding goals of consumer welfare and
interbrand competition throughout balancing.
Part IV wraps up by exploring the consequences of this Article. Primarily, it examines the likely effects of bridging the
disconnect between what practitioners and courts think courts
do (balance), on the one hand, and what courts actually do (not
balance), on the other. It also explores the consequences of removing the less restrictive alternative analysis from the equation.16 Section A looks to the effect on the parties. It concludes
that a shift in thinking to accord with reality would decrease
the number of suits filed and would focus the parties’ attention
to a greater extent on the relevant factors in a Rule of Reason
analysis (in particular) and competition (in general). Section B
looks to the effect on courts. Admittedly, there would be less of
an effect on courts. Even though they repeatedly cite the prescription that they are to balance anticompetitive and procompetitive effects,17 the courts usually require the parties to clear
the initial stages before balancing. The bridging of the disconnect nonetheless would have salutary effects, in particular by
bringing the language and reasoning of antitrust opinions in
line with the results, thereby enhancing the legitimacy of antitrust courts. Moreover, the elimination of the analysis based on
less restrictive alternatives would prevent post hoc secondguessing of the defendant’s justifications.
I. NONBALANCING UNDER THE RULE OF REASON: THE SURVEY
In only 20 out of 495 cases decided under the Rule of Rea16. The shift in the burden of production on reasonable necessity should not have
significant repercussions.
17. When confronted with Rule of Reason cases, courts usually cite Justice
Brandeis’s instruction in Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States to consider
the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect,
actual or probable[, as well as] [t]he history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, [and] the purpose or end sought
to be attained.

246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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son in the modern era have courts balanced the anticompetitive
and procompetitive effects of the restraints at issue.18 Part I divides the universe of Rule of Reason analysis into six types of
restraints: (1) vertical territorial, customer, and other similar
restraints; (2) refusals to deal; (3) exclusive dealing arrangements; (4) tying arrangements; (5) unfair competition practices;
and (6) association rules and practices. Each of the Sections of
this Part initially provides a brief description of the types of restraints. They then calculate and array the instances of each
stage of resolution: anticompetitive effect, procompetitive justification, reasonable necessity, less restrictive alternatives, and
balancing. Finally, the Sections provide synopses of cases in
which courts conducted balancing and offer instances of courts’
application of the burden-shifting construct.
A. Vertical Restraints
Ever since the Supreme Court’s decision in Sylvania,19
courts have applied the Rule of Reason to vertical nonprice restraints.20 Vertical restraints occur at different levels of the distribution chain, typically between manufacturers or suppliers,
on the one hand, and dealers or distributors, on the other.21
Such restraints generally reduce intrabrand competition—
competition among the distributors of a product of a particular
manufacturer22—by limiting various types of competition
among the distributors.23 On the other hand, vertical restraints
18. This Article uses the term “restraints” to refer to the agreements or arrangements at issue. It is used in a broad sense and has no normative implications.
19. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
20. Sylvania overturned the emphasis on whether a manufacturer had passed
title to a product to the dealer—holding vertical restraints to be per se illegal if title
had passed, but analyzed under the Rule of Reason if it had not—that the Court had
imposed in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). See Sylvania,
433 U.S. at 52, 58-59. The Sylvania Court recognized the complex effect of vertical restraints on competition because of the “potential for a simultaneous reduction of intrabrand competition and stimulation of interbrand competition.” Id. at 51-52. The
Court confirmed that interbrand competition “is the primary concern of antitrust law.”
Id. at 52 n.19. It also explained that the exploitation of intrabrand market power often
would be counterbalanced by interbrand competition, through which consumers could
always turn to different brands of a product. See id.
21. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 606 (1972); Crane &
Shovel Sales Corp. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 854 F.2d 802, 805 (6th Cir. 1988); VII AREEDA,
supra note 3, ¶ 1437, at 3-4.
22. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52 n.19.
23. See id. at 54; VIII PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1602, at 23 (1989).
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often promote interbrand competition—competition among the
manufacturers of the same generic product24—by allowing
manufacturers to achieve efficiencies (such as economies of
scale) in product distribution. For example, manufacturers entering a market may use the restrictions to encourage dealers
to invest capital and labor in their product.25 Or the restraints
may allow established manufacturers to induce dealers “to engage in promotional activities or to provide service and repair
facilities.”26 Such restrictions also may prevent “free-riding” by
allowing dealers to recoup their investment.27
1. Territorial, customer, and other restrictions
Vertical nonprice restraints include territorial, customer,
and other similar restrictions. A manufacturer might designate
certain territories in which dealers are encouraged to distribute, or are prohibited from distributing, its products.28 Or the
manufacturer could impose customer restraints by requiring
distributors to sell only to certain customers, by requiring sale
directly to customers, or by prohibiting certain types of distribution, for example, mail order sales.29 The manufacturer could
decide to add a new distributor or to prohibit a dealer’s transfer
of ownership without consent.30 Or a franchisor could decide
24. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52 n.19.
25. Id. at 55; Westman Comm’n Co. v. Hobart Int’l, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216, 1227
(10th Cir. 1986).
26. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55; see also Hobart, 796 F.2d at 1227; Cowley v. Braden
Indus., Inc., 613 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1980).
27. An oft-quoted example of free-riding occurs when a dealer provides helpful
customer service (perhaps by hiring employees to explain and demonstrate the qualities of a product) and is thereby forced to raise the price of the product. Yet the ungrateful customer may, after receiving this service, buy the product from a competing
dealer that offers limited services but lower prices. See VIII AREEDA, supra note 23, ¶
1601, at 14; 1 JULIAN O. VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE
REGULATION § 19.01[2], at 19-3 (1998); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 927 n.3 (1979) [hereinafter Posner, Chicago
School].
28. See, e.g., Jayco Sys., Inc. v. Savin Bus. Machs. Corp., 777 F.2d 306 (5th Cir.
1985); Cowley v. Braden Indus., Inc., 613 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1980); Laurence J. Gordon,
Inc. v. Brandt, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 1144, 1153 (W.D. Wash. 1983); see generally VIII
AREEDA, supra note 23, ¶ 1600, at 5.
29. See, e.g., Sports Ctr., Inc. v. Riddell, Inc., 673 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1982);
American Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Panasonic Indus. Co., No. Civ.A.87-4461, 1988 WL 76220
(E.D. La. July 12, 1988); O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1274 (C.D.
Cal. 1985).
30. See, e.g., Desai v. Impacta, S.A., No. Civ.A.89-4817, 1990 WL 132709 (D.N.J.
Sept. 7, 1990); Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. v. Del Monte Corp., No. Civ.A.CA3-88-3012-D,
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not to grant an additional franchise or to require franchisees to
act consistently.31
a. The results. The courts found that the plaintiff failed to
demonstrate a significant anticompetitive effect in 105 out of
118 cases (89%) involving vertical restraints. Nine of the cases
did not fall into any category, as the courts, without considering the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects, found that
the restraint at issue was not an unreasonable restraint of
trade32 (or that there was no evidence of an unreasonable restraint33), was reasonable,34 was an unreasonable restraint,35 or
was anticompetitive.36 Courts did not decide any of the cases on
the ground that the defendant failed to demonstrate a procom1990 WL 291495 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 1990).
31. See, e.g., Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1055
(E.D. Pa. 1996); Great Clips, Inc. v. Levine, No. CIV.3-90-211, 1991 WL 322975 (D.
Minn. Oct. 9, 1991); Blanton Enters., Inc. v. Burger King Corp., 680 F. Supp. 753
(D.S.C. 1988); Blaine v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 1107 (D.
Conn. 1987).
32. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 694 F.2d 1132, 1139-40 (9th
Cir. 1982); Northeastern Educ. Television v. Educational Television Ass’n, 758 F. Supp.
1568, 1578 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
A court’s summary conclusion that a restraint is reasonable or unreasonable
or its finding that there is no evidence of an unreasonable (or a reasonable) restraint
cannot be viewed as a type of balancing for two related reasons. First, the court’s failure to explicitly discuss anticompetitive or procompetitive effects precludes an assumption that the court considered these effects. A finding of reasonableness or its opposite
may be a “gut reaction” as much as it may be implicit balancing, and in the absence of
even a mention of anticompetitive or procompetitive effects, we cannot superimpose on
the court, post hoc, an intention to balance. Second, even deferring to the court’s unsupported conclusions leads to ambiguous results. For example, a court, in finding that
there is no evidence of an unreasonable restraint, could mean that there is no evidence
of (a) anticompetitive effects outweighing procompetitive effects or (b) any anticompetitive effects at all. Similarly, the unsupported conclusion that a practice is reasonable or
unreasonable may imply either implicit balancing or the absence of the countervailing
factor (i.e., the absence of an anticompetitive effect if the restraint is found to be reasonable). Therefore, the summary conclusions reached by courts when examining each
of the six types of restraints that there is no evidence of an unreasonable (or reasonable) restraint or that a restraint is reasonable or unreasonable or anticompetitive or
procompetitive do not fit into any of the categories of the Rule of Reason analysis explored by this Article.
33. See Lee Klinger Volkswagen, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 583 F.2d 910, 915 (7th
Cir. 1978); National Auto Brokers Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 572 F.2d 953, 960 (2d
Cir. 1978).
34. See Mularkey v. Holsum Bakery, Inc., 146 F.3d 1064, 1065 (9th Cir. 1998);
Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 465 F. Supp. 195, 222-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 442 F. Supp. 1366, 1368 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
35. See Eiberger v. Sony Corp., 622 F.2d 1068, 1076-81 (2d Cir. 1980).
36. See Munters Corp. v. Burgess Indus. Inc., No. 75.Civ.4622, 1978 WL 1367, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 1978).
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petitive justification. One court held that the defendant showed
that the restraint was reasonably necessary to achieve its objectives.37 In only 3 out of 118 cases (2.5%) did the courts balance the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of the restraint.
b. Three instances of balancing. In New York v. AnheuserBusch, Inc.,38 the court upheld a system of territorial restraints
that a brewer-manufacturer imposed on its distributors. The
court found that the “numerous beneficial effects on interbrand
competition,”39 namely maintaining quality by mandating investment, encouraging advertising and promotion, enabling
more efficient distribution, and improving the performance of
customer services,40 “dramatically outweighed”41 limited intrabrand effects. The court also found that the defendant
lacked market power.42
One case in which an adverse effect on intrabrand competition did affect interbrand competition is Graphic Products Distributors, Inc. v. Itek Corp.43 In Itek, a manufacturer with a 70%
market share44 granted exclusionary territories to its distributors. The defendant’s market power provided the rare setting in
which intrabrand competition “was an important source of
competitive pressure on price”45 and in which the foreclosure of
such competition could have “substantially adverse effects on
price competition and consumer welfare.”46 The court also
found that the defendant’s proffered procompetitive justifications—providing adequate servicing and enhancing market

37. See Newberry v. Washington Post Co., 438 F. Supp. 470, 475 (D.D.C. 1977).
38. 811 F. Supp. 848 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
39. Id. at 876.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 877.
42. See id. at 873 (noting that defendant had small market share, there were no
significant entry barriers, and the market was characterized by intense price competition). The court did not rest its holding on a lack of market power because of the decision in Eiberger v. Sony Corp., 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980), which held that an anticompetitive effect on intrabrand competition alone could constitute an unreasonable
restraint. See id. at 1081. The court in Eiberger may not yet have been operating under
the mandate of Sylvania. See Anheuser-Busch, 811 F. Supp. at 872 n.69 (“The outcome
in Eiberger may have resulted more from the case’s timing than its factual circumstances. . . . [T]he trial occurred while Schwinn was still the law of the land.”).
43. 717 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1983).
44. See id. at 1570.
45. Id. at 1575.
46. Id.
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penetration—were not reasonably necessary to achieve the defendant’s goals.47
In Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co.,48 the court upheld a
change in a newspaper’s distribution system by which the
newspaper replaced independent contract carriers with its own
delivery agents.49 The court found that “the procompetitive effects generated by optimum monopoly pricing50 and the unique
nature of a newspaper’s revenues51 outweighed the minimal
anticompetitive effect of eliminating potential competition.”52
2. Refusal-to-deal cases
A refusal to deal can take multiple forms. A manufacturer
may select distributors with whom it will deal or it may terminate existing distributors.53 A supplier may decide not to deal
with a particular purchaser,54 or vice versa.55 A hospital or
group of medical providers may refuse membership to a doctor.56 Refusal-to-deal cases also may have a horizontal compo47. See id. at 1577-78.
48. 727 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1984).
49. See id. at 694-95.
50. Under an optimum monopoly pricing theory, a monopolist’s vertical integration into a second market would not increase the price of the item in the second market
because a monopolist could still only charge the price at which marginal cost equals
marginal revenue. See id. at 701.
51. Because advertising constitutes a significant portion of a newspaper’s revenues, the newspaper would have a greater incentive than would contract carriers “to
keep the retail price as low as possible in order to increase circulation,” which would
increase advertising revenues. Id.
52. Id. at 704 (internal footnotes added).
53. See, e.g., Sportswear Design, Inc. v. Canstar Sports USA, Inc., Nos. 93-2242,
93-2294, 1995 WL 675615 (6th Cir. Nov. 9, 1995); R.W. Int’l Corp. v. Welch Food, Inc.,
13 F.3d 478 (1st Cir. 1994); Crane & Shovel Sales Corp. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 854 F.2d
802 (6th Cir. 1988); Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 833 F.2d 208
(9th Cir. 1987); Filter Queen, Inc. v. Health-Mor Inc., No. 89C5511, 1990 WL 36824
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 1990).
54. See, e.g., Scott & Fetzer Co. v. Peterson, No. 86-C-29-C, 1987 WL 110400
(W.D. Wis. June 1, 1987); Family Boating Ctr., Inc. v. Washington Area Marine Dealers Ass’n, No. 81-694, 1982 WL 1815 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 1982).
55. See, e.g., Great Escape, Inc. v. Union City Body Co., 791 F.2d 532 (7th Cir.
1986); Wimer v. Holzapfel, 868 F. Supp. 844 (E.D. Tex. 1994).
56. See, e.g., BCB Anesthesia Care, Ltd. v. Passavant Mem’l Area Hosp. Ass’n, 36
F.3d 664, 667-68 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing cases); Lie v. St. Joseph Hosp., 964 F.2d 567
(6th Cir. 1992); Tarabishi v. McAlester Reg’l Hosp., 951 F.2d 1558 (10th Cir. 1991); Oksanen v. Page Mem’l Hosp., 945 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1991); Minnesota Ass’n of Nurse
Anesthetists v. Unity Hosp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 694 (D. Minn. 1998); Davies v. Genesis Med.
Ctr., 994 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Iowa 1998); Ginzburg v. Memorial Healthcare Sys., Inc.,
993 F. Supp. 998 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
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nent—e.g., where a manufacturer conspires with a dealer to
boycott competitor dealers—and courts sometimes apply Rule
of Reason analysis to these agreements.57
a. The results. The nonbalancing continues in these cases.
The courts dismissed 133 out of 142 refusal-to-deal cases it decided under the Rule of Reason, or 94%, at the initial stage,
finding that the plaintiff failed to prove a significant anticompetitive effect. Two cases were dismissed at the second stage on
the ground that the defendant failed to come forward with legitimate procompetitive justifications.58 Five of the cases did
not fall into any category, as the courts found that there was no
unreasonable restraint59 or affirmed jury verdicts of reasonable60 or unreasonable61 restraints of trade. Finally, the courts
balanced the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of the
restraint at issue in only 2 out of 142 cases (1.4%).
b. Two instances of balancing. In Williamson v. Sacred
Heart Hospital,62 a radiologist challenged a refusal to deal by
an HMO. The court concluded that “the procompetitive benefit
of allowing consumers the choice of an additional HMO outweighs the anticompetitive effect of the HMO structure.”63 The
court also recognized the lack of anticompetitive effect: the defendant had a market share of only 8%, its presence did not
“appear . . . [to have] resulted in any detriment to competition,”64 and the plaintiff competed successfully in the market.65
The second case conducted balancing even though it too
could have disposed of the case based on a lack of significant

57. See, e.g., Doctor’s Hosp., Inc. v. Southeast Med. Alliance, Inc., 123 F.3d 301
(5th Cir. 1997); Retina Assocs., P.A. v. Southern Baptist Hosp., Inc., 105 F.3d 1376
(11th Cir. 1997); Thurman Indus., Inc. v. Pay ‘n Pak Stores, Inc., 875 F.2d 1369 (9th
Cir. 1989).
58. See Wilk v. American Med. Ass’n, 895 F.2d 352, 362 (7th Cir. 1990); International Wood Processors v. Power Dry, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 710, 722 (D.S.C. 1984).
59. See W.W. Blackburn v. Crum & Forster, 611 F.2d 102, 105 (5th Cir. 1980);
Bernard v. Curtis Circulation and Manor Books, Inc., No. 77 C 1415, 1978 WL 1364, at
*3 (E.D.N.Y. June 15, 1978).
60. See Fulton v. Hecht, 580 F.2d 1243, 1249 (5th Cir. 1978).
61. See American Computech, Inc. v. National Med. Care, Inc., No. CV-84-1565S, 1992 WL 66641, at *4 (9th Cir. Apr. 3, 1992); Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,
Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 955-56, 983 (10th Cir. 1990).
62. No. 89-30084-RV, 1993 WL 543002 (N.D. Fla. May 28, 1993), aff’d, 41 F.3d
667 (11th Cir. 1994).
63. Id. at *50.
64. Id.
65. See id.
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anticompetitive effect. In Robinson v. Magovern,66 a surgeon
challenged a hospital’s denial of staff privileges. The court
stated that the procompetitive effects of the hospital’s staffing
policy outweighed the anticompetitive effects.67 By granting
staff privileges only to applicants “who meet very high standards,”68 the hospital increased interbrand competition and
“raise[d] the prevailing level of care”69 for the public. Although
the court stated that the anticompetitive effects of the policy
were “not severe”70—because a surgeon would have access to
other hospital facilities in the market—the court could have
concluded that harm suffered by one doctor did not constitute
an adverse effect on competition. In short, the two “balancing”
cases in the refusal-to-deal context could have been resolved on
the ground that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate an anticompetitive effect.
c. Instances of burden-shifting. A handful of refusal-to-deal
cases have explicitly articulated the three-stage burdenshifting analysis. In these cases, the courts typically have dismissed the case on the ground that the plaintiff failed to carry
its initial burden of showing a significant anticompetitive effect.71 The cases also confirm the benefits of the burden-shifting
construct. In particular, the paradigm prevents the plaintiff
from blinding the court with the alleged absence of a procompetitive justification in circumstances where the court should
not even be looking at the issue because of the lack of anticompetitive effect.72
66. 521 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
67. See id. at 919.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123,
128-30 (2d Cir. 1995); Flegel v. Christian Hosp., N.E.-N.W., 4 F.3d 682, 688-91 (8th Cir.
1993); Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 546-47
(2d Cir. 1993); Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1413-14 (9th Cir. 1991); Ginzburg v. Memorial Healthcare Sys., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 998, 1026-27 (S.D. Tex. 1997);
Nationwide R.A.C. Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., No. C-96-2877 FMS, 1997 WL 88399,
at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 1997); Bogan v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 953 F. Supp.
532, 549-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Patel v. Scotland Mem’l Hosp., No. 3:94CV00284, 1995
WL 319213, at *6 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 1995).
72. See Capital Imaging Assocs., 996 F.2d at 547 (stating that a demonstration of
procompetitive justifications is unnecessary where plaintiff has not carried initial burden of showing anticompetitive effect: “[o]nly after a plaintiff has successfully met its
initial burden under the rule of reason must an antitrust defendant offer evidence to
exonerate its conduct.”); Patel, 1995 WL 319213, at *1 n.4 (dismissing plaintiff’s argu-
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3. Exclusive dealing
An exclusive dealing agreement typically requires a buyer
to purchase products or services from a particular seller for an
extended period of time.73 One type of exclusive dealing arrangement, a requirements contract, provides that the buyer
will purchase all of its requirements from the seller.74 Under
another type of arrangement, an output contract, a seller supplies all of its output to the buyer.75 The concern with exclusive
dealing agreements is that they foreclose a segment of the
market from competing purchasers.76 On the other hand, such
agreements can have procompetitive benefits, such as enlisting
dealers to promote a seller’s product and discouraging free riding.77
a. The results. Courts dismissed 62 out of 70, or 89% of, exclusive dealing cases on account of the plaintiffs’ failure to
demonstrate a significant anticompetitive effect. One case was
dismissed for the defendant’s failure to show a procompetitive
effect.78 Six of the cases do not fit into any category, as courts
summarily found that the agreement was an unreasonable restraint of trade,79 was not an unreasonable restraint,80 was reament that defendants “have failed to set forth any pro-competitive justifications for
their actions” because these explanations are required only where plaintiff satisfies
initial burden of showing anticompetitive effect).
73. See XI HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1800, at 3 (1998); 1 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note
27, § 23.01[1] at 23-2.
74. See, e.g., City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 955 F.2d 641 (10th
Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Lab. Corp., 117
F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1997); TCA Bldg. Co. v. Northwestern Resources Co., 873 F. Supp.
29 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Taggart v. Rutledge, 657 F. Supp. 1420 (D. Mont. 1987); XI
HOVENKAMP, supra note 73, ¶ 1800, at 4.
75. See, e.g., Garshman v. Universal Resources Holding Inc., 824 F.2d 223 (3d
Cir. 1987); XI HOVENKAMP, supra note 73, ¶ 1800, at 4.
76. This foreclosure is a type of adverse effect on competition. See, e.g., M & H
Tire Co. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 733 F.2d 973, 987 (1st Cir. 1984); Satellite Television & Associated Resources, Inc. v. Continental Cablevision, Inc., 714 F.2d 351, 35758 (4th Cir. 1983); Contractor Util. Sales Co. v. Certain-Teed Prods. Corp., 638 F.2d
1061, 1078-79 (7th Cir. 1981).
77. See, e.g., Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215, 1234 & n.17 (8th Cir.
1987); XI HOVENKAMP, supra note 73, ¶ 1812, at 130-36.
78. See Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles O. Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1291,
1304-05 (9th Cir. 1982).
79. See Oltz v. St. Peter’s Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1448 (9th Cir. 1988);
Fishman v. Wirtz, Nos. 74-C-2814, 78-C-3621, 1981 WL 2153, at *56 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28,
1981).
80. See Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 658 F.2d 139, 150-51 (3d Cir.
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sonable,81 or promoted competition.82 In only 1 of the 70 cases
(1.4%) did a court conduct any inquiry akin to balancing.
b. One instance of balancing. In Servicetrends, Inc. v. Siemens Medical Systems, Inc.,83 the court upheld an exclusive
dealing agreement. It found that the foreclosure of 32 to 38% of
the market, together with the longstanding practice at issue
and the asserted business justifications for the agreement, led
to the conclusion that the agreements did not “substantially
foreclose”84 competition. The court’s consideration of foreclosure
and the defendant’s justifications can be viewed, most broadly,
as a form of balancing.
c. Instance of burden-shifting. The case of Calculators Hawaii, Inc. v. Brandt, Inc.85 illustrates the benefits of the burden-shifting approach. In particular, the case is an example of
the paradigm operating to prevent courts from being distracted
by an alleged absence of procompetitive benefit when they
should (at least initially) be focusing on anticompetitive effect.
The court in Brandt reversed a lower court’s judgment for the
plaintiff that had been based on the insufficiency of the defendant’s justification. The appellate court observed that the
manufacturer’s refusal to sell repair parts to a dealer, on account of an exclusive dealing agreement into which it had entered with another dealer, was “simply insufficient”86 to prove
anticompetitive effect.
4. Tying
In a tying arrangement, a seller agrees to sell a product to a
buyer only on the condition that the buyer purchases a second
product from it, or agrees not to purchase a product from another supplier.87 Courts have found tying agreements to be per
se unlawful if four factors are present: (1) two separate prod-

1981).
81. See National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass’n, 507 F. Supp. 1113,
1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d, 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981).
82. See Gemini Concerts, Inc. v. Triple-A Baseball Club Assocs., 664 F. Supp. 24,
27 (D. Me. 1987); Woodbury Daily Times Co. v. Los Angeles Times-Washington Post
News Serv., 616 F. Supp. 502, 511 (D.N.J. 1985).
83. 870 F. Supp. 1042 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
84. Id. at 1066.
85. 724 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1983).
86. Id. at 1337.
87. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
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ucts or services; (2) an agreement to sell one product conditioned on the sale of another; (3) economic power in the tying
product market; and (4) a not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce in the tied product market.88 Courts also have
examined such agreements under the Rule of Reason. In doing
so, they require a showing of an anticompetitive effect in the
tied product market.89 Tying agreements include more subtle
forms of conditioning such as “line forcing” agreements, by
which a manufacturer agrees to license a dealer to sell its
products, but only on the condition that the dealer sells a full
or a representative line of the products.90 The concern with tying arrangements is that a supplier can enhance its market
power by forcing a purchaser to buy a product that it may not
wish to purchase.91
a. The results. In the tying cases in which courts applied the
Rule of Reason, 29 out of 33, or 88%, were dismissed because
the plaintiff failed to show a significant anticompetitive effect.
One case was dismissed because the defendant failed to offer a
procompetitive justification.92 Two cases did not fall into any
category, as the courts found the agreement to be reasonable93
or affirmed a jury verdict of unreasonableness.94 Only one case
(3%) involved balancing.
88. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-64
(1992).
89. See, e.g., Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Techs., Inc., 73 F.3d 756, 761-63
(7th Cir. 1996); L.A.P.D., Inc. v. General Elec. Corp., No. 94-C-664, 1994 WL 424120, at
*4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 1994); Reisner v. General Motors Corp., 511 F. Supp. 1167, 117879 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
90. See, e.g., Southern Card & Novelty, Inc. v. Lawson Mardon Label, Inc., 138
F.3d 869 (11th Cir. 1998); Smith Mach. Co. v. Hesston Corp., 878 F.2d 1290 (10th Cir.
1989); Ransomes Am. Corp. v. Spartan Distribs., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 183 (W.D. Mich.
1996).
91. For an argument that tying cannot increase market power in the tied product
market, because “an increase in the price charged for the tied product will . . . reduce
the price that the purchaser is willing to pay for the tying product,” see Posner, Chicago School, supra note 27, at 926; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 143-44 (1984) [hereinafter
Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements]; Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional
Economics: Farewell to the Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1997) (contending
that tying arrangements are not the result of coercion).
92. See Barber & Ross Co. v. Lifetime Doors, Inc., 810 F.2d 1276, 1280 (4th Cir.
1987) (noting that plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to support finding that defendant’s justification was pretext).
93. See Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998).
94. See Parts and Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 826 F.2d 712, 721 (7th
Cir. 1987).
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b. One instance of balancing. In Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru,
Inc.,95 the court reversed a judgment for a plaintiff car dealer
who was required, in purchasing cars from a regional distributor, to purchase spare parts kits. It concluded that the plaintiff
failed to show that the anticompetitive effects outweighed “legitimate . . . business justifications”96 such as making certain
that dealers had enough spare parts on hand to make repairs.97
Balancing was unnecessary: the court found that the defendants had a “miniscule”98 market share in the tying product,
that there was no actual anticompetitive effect in the tied
product market,99 and that the tie had, at most, “trivial effects.”100
B. Horizontal Arrangements
Courts have examined horizontal arrangements, or arrangements between competitors,101 under both the per se rule
and the Rule of Reason. Because many of these arrangements
do not typically have any procompetitive benefits, courts have
applied per se treatment to such horizontal activities as price
fixing,102 agreements to limit output,103 and agreements to allocate markets.104 Nonetheless, some horizontal arrangements
have received treatment under the Rule of Reason as well.
1. Unfair competition
Certain types of horizontal arrangements can broadly be
grouped under the heading “unfair competition.” For example,
plaintiffs have challenged the appropriation of confidential records and customer lists by former employees,105 the appropria95. 858 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1988).
96. Id. at 799.
97. See id. at 793.
98. Id. at 797.
99. See id. at 799.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972); Crane &
Shovel Sales Corp. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 854 F.2d 802, 805 (6th Cir. 1988); 1 VON
KALINOWSKI, supra note 27, § 8.03[4], at 8-30.
102. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
103. See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
104. See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990); Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596
(1972); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
105. See, e.g., Military Servs. Realty, Inc. v. Realty Consultants, Ltd., 823 F.2d
829 (4th Cir. 1987); H.J. Hodes & Co. v. Triangle Brass & Specialties Co., No. 79-0673-
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tion of more general opportunities,106 and verbal attacks or
defamation.107 Additionally, plaintiffs have challenged particular agreements, such as restrictive covenants,108 covenants not
to compete,109 and blanket licenses.110 Although many of these
actions may constitute, for example, state-law business torts,
they typically do not present an injury to competition.
a. The results. Of the 69 unfair competition cases courts
have examined under the Rule of Reason, 58, or 84%, were
dismissed on account of the plaintiff’s failure to show a significant anticompetitive effect. Three cases did not fall into any
category, as the court summarily found the challenged activity
to be a reasonable111 or an unreasonable112 restraint, or it affirmed a verdict that a restraint was anticompetitive.113 Courts
in three cases (4.5%) found that the defendant failed to show a
legitimate procompetitive justification.114 One court disposed of
a case by finding that the restraint was reasonably necessary.115 In four cases (6%), the courts balanced anticompetitive
and procompetitive effects.
b. Four instances of balancing. In two of the balancing
cases, the courts could have disposed of the case on the ground
CV-W-3, 1979 WL 1804 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 11, 1979).
106. See, e.g., Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 1998).
107. See, e.g., Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1992); Bushnell Corp.
v. ITT Corp., 973 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Kan. 1997).
108. See, e.g., Goodman v. Acme Mkts., Inc., Civ.A.No.88-6447, 1989 WL 42484
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 1989); Coleman v. General Elec. Co., 643 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D. Tenn.
1986).
109. See, e.g., Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1983); Caremark
Homecare, Inc. v. New England Critical Care, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Minn. 1988);
Westgo Indus., Inc. v. W.J. King Co., Civ. No. A3-75-82, 1981 WL 2064 (D.N.D. Mar.
31, 1981).
110. See, e.g., F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop, No. 81-1333, 1982 WL
19198 (7th Cir. Mar. 25, 1982); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. American Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980); National Cable Television
Ass’n v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 614 (D.D.C. 1991).
111. See Burchett v. General Tel. Co., 699 F. Supp. 114, 119 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
112. See International Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. Western Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d
1255, 1268 (8th Cir. 1980).
113. See Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 624 F.2d 1342, 1353
(5th Cir. 1980).
114. See In re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass’n, 955 F.2d 457, 471-72 (6th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 153-54 (E.D. Wis. 1983), aff’d,
756 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1985); Countrie Butcher Shoppe, Inc. v. Foodarama Supermarkets, Inc., No. 81-5336, 1982 WL 1909, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 1982).
115. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758, 767-72 (D.
Del. 1981), aff’d, 691 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1982).
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that the plaintiff failed to allege a significant anticompetitive
effect. In Jetro Cash & Carry Enterprises, Inc. v. Food Distribution Center,116 the court upheld a restrictive covenant that allowed vendors to sell their products in only 18 acres of a 400acre section of a market and prescribed the hours during which
such products could be sold.117 The court found that, in light of
the large geographic market and close proximity of other markets, “the covenant simply [did] not have a significant adverse
effect on competition.”118 Rather than dismiss the case on this
showing, however, the court found it “more important[]”119 that
the restraints, by creating a “segregated market,”120 had procompetitive benefits: bringing together buyers and sellers and
facilitating quality and price comparison.121 The court concluded that “the insignificant adverse impact on trade is outweighed by the benefits.”122
Similarly, in Net Realty Holding Trust v. Franconia Properties, Inc.,123 the court upheld a restrictive covenant requiring
certain stores in a mall to operate as department stores for particular periods of time.124 The court found that the covenant
had a “very slight” anticompetitive effect as it affected only a
fraction of 1% of the market.125 It nonetheless considered the
“many” procompetitive effects of the covenant: facilitating cost
comparison and combating the free-rider problem by allowing
“anchor” stores to recoup the benefit of contributing to the success of the mall.126 The court concluded that the “minimal anticompetitive impact”127 of the covenant is “far outweighed by
[its] procompetitive effects.”128
The other two balancing cases, in which the courts found
the anticompetitive effects to predominate, reveal some of the
dangers of balancing. In United States v. North Dakota Hospi116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

569 F. Supp. 1404 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
See id. at 1407-08.
Id. at 1416.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
No. 82-0318-A, 1983 WL 1786 (E.D. Va. Jan. 20, 1983).
See id. at *1.
Id. at *7.
See id. at *7-*8.
Id. at *8.
Id.
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tal Ass’n,129 nonprofit hospitals (with operating margins 2 to 3%
above cost) and a hospital association billed customers based on
their actual costs rather than granting discounts.130 The Indian
Health Service (“IHS”), an agency of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, entered into contracts with the hospitals for the treatment of eligible Native
Americans.131 The local IHS then sought new contracts that
would provide for payment based on a discounted Medicaid
rate.132 The hospitals ultimately declined the reimbursement
rate but temporarily agreed to an “open market limitation” of
$10,000 per patient.133 The court’s treatment of anticompetitive
effect was flawed because it failed to define a market in which
IHS had market power, failed to credit properly the discounts
in fact applied by the $10,000 limit per patient,134 and recognized that the reimbursement method proposed by IHS was
“inherently anticompetitive”135 because it “remove[d] the financial incentive for price competition and cost containment.”136
The court also noted that the purpose of the restraint “was not
to maximize . . . profits, but to protect other patients and payers from having to absorb the cost of granting discounts to the
IHS.”137 Further, the procompetitive effects of the actions in
creating a “single standardized reimbursement methodology”138
facilitated price comparisons by purchasers. The court nonetheless concluded that “the anticompetitive harm of [the actions]
outweigh[ed] the procompetitive benefits.”139
In TV Signal Co. v. AT&T,140 the defendant telephone company enforced a policy of attaching a maximum of one cable per
129. 640 F. Supp. 1028 (D.N.D. 1986).
130. See id. at 1030-31, 1039.
131. See id. at 1030.
132. See id. at 1031.
133. Id. at 1032-34.
134. See id. at 1039 (conceding that the restraint “did not actually have [an] adverse effect on the price IHS paid for services”).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1038. See also id. at 1038-39 (explaining that the hospitals had endeavored to prevent shifting the cost of the Medicaid discount onto other patients and payors; moreover, IHS had “repeatedly run out of funds before the end of the fiscal year,
resulting in large sums of money for which the hospitals were never paid for services
rendered to IHS patients”).
138. Id. at 1039.
139. Id.
140. No. Civ.70-6N, 1981 WL 2049 (D.S.D. Mar. 13, 1981).
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telephone pole to the detriment of the plaintiff cable television
company.141 The court conceded that, even “in spite of
[d]efendants’ [p]olicy,”142 the plaintiff was able to enter the
market. Not only did the court fail to examine any effect on
competition, but it also neglected to review defendants’ claimed
justifications for the policy: “[s]uch legitimate reasons may well
exist, but when they travel in company with a significant anticompetitive purpose and effect, they cannot sanitize the
[d]efendants’ [p]olicy.”143
c. Instances of burden-shifting. In Clorox Co. v. Sterling
Winthrop, Inc.,144 the court articulated the burden-shifting
paradigm and found no anticompetitive effect.145 The court recognized that its discussion of procompetitive effects was “immaterial” since the plaintiff did not meet its initial burden of
showing a significant anticompetitive effect.146
The court in Jim Forno’s Continental Motors, Inc. v. Subaru
Distributors Corp.147 illustrated the dangers of not following the
construct. In this case, the court found no anticompetitive effect but nonetheless accepted the argument by the plaintiff—
who was seeking “to resurrect his complaint”148—that proof of
anticompetitive effect is not necessary if the restraint does not
have a procompetitive justification.149 Even though the court in
Jim Forno’s indicated that the plaintiff was stretching the case
law,150 it addressed the plaintiff’s radical theory on its own
terms: “[W]e do not believe that the challenged action, as a
matter of law, could have no procompetitive effect.”151 Adherence to the burden-shifting approach would prevent such errors.

141. See id. at *2; see also TV Signal Co. v. AT&T, 617 F.2d 1302, 1305 (8th Cir.
1980).
142. T.V. Signal Co. v. AT&T, 1981 WL 2049, at *5.
143. Id.
144. 117 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1997).
145. See id. at 56-57.
146. See id. at 59-60. Another Second Circuit decision recognized the benefits of
the initial requirement of anticompetitive effect, which “ensures that otherwise routine
disputes between business competitors do not escalate to the status of an antitrust action.” Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1998).
147. 649 F. Supp. 746 (N.D.N.Y. 1986).
148. Id. at 754.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. Id.
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2. Trade association rules and activities
Trade associations typically consist of companies sharing a
common interest in an industry.152 Although such associations
often promote competition, they have the potential to harm
competition, in particular, by promulgating certain rules,153 excluding prospective members,154 and disciplining current members.155 Because courts have recognized that associations need
certain criteria and rules to exist and function,156 the question
addressed by courts often is whether the restraint is reasonably necessary to attain the desired objective.157 By necessity,
then, the instances of balancing and inquiries of reasonable necessity promise to be higher in this area.
a. The results. The results bear out this prediction. In 31
out of 63 association cases (49%), the court disposed of the case
because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a significant anticompetitive effect. In 7 of the 63 cases (11%), the court found
that the defendant did not offer a legitimate procompetitive
justification.158 In 4 of the 63 cases (6%), the court found for the
defendant because the restraint was reasonably necessary159 or
152. See, e.g., 1 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 27, § 15.03, at 15-17.
153. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (rule for televising
product); National Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (canon of
ethics); Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478 (1st Cir. 1988) (product standard); Eliason Corp. v. National Sanitation Found., 614 F.2d 126 (6th Cir.
1980) (same); Weight-Rite Golf Corp. v. United States Golf Ass’n, 766 F. Supp. 1104
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (prohibiting use of certain equipment).
154. See, e.g., SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994); MidSouth Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983); In re Appraiser Found. Antitrust
Litig., 867 F. Supp. 1407 (D. Minn. 1994); Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, No. 80C1405, 1991 WL 5827 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 1991).
155. See, e.g., Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1996);
Wigod v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., No. 87C3743, 1989 WL 76865 (N.D. Ill. June 30,
1989); Martin v. American Kennel Club, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Catrone
v. Ogden Suffolk Downs, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 302 (D. Mass. 1988).
156. See, e.g., Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 598-99
(7th Cir. 1996); Thompson v. Metropolitan Multi-List, Inc., 934 F.2d 1566, 1580-81
(11th Cir. 1991); Brenner v. World Boxing Council, 675 F.2d 445, 454-55 (2d Cir. 1982).
157. See, e.g., SCFC ILC, Inc., 36 F.3d at 970; National Bancard Corp. v. Visa
U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 601 (11th Cir. 1986).
158. See Federal Trade Comm’n v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459,
462-64 (1986); Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 113-20; National Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435
U.S. at 693-96; Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1021-24 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 65 (1998); Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 674-76 (7th
Cir. 1992); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1186-87 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mardirosian v. American Inst. of Architects, 474 F. Supp. 628, 648-51 (D.D.C. 1979).
159. See SCFC ILC, Inc., 36 F.3d at 971-72 (association bylaw reasonably neces-
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the plaintiff was not able to prove a less restrictive alternative.160 Twelve of the cases did not fall into any category, as the
courts found the activity to be reasonable,161 procompetitive,162
or not an unreasonable restraint of trade.163 Finally, courts in
nine of the cases (14%) balanced the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of the restraint.
b. Nine instances of balancing. In 2 of the 9 balancing cases,
the court found not only that the procompetitive effects outweighed the anticompetitive effects but also that the plaintiff
failed to show an anticompetitive effect. In National Bancard
Corp. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc.,164 the court upheld an interchange
fee imposed by the financial institutions processing transactions in a credit card system.165 The court held that the procompetitive effects of the fee—attaining widespread acceptance
of the credit card system and allowing the creation of a product
that member banks could not produce by themselves—
outweighed any anticompetitive effects.166 The court also found
that the defendant, which possessed, at most, 5% of the relesary to prevent free riding in competitive market); Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356,
382-83 (D. Ariz. 1983) (sanctions reasonably related to objectives and not overbroad);
Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass’n, 511 F. Supp. 1103, 1117-21,
1124 (D. Neb.), aff’d, 665 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1981) (association guideline reasonably related to legitimate goals and no more extensive than necessary). Although the holdings
of these cases were based on reasonable necessity, the courts did not apply the burdenshifting construct.
160. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1319 (finding that association sanctions had anticompetitive and procompetitive effects but that plaintiff failed to show that association’s objectives could be achieved “in a substantially less restrictive manner”).
161. See McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344-45 (5th Cir. 1988); Independent Entertainment Group, Inc. v. NBA, 853 F. Supp. 333, 338-39 (C.D. Cal. 1994); Bishara v. American Bd. of Orthopaedic Surgery, Inc., No. 85C3400, 1986 WL 15265, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 1986); Cooney v. American Horse Shows Ass’n, 495 F. Supp. 424,
431-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Paralegal Inst., Inc. v. American Bar Ass’n, 475 F. Supp. 1123,
1130-31 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), aff’d, 622 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1980).
162. See Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v. San Fernando Valley Bd. of Realtors, 786
F.2d 1400, 1407 (9th Cir. 1986); Southtrust Corp. v. Plus Sys., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1517,
1524-25 (N.D. Ala. 1995).
163. See Consolidated Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anchor Sav. Ass’n, No. 79-2260,
1980 WL 4691, at *2 (10th Cir. July 24, 1980); Ackerman-Chillingworth v. Pacific Elec.
Contractors Ass’n, 579 F.2d 484, 491-92 (9th Cir. 1978); Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d
1136, 1140, 1153-54 (5th Cir. 1977); Western Trails, Inc. v. Camp Coast to Coast, Inc.,
Civ.A.No. 90-2063, 1994 WL 773361, at *2 (D.D.C. June 16, 1994); Admiral Theatre
Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 437 F. Supp. 1268, 1294-95 (D. Neb. 1977), modified, 585
F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1978).
164. 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir. 1986).
165. See id. at 594-95.
166. See id. at 605.
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vant market, did not have market power.167 In Plueckhahn v.
Farmers Insurance Exchange,168 the court considered an employment policy of a group of insurance companies that limited
conflicts of interest by preventing managerial employees in a
supervisory regional office from working for those they had
previously supervised.169 The court held that the procompetitive effects of preventing impropriety “clearly outweigh the hypothetical anticompetitive effects.”170 Again, the court could
have dismissed the case because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate anticompetitive effect, making balancing unnecessary.171
In Cantor v. Multiple Listing Service, Inc.,172 a finding of no
anticompetitive effect could have been made and would have
changed the outcome. The court invalidated a real estate multiple listing service bylaw that allowed only one type of sign—
that of the multiple listing service—to be posted on the property for sale.173 The court found that the anticompetitive effects
of the bylaw outweighed the justifications of distributing commissions among members of the service.174 But the anticompetitive effect alleged was only “a substantial adverse impact
on plaintiffs’ businesses.”175 Considering that the plaintiffs
were 2 of over 600 licensed real estate brokers in the local
market,176 the adverse effect appeared to be on a competitor
rather than on competition.177 With no adverse effect on competition, the restraint should have been upheld.
In two cases, the court found that the procompetitive effects
outweighed anticompetitive effects. In Eureka Urethane, Inc. v.
Professional Bowling Ass’n, Inc.,178 the court upheld a bowling
association’s product standards and certification that precluded

167. See id. at 604-05.
168. 749 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1985).
169. See id. at 244.
170. Id. at 247.
171. See id.
172. 568 F. Supp. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
173. See id. at 426-27.
174. See id. at 431.
175. Id. at 430.
176. See id. at 426.
177. The court’s discussion of anticompetitive effect confirms this conclusion. The
court noted that plaintiffs’ compliance with the bylaw led to a decrease in business and
“vitiated any competitive advantage” that plaintiffs sought to obtain in entering into an
agreement with another real estate organization. Id. at 430.
178. 746 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. Mo. 1990).
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the use in televised tournaments of a bowling ball manufactured by the plaintiff.179 The court found that the association’s
right “to administer the sport of professional bowling”180 outweighed the anticompetitive effects of foreclosure of the bowling ball from the defined market.181 In NBA v. Williams,182 the
court addressed the NBA’s collegiate draft, right of first refusal, and salary cap.183 The court found that, because of the existence of a collective bargaining agreement between the players and the NBA, the restraints fell within the nonstatutory
labor exemption to the antitrust laws.184 In dicta, the court
summarily found that the players “have failed to show that the
alleged restraints of trade are on balance unreasonably anticompetitive,”185 and the procompetitive effects, such as maintaining competitive balance, “may outweigh their restrictive
consequences.”186
The majority of cases finding that the anticompetitive effects of an association rule outweigh the procompetitive effects
have occurred in the context of sports leagues. In Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL (“Raiders”),187 the
court invalidated the NFL’s rules concerning the relocation of
franchises. After finding that the rules had anticompetitive and
procompetitive effects, the court concluded that less restrictive
alternatives could have achieved the NFL’s objectives of achieving financial stability, recovering expenditures invested in stadiums and other facilities, and promoting fan loyalty.188 In particular, the court recommended that the NFL adopt relocation
rules that incorporated objective factors.189
In North American Soccer League v. NFL,190 the court invalidated a proposed amendment to the NFL Constitution and
By-laws that would have prevented NFL owners from “pos-

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

See id. at 920-21.
Id. at 933.
See id.
857 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995).
See id. at 1071.
See id. at 1078.
Id. at 1079.
Id.
726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
See id. at 1396.
See id. at 1397.
670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982).
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sess[ing] any interest in another major team sport.”191 The
court found a limited market of “sports capital and skill”192
composed in large part of owners of major professional sports
teams.193 It further found that the foreclosure of this market by
the cross-ownership rule outweighed procompetitive effects
proffered by the NFL: ensuring the undivided loyalty of team
owners, preventing disclosure of confidential information, preventing the dilution of goodwill, avoiding a potential source of
disruption of NFL operations, and preventing collusion between the leagues.194 Although the court credited the latter
three of these rationales, it found the procompetitive effects to
be “clearly outweighed” by anticompetitive effects.195
In Eleven Line, Inc. v. North Texas State Soccer Ass’n,196 the
court found unreasonable a soccer association’s rules on player
registration that decreased options for consumers and that had
the result of limiting indoor soccer contests.197 Finally, in Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Memorial Park Cemetery Ass’n,198 the
court struck down a rule adopted by a trade association of
cemetery owners that limited the preparation of foundations
for grave markers and monuments to the cemetery owning the
lot.199 The court found that the rule reduced competition and
that the anticompetitive effect was “obvious”200 and outweighed
any procompetitive effects.201
c. Instance of burden-shifting. The association cases also offer one instance in which the court applied the burden-shifting
approach to the benefit of the plaintiff. In Law v. NCAA,202 the
court applied this approach to an NCAA rule that limited compensation to entry-level college coaches known as “restricted-

191. Id. at 1255.
192. Id. at 1259-60.
193. See id. at 1260.
194. See id. at 1261.
195. Id. For criticism of the Raiders and North American Soccer League cases, see
infra notes 494-503, 591-602 and accompanying text.
196. No. CA-3-95-CV-3120-R, 1998 WL 574893 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 1998).
197. See id. at *3-5; Eleven Line, Inc. v. North Texas State Soccer Ass’n, No. CA3:95-CV-3120-R, 1997 WL 135684, at *1-3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 1997).
198. 666 F.2d 1130 (8th Cir. 1981).
199. See id. at 1136, 1140.
200. Id.
201. See id.
202. 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 65 (1998).
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earnings” coaches.203 Under a “quick look” Rule of Reason
analysis, the court found that the “artificial[] lowering [of] the
price of coaching services”204 constituted an anticompetitive effect. The court then considered, and rejected, the three procompetitive justifications offered by the defendant, finding that
(1) there was no evidence that the restraint allowed entry-level
coaches to retain their positions; (2) the reduction of costs,
standing alone, was not “a valid procompetitive justification”;205
and (3) the restraint was not designed to achieve competitive
balance.206 The court appropriately recognized that it did not
need to address the issue of less restrictive alternatives,207 nor
did it pursue balancing. In short, the burden-shifting approach,
in addition to benefitting defendants by dismissing cases with
no anticompetitive effect, can also benefit plaintiffs.
C. Survey Results
Summing up the results of Part I reveals that most courts
have disposed of Rule of Reason cases on the ground that the
plaintiff failed to prove a significant anticompetitive effect, and
few courts have balanced anticompetitive and procompetitive
effects. Specifically, cases were resolved at the following
stages:208
No anticompetitive effect:
No procompetitive
justification:
Reasonable
necessity/Less restrictive alternatives:
Balancing:

418 out of 495 cases
(84%)
14 out of 495 cases
(3%)
6 out of 495 cases (1%)
20 out of 495 cases
(4%)

This Article will now explore the normative consequences of
these figures. Is it beneficial that courts dispose of most anti-

203. Id. at 1013-14.
204. Id. at 1020.
205. Id. at 1022.
206. See id. at 1021-24.
207. See id. at 1024 n.16.
208. Again, the figures add up to less than 100% because some courts summarily
found restraints to be, for example, reasonable or unreasonable. See supra note 32.
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trust cases because the plaintiff has failed to prove a significant anticompetitive effect? Is balancing justified? Are the
other factors that courts examine justified?
II. THE PROPRIETY OF THE RULE OF REASON FACTORS
Part II draws on historical and contemporary sources to determine whether courts should consider the factors utilized in a
Rule of Reason analysis. In particular, it looks to the legislative
history of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the common law that
predated the Sherman Act, and two contemporary schools of
antitrust philosophy—the “Chicago School of Economics” and
the “Post-Chicago School.”209 Section A will introduce the four
guideposts, and the four succeeding sections will apply each of
the sources to the factors of anticompetitive effect, procompetitive justifications, reasonable necessity, less restrictive alternatives, and balancing.
A. The Sources
1. The legislative history of the Sherman Act
Analysis of a statute normally begins with its text.210 In this
instance, however, the text provides no assistance in our search
for support for the factors of a Rule of Reason analysis. Section
1 of the Sherman Act, the applicable statutory provision, provides, in relevant part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to
be illegal.211

The text thus provides that every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade is illegal. The courts, appropriately, have not interpreted the statute literally. Instead, they
have found that only unreasonable restraints are illegal. In any

209. Utilizing the legislative history and common law preceding the Sherman Act
as interpretive tools should not be controversial. The deference accorded to the two contemporary schools will vary based on the reader’s outlook, but the schools nonetheless
offer insights on the propriety of the factors. See infra text succeeding note 323.
210. See, e.g., Bankamerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 128 (1983);
Bread Political Action Comm. v. Federal Election Comm., 455 U.S. 577, 580 (1982).
211. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1997).
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event, the text of the Sherman Act does not offer any clues
upon which we can rely in analyzing the propriety of particular
factors in a Rule of Reason analysis. We turn, therefore, to the
legislative history of the Sherman Act.
The Sherman Act was a consequence of the post-Civil-War
era. The period between 1865 and 1890 witnessed remarkable
developments and innovations in manufacturing, agriculture,
transportation, and communication.212 These changes were fueled by a laissez-faire governmental policy, along with increases in investment, speculation, and private banking.213 In
response to these changes, new forms of business organization
developed, such as corporations, pools,214 and trusts.215 Trusts
became the combination of choice for many businessmen because they were exempt from the restrictions that states imposed on corporations and they had the enforcement capabilities that pools lacked.216 Consequently, trusts amassed
significant power and came to dominate various industries.
By the late 1880s, the accumulation of power by trusts had
engendered public hostility.217 Farmers had suffered from the
discriminatory railroad rebate system and small independent
businessmen had often been harmed by their larger competitors’ economic power.218 The public was dismayed that trusts
were supported by tariffs, which limited foreign competition,
and by instances of graft and political corruption.219 States
could not effectively control the trusts because each state’s ju212. See 1 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 27, § 9.02[1], at 9-4; 1 THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 9 (Earl W. Kintner
ed., 1978) [hereinafter 1 Kintner].
213. See 1 Kintner, supra note 212, at 9.
214. Pools were formed by competitors that jointly agreed to wield their economic
power through methods such as dividing markets, sharing profits, and discriminating
against other entities. See id. at 10.
215. Trusts were “characterized by two or more corporations . . . secur[ing] centralized control over the businesses of the trust members.” 1 VON KALINOWSKI, supra
note 27, § 9.02[2][a], at 9-5 n.10. Such centralization would be achieved when shareholders of the member corporations transferred their shares to a single trustee or board
of trustees, who would receive full control over the management of the trust. See id.
216. See 1 Kintner, supra note 212, at 10.
217. See id. at 11; William T. Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law:
1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 221, 222-25 (1956) (public sentiment was “sufficient . . .
to persuade Congress that something had to be done”).
218. See HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN
AMERICAN TRADITION 58-62 (1955); 1 Kintner, supra note 212, at 11.
219. See THORELLI, supra note 218, at 62; 1 Kintner, supra note 212, at 11; Letwin, supra note 217, at 235.
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risdiction was limited to conduct occurring within its borders
and the states lacked sufficient resources for enforcement.220 In
short, the opportunity to address trusts was placed squarely
before Congress.
Congress realized the problem before it. The legislators invoked a menagerie of metaphors to describe the trusts: “tyrannies”;221 “commercial monsters”;222 entities that “devour the
substance of the people and grind the faces of the poor.”223 The
“oppressive and merciless character of the evils”224 that trusts
inflicted upon consumers was “known and admitted everywhere.”225 Members of Congress felt that trusts presented the
“gigantic commercial sin”226 of the era and were a “menace to
republican institutions.”227
On July 10, 1888, Senator John Sherman (R-Ohio) introduced a resolution directing the Finance Committee to “inquire
into . . . [the] control . . . [of] trusts.”228 On August 14, 1888,
Senator Sherman introduced his initial antitrust bill, which
declared unlawful
all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations . . . made with a view, or which tend, to prevent full and
free competition in the production, manufacture, or sale of articles . . . and all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts,
or combinations . . . designed, or which tend, to advance the
cost to the consumer of any of such articles.229

Thus began debate on the Sherman Act. Most of the debate
focused on issues not relevant here, such as the constitutional220. See I EARL W. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 4.1, at 128 (1980) [hereinafter I KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW].
221. 21 CONG. REC. 2726 (1890) (statement of Sen. Edmunds (R-Vt.)).
222. 20 id. at 1457 (1889) (statement of Sen. Jones (D-Ark.)). Senator Jones continued the theme: “[H]aving been allowed to grow and fatten upon the public, their success is an example of evil that has excited the greed and conscienceless rapacity of
commercial sharks until in schools they are to be found now in every branch of trade,
preying upon every industry . . . .” Id.
223. 21 id. at 2647 (1890) (statement of Sen. Vance (D-N.C.)).
224. Id. at 2558 (statement of Sen. Pugh (D-Ala.)).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 140 (statement of Sen. Turpie (D-Ind.)); see also id. at 2598 (statement
of Sen. George (D-Miss.)) (there was “no subject likely to engage the attention of the
present Congress in which the people of this country are more deeply interested than
in the subject of trusts and combinations”).
227. Id. at 3146 (statement of Sen. Hoar (R-Mass.)).
228. 19 id. at 6041 (1888).
229. S. 3445, 50th Cong. (1888).
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ity of the Act,230 its potential efficacy,231 and an amendment
covering options and futures.232 But the debate nonetheless
covered ground that offers assistance in examining factors in
today’s Rule of Reason analysis. Draft bills and legislators’
comments touched upon issues relating to a restraint’s anticompetitive effects233 and procompetitive justifications.234 Significantly, the Senators and Representatives debated the crucial role that the common law was to play in courts’ analysis of
antitrust cases.
The legislators realized that they could not define “the precise line”235 between “lawful combinations in aid of production”236 and “unlawful combinations to prevent competition and
in restraint of trade.”237 That task was “left for the courts to determine in each particular case.”238 But the courts were not
without guidance; in particular, they were to turn to the “old
and well recognized principles of the common law.”239
230. See, e.g., 21 CONG. REC. 2727-28 (1890) (statement of Sen. Edmunds); id. at
2607-08 (statement of Sen. Platt (R-Ct.)); id. at 2601-02 (statement of Sen. Reagan (DTex.)); id. at 2597-600 (statement of Sen. George); id. at 2570-71 (statement of Sen.
Vest (D-Mo.)); id. at 2558-59 (statement of Sen. Pugh); id. at 2556-58 (statement of
Sen. Turpie); id. at 2467-68 (statement of Sen. Hiscock (R-N.Y.)); id. at 2463-67 (statement of Sen. Vest); id. at 2460-62 (statement of Sen. Sherman); id. at 1768-71 (statement of Sen. George).
231. See, e.g., id. at 2645-46 (1890) (statement of Sen. Eustis (D-La.)); id. at 2571
(statement of Sen. Hiscock); id. at 2570-71 (statement of Sen. Vest); id. at 2568-69
(statement of Sen. Sherman); id. at 1765-68 (statement of Sen. George); 20 id. at 145962 (1889) (statement of Sen. George).
232. See, e.g., 21 id. at 2651-57 (statements of various Senators); id. at 2648-51
(statement of Sen. Ingalls); id. at 2648 (statement of Sen. Pugh); id. at 2646 (statement
of Sen. Eustis); id. at 2566 (statement of Sen. Blair (R-N.H.)); id. at 2562-63 (statement
of Sen. Sherman); id. at 2560 (statement of Sen. Reagan);. id. at 2559-60 (statement of
Sen. Sherman); id. at 2462-63 (statement of Sen. Ingalls).
233. See infra Section II.B.1.
234. See infra Section II.C.1.
235. 21 CONG. REC. 2460 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
236. Id. at 2456.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 2460 (“All that we, as lawmakers, can do is to declare general principles, and we can be assured that the courts will apply them so as to carry out the
meaning of the law, as the courts of England and the United States have done for centuries.”); id. at 4089 (statement of Rep. Culberson (D-Tex.)) (“Now, just what contracts,
what combinations in the form of trusts, or what conspiracies will be in restraint of the
trade or commerce mentioned in the bill will not be known until the courts have construed and interpreted this provision.”).
239. Id. at 2456 (statement of Sen. Sherman); see also id. at 2457 (“It is the unlawful combination, tested by the rules of common law and human experience, that is
aimed at by this bill, and not the lawful and useful combination.”); id. at 3152 (statement of Sen. Hoar) (“The great thing that this bill does . . . is to extend the common-law
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Throughout the debate, Senators added numerous amendments to the bill, creating an unwieldy amalgam that eventually contained 16 sections and 309 lines.240 Because of concerns
about the size241 and the constitutionality242 of the bill, it was
referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee,243 which returned
a simplified version of the bill.244 After limited debate, the Senate approved the bill by a vote of 52-1, with twenty-nine Senators not voting.245 The House approved the bill by a vote of 2420, with eighty-five not voting.246 President Benjamin Harrison
signed the Sherman Act into law on July 2, 1890.247
2. Common law
As already mentioned, the Sherman Act framers intended
that courts would draw the dividing line between reasonable
and unreasonable restraints of trade by applying the common
law. Even though the common law was not as fixed or lucid as
the framers believed,248 it fills in some of the gaps in the text

principles, which protected fair competition in trade in old times in England, to international and interstate commerce in the United States.”); id. at 3149 (statement of Sen.
Morgan (D-Ala.)) (noting the use in the debate of “common-law terms” and “commonlaw definitions”); id. at 3146 (statement of Sen. Hoar) (“We have affirmed the old doctrine of the common law in regard to all interstate and international commercial transactions . . . .”); id. at 2456 (“The purpose of this bill is to enable the courts of the United
States to apply the same remedies against combinations which injuriously affect the
interests of the United States that have been applied in the several States . . . .”).
240. See S. 1, 51st Cong. (as amended, Mar. 26, 1890).
241. See 21 CONG. REC. 2651-61 (1890).
242. See id. at 2597-611.
243. See id. at 2731.
244. See id. at 3152-53 (1890).
245. See id. at 3153.
246. See id. at 6314. Prior to the vote of the House of Representatives, the House
had added an amendment to the bill, id. at 4104; the Senate had added an amendment
to the amendment of the House, id. at 4753; and both houses then had withdrawn the
amendments, id. at 6208.
247. See 1 Kintner, supra note 212, at 30.
248. See, e.g., I PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶
104a, at 64 (rev. ed. 1997) (noting variations among the states and that the common
law of competition was in “a state of flux”) [hereinafter I AREEDA]; Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, IX JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
7, 37 (1966) [hereinafter Bork, Legislative Intent] (characterizing the “common law” as
“an artificial construct, made up for the occasion out of a careful selection of recent decisions from a variety of jurisdictions plus a liberal admixture of the senators’ own policy prescriptions” and contending that “[i]t is to this ‘common law,’ holding full sway
nowhere but in the debates of the Fifty-first Congress, that one must look to understand the Sherman Act”).
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and legislative history of the Sherman Act. This Section will
provide a brief overview of the English and American common
law predating the passage of the Sherman Act.
a. English common law. Between the fifteenth and the seventeenth centuries, English courts held all covenants in restraint of trade to be unlawful.249 The term “restraint of trade”
initially did not have the broad meaning it has today; it referred only to agreements by which one of the parties to a contract was prevented from pursuing a particular occupation or
trade, or was restricted in the means by which he could carry
on his trade.250 Typically, such contracts would be incidental (or
“ancillary”251) to the principal contract for the sale or lease of a
business, or to employment contracts, partnership agreements,
or contracts for the sale of goods.252 Such restraints were condemned because of the harm caused to the public by being deprived of the restrained party’s work and the harm to the party
himself, who would lose his livelihood and would not be able to
support himself.253 The historic setting explains this treatment—one who could not pursue his trade likely would not
work at all.254
With the change in economic conditions in seventeenthcentury England, and with the recognition that the refusal to
enforce restraints prevented everyday business transactions,
the courts began to uphold certain types of restraints.255 The

249. See, e.g., Dyer’s Case, Y.B. 2 Hen. V Pasch. f. 5, pl. 26 (1415); THORELLI, supra note 218, at 17.
250. See, e.g., I KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 220, § 2.4, at 49.
251. See id. § 2.6, at 54.
252. See id. § 2.4, at 49; THORELLI, supra note 218, at 17.
253. See, e.g., Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64, 68 (1873); Nordenfelt v. Maxim-Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co., [1894] A.C. 535, 565; Leather
Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, 9 L.R.-Eq. 345, 354 (1869); Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181,
190, 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 350 (K.B. 1711) (noting the dangers of the restraints “to the
party, by the loss of his livelihood, and the subsistence of his family” and “to the publick, by depriving it of an useful member”); Case of Tailors of Ipswich, 11 Coke 53a,
53b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1218, 1219 (K.B. 1614) (“The law abhors idleness, the mother of all
evil . . . and especially in young men, who ought in their youth . . . to learn lawful sciences and trades, which are profitable to the commonwealth, and whereof they might
reap the fruit in their old age, for idle in youth, poor in age . . . .”).
254. See Herreshoff v. Boutineau, 17 R.I. 3, 6, 19 A. 712, 713 (1890) (“In the days
of the early English cases, one who could not work at his trade could hardly work at
all. . . . Contracting not to follow one’s trade was about the same as contracting to be
idle . . . .”).
255. See, e.g., I KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 220, § 3.3, at 84; 1
VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 27, § 8.02[1], at 8-15.
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courts drew one distinction between general restraints, which
were not restricted as to time or space,256 and partial restraints,
which were so limited.257 While the courts condemned general
restraints,258 they upheld partial restraints that were reasonable.259 In Mitchel v. Reynolds,260 for example, the court upheld
a promise by the seller of a bakery that he would not compete
with the buyer of the business for five years in a limited area.261
The court sustained the partial restraint because it was based
on “good and adequate consideration.”262 In the wake of
Mitchel, courts compared the values of the consideration
granted and the right given up,263 a project that some courts believed they had “no means whatever to execute.”264
A test based on reasonableness replaced the emphasis on
consideration in Horner v. Graves.265 In Horner, the court upheld a covenant by which a dentist agreed not to practice
within a certain location and determined whether such a restraint was reasonable by considering “whether the restraint is
such only as to afford a fair protection to the interests of the
party in favour of whom it is given, and not so large as to interfere with the interests of the public.”266 So too, the term “restraint of trade” gradually expanded throughout the nineteenth
century to encompass agreements designed to limit competition
or to gain control of the market.267

256. See 1 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 27, § 8.03[4], at 8-33.
257. See id.; see also Broad v. Jollyfe, Cro. Jac. 596, 79 Eng. Rep. 509 (K.B. 1619);
Rogers v. Parrey, 2 Bulst. 136, 80 Eng. Rep. 1012 (K.B. 1613).
258. See Davies v. Davies, [1887] L.R. 36 Ch.D. 359; Mallan v. May, 11 M. & W.
653, 152 Eng. Rep. 967 (Ex. 1843).
259. See, e.g., I KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 220, § 3.3, at 8485; 1 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 27, § 8.02[1], at 8-15 to 8-16.
260. 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B. 1711).
261. See 24 Eng. Rep. at 352.
262. Id. at 349.
263. See, e.g., THORELLI, supra note 218, at 19.
264. Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 Ad. & E. 438, 457, 112 Eng. Rep. 167, 175 (1837). In
Hitchcock, the court relaxed the analysis of the value of consideration: “It is enough, as
it appears to us, that there actually is a consideration for the bargain; and that such
consideration is a legal consideration, and of some value.” Hitchock, 112 Eng. Rep. at
175.
265. 7 Bing. 735, 131 Eng. Rep. 284 (C.P. 1831).
266. Horner, 131 Eng. Rep. at 287.
267. See, e.g., I KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 220, § 2.4, at 50;
THORELLI, supra note 218, at 52-53. By the end of the nineteenth century, the original
“restraints of trade”—noncompetition agreements—were upheld since they did not restrict competition or lead to monopoly. Cartels, or combinations designed to restrict
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The final step in the transition to an analysis based solely
on the reasonableness of the restraint came in Nordenfelt v.
Maxim-Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co.268 After various
courts had laid the foundation for the emphasis on reasonableness rather than the scope of the restraint,269 the court in Nordenfelt upheld a covenant that prevented the seller of a business from participating in that business in any part of the
world for a twenty-five year period. The court looked solely to
the reasonableness of the restraint and dispensed with the requirement that the restraint be limited in time and space.270
b. American common law. Many of the factors traced by the
English common law found their way across the Atlantic. The
American courts tended to uphold, for example, partial (as opposed to general) restraints;271 internal restraints (affecting
only the parties to the agreement) but not external restraints
(directed at competitors);272 arrangements that did not control
the market or constitute a monopoly;273 and agreements that
did not address articles of “prime necessity.”274 Moreover,
American courts were less affected than their English counterparts by the laissez-faire philosophy that counseled courts to
refrain from interfering with the freedom of traders even if
competition, on the other hand, were more readily condemned. See I AREEDA, supra
note 248, ¶ 104, at 73.
268. [1894] A.C. 535.
269. See Watertown Thermometer Co. v. Pool, 4 N.Y.S. 861 (Sup. Ct. 1889); Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 13 N.E. 419 (N.Y. 1887); Hodge v. Sloan, 17 N.E. 335 (N.Y.
1887).
270. See Nordenfelt v. Maxim-Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co., [1894] A.C.
535; I KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 220, § 3.3, at 85; THORELLI, supra note 218, at 20. Whether a Rule of Reason applied to all, or only to ancillary, restraints is an inquiry that has never definitively been settled. Some have argued that
common law courts did not distinguish between restraints. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911); see also Wickens v. Evans, 3 Y. & J. 318, 148
Eng. Rep. 1201 (Ex. 1829); Jones v. North, 19 Eq. 426 (1875); Collins v. Locks, [1879] 4
App. Cas. 674 (P.C.). Others have argued that the Rule applied only to ancillary restraints. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281-82 (6th Cir.
1898).
271. See, e.g., Skrainka v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo. App. 522, 527 (1880); Kellogg v.
Larkin, 3 Pin. 123, 133, 56 Am. Dec. 164, 173 (Wis. 1851).
272. See, e.g., Central Shade-Roller Co. v. Cushman, 9 N.E. 629, 631 (Mass. 1887);
Dolph v. Troy Laundry Mach. Co., 28 F. 553, 555-56 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1886); Jones v.
North, 19 L. R.-Eq. 426, 430 (1875); see generally THORELLI, supra note 218, at 31
(“[W]hen the parties only restrain their own trade and leave more or less ample leeway
for outsiders to enter or carry on the same trade the restriction is not unlawful . . . .”).
273. See Dolph, 28 F. at 555-56; Larkin, 56 Am. Dec. at 176.
274. See, e.g., Cushman, 9 N.E. at 631; Dolph, 28 F. at 555.
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their actions raised prices.275
Drawing broad generalizations about the treatment of various types of arrangements, American common law courts generally viewed vertical nonprice restraints as ancillary to transactions such as the sale of goods,276 and upheld the
restraints.277 Horizontal arrangements encountered more hostile treatment. Agreements to control supply or production, for
example, were usually held to be unenforceable.278 Thus, a
court held unenforceable arrangements by which all the suppliers in an area separately agreed to sell only to one purchaser,279 by which eight firms agreed not to engage in cotton
bagging for a period of time without the consent of the majority,280 and by which firms established a common marketing
agency to fix prices, divide profits, and restrict output.281 Attempts to corner a market also were held to be unenforceable.282 Finally, the courts refused to enforce agreements to divide territories—e.g., where companies refrained from
supplying a product to certain areas283 or where they established a committee that divided the market and fixed prices.284
The courts also examined the activities of the trusts. In
cases referenced by Senator Sherman in the debate over the
275. See, e.g., ELEANOR M. FOX & LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, CASES AND MATERIALS
16 (1989).
276. See, e.g., I KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 220, § 3.9, at 99;
Stanley D. Robinson, Restraints on Trade and the Orderly Marketing of Goods, 45
CORNELL L.Q. 254 (1960).
277. See, e.g., Brown v. Rounsavell, 78 Ill. 589 (1875); Palmer v. Stebbins, 20
Mass. (3 Pick.) 188 (1826); Newell v. Meyendorff, 23 P. 333 (Mont. 1890); Live Stock
Ass’n v. Levy, 54 N.Y. Super. 32 (1886); Matthews v. Associated Press, 32 N.E. 981
(N.Y. 1883).
278. See, e.g., I KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 220, § 3.6, at 92
(citing sources).
279. See Arnot v. Pittston & Elmira Coal Co., 68 N.Y. 558 (1877); see also Santa
Clara Valley Mill & Lumber Co. v. Hayes, 18 P. 391 (Cal. 1888) (similar scheme).
280. See India Bagging Ass’n v. B. Kock & Co., 14 La. Ann. 168 (1859); see also,
e.g., Emery v. Ohio Candle Co., 24 N.E. 660 (Ohio 1890); McBirney & Johnston White
Lead Co. v. Consol. Lead Co., 8 Ohio Dec. Reprint 762 (Super Ct. 1883).
281. See Central Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666 (1880).
282. See, e.g., Pacific Factor Co. v. Adler, 27 P. 36 (Cal. 1891) (refusing to enforce
option because party had entered into similar agreements in the goal of monopolizing
the market); Samuel v. Oliver, 22 N.E 499 (Ill. 1889) (holding that broker employed to
corner the market cannot recover money advanced, nor could employer recover money
received by broker).
283. See Chicago Gas-Light & Coke Co. v. People’s Gas-Light & Coke Co., 13 N.E.
169 (Ill. 1887).
284. See Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173 (1871).
ON ANTITRUST
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Sherman Act, the courts struck down trusts that controlled
price285 or divided the market286 or profits.287 Generally, courts
struck down trusts that restricted competition288 or injured the
public.289
3. Chicago School of Economics
The Chicago School of Economics290 champions the use of
economics, in particular neoclassical price theory, in antitrust
analysis.291 Proponents of the Chicago School contend that efficiency (sometimes phrased in terms of “consumer welfare”)292 is
the sole purpose of the antitrust laws.293 Only efficiency, claim
the proponents, conforms to the legislative history of the

285. See Handy v. Cleveland & Marietta R.R. Co., 31 F. 689, 692 (C.C.S.D. Ohio
1887); Craft v. McConoughy, 79 Ill. 346 (1875); 21 CONG. REC. 2458 (1890) (citing
Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. (Pa. 1879)).
286. See Chicago Gas-Light & Coke Co., 13 N.E. at 174-75.
287. See New York v. North River Sugar-Refining Co., 7 N.Y.S. 406, 415 (Sup. Ct.
1889).
288. See McConoughy, 79 Ill. at 350; Nebraska v. Nebraska Distilling Co., 46 N.W.
155, 161 (Neb. 1890).
289. See Chicago Gas-Light & Coke Co., 13 N.E. at 174-75; North River SugarRefining Co., 7 N.Y.S. at 415; Pennsylvania v. Carlisle, Brightly’s N.P. 36, 40 (Ct. of
Nisi Prius 1821).
290. This Article speaks of the Chicago School as a monolithic force, and for purposes of the Article, differences within the school are not relevant. But like most
movements, Chicago School adherents sometimes disagree. See, e.g., Jerome Ellig, Untwisting the Strands of Chicago Antitrust, XXXVII THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN 863, 864,
877 (1992) (distinguishing between “new Chicago” school believing in perfectly competitive equilibrium and “market rivalry” school viewing competition as process of rivalry).
291. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 8, 84 (1978) [hereinafter BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX]; Posner, Chicago School,
supra note 27, at 928, 933-34.
292. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 291, at 51. For a claim that the term
“consumer welfare” deceptively implies a concern with the welfare of consumers rather
than total welfare, see Robert H. Lande, Chicago’s False Foundation: Wealth Transfers
(Not Just Efficiency) Should Guide Antitrust, 58 ANTITRUST LAW J. 631, 638 (1989)
[hereinafter Lande, Chicago’s False Foundation]. For a distinction between the terms
“efficiency” and “consumer welfare,” see Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1020 (1987).
293. See, e.g., BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 291, at 81-89; Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1984) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust]; Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust
Law?, 60 TEX. L. REV. 705, 716 (1982); Richard A. Posner, Exclusionary Practices and
the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 506, 507 (1974) [hereinafter Posner, Exclusionary Practices].
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Sherman Act,294 offers the courts a workable standard to apply,295 and promotes “fair warning” for the parties.296 Chicago
School proponents contend that courts’ consideration of any
standard besides efficiency is a recipe for disaster.297 Adherents
of the School put their faith in the market, believing that it can
solve problems better than the government.298
The Chicago School would significantly confine the range of
restraints that courts could consider under a Rule of Reason
analysis. Vertical restraints, for starters, would not threaten
an adverse effect on competition, and so should be outside the
realm of antitrust analysis.299 Some in the School would include
within the antitrust laws only cartels, horizontal mergers that
are large enough to create a monopoly or to facilitate cartelization by significantly reducing the number of sellers in a market, and perhaps “[d]eliberate predation.”300 So in one sense,
the Chicago School would treat application of the Rule of Rea-

294. See, e.g., BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 291, at 61, 71, 89 (“The legislative history of the Sherman Act . . . displays the clear and exclusive policy intention
of promoting consumer welfare.”); Thomas C. Arthur, Workable Antitrust Law: The
Statutory Approach to Antitrust, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1163, 1223-24 (1988); Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 248, at 7, 11.
295. See, e.g., BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 291, at 71 (“Should consistency be sought by introducing values other than consumer welfare into the law about
cartels, antitrust would lose much in ease of administration and therefore in effectiveness.”).
296. See, e.g., id. at 81-82.
297. See id. at 85 (“Where the common denominator of consumer welfare is abandoned, an antitrust court that attempts to avoid the appearance of complete subjectivism, that tries to explain its decision, will be driven to distinctions without any reality.”); Posner, Chicago School, supra note 27, at 944-45 (explaining that the goal of
dispersing concentration is not significant because excessive profitability would lead to
new entry that would cause prices to fall to competitive levels).
298. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note 293, at 15-16; Posner,
Exclusionary Practices, supra note 293, at 534-35.
299. See BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 291, at 288, 290, 297 (“[A]ll vertical restraints are beneficial to consumers and should for that reason be completely lawful.”); William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the
“Common Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 697 (1982); Posner, Exclusionary Practices, supra note 293, at 534-35 (arguing that practices by which firms
attempt to exclude a rival by means other than lower costs and lower prices—such as
predatory pricing, tying arrangements, vertical integration, exclusive dealing, and
group boycotts—are not sufficiently dangerous to justify enforcement).
300. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 291, at 406; see also, e.g., Frank H.
Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1701 (1986); Posner,
Chicago School, supra note 27, at 928; Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 24
(1981) [hereinafter Posner, Per Se Legality].
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son by courts today as overbroad, encompassing far more restraints than it should. But as far as the type of analysis that
courts conduct pursuant to the Rule of Reason—an inquiry focused on competition—the Chicago School would voice its support.
4. Post-Chicago School
A look to the Post-Chicago School reveals the influence of
the Chicago School, particularly since many in the PostChicago School recognize efficiency as a legitimate goal of the
antitrust laws.301 Yet the many strands of the Post-Chicago
School302 overlap in the belief that efficiency is not the sole objective of the antitrust laws.303 These criticisms, from “outside”
the Chicago School model, posit alternate goals that courts
should consider: dispersing concentrated economic power,304
preventing transfers of wealth from consumers to firms with
market power,305 maintaining the process of competition,306 and
promoting individual liberty.307 Some in the School have al-

301. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1140, 1191 (1981); Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1075 (1979).
302. See, e.g., Lande, Chicago’s False Foundation, supra note 292; Fox, supra note
301; Pitofsky, supra note 301; Lawrence A. Sullivan, Post-Chicago Economics: Economists, Lawyers, Judges, and Enforcement Officials in a Less Determinate Theoretical
World, 63 ANTITRUST LAW J. 669 (1995) [hereinafter Sullivan, Post-Chicago Economics].
303. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 301, at 1146, 1152, 1154, 1178-79; Lande, Chicago’s
False Foundation, supra note 292, at 631. In addition, members of the School may contemplate lower thresholds for demonstrating anticompetitive conduct.
304. See Fox, supra note 301, at 1153, 1182, 1185-88 (positing “dispersion of economic power” as goal of antitrust laws); Pitofsky, supra note 301, at 1053-55 (contending that antitrust policy should take into account “[f]ear of [c]oncentrated [e]conomic
[p]ower” and stating that “historical and contemporaneous democracies are almost invariably associated with market systems, while totalitarian regimes (fascist and communist) almost always are not”).
305. See Lande, Beyond Chicago, supra note 13, at 5-6; Lande, Chicago’s False
Foundation, supra note 292, at 631 (“The main purpose of the antitrust laws is to prevent firms from acquiring and using market power to force consumers to pay more for
their goods and services.”).
306. See Fox, supra note 301, at 1169, 1174-76, 1191 (contending that the notion of
“competition as process” promotes “vigorous rivalry” that leads to “efficiency and progressiveness”; proponents of the idea “place value on diversity and pluralism” and endeavor to preserve “lower barriers to entry and greater opportunity for entry and success of unestablished firms” rather than to promote “productive efficiency of
established firms”); Pitofsky, supra note 301, at 1063-64.
307. See, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 301, at 1056-57.
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leged a potential conflict between general government policy
undertaking wealth-distribution activities and antitrust policy
pursuing only the goal of efficiency.308
Post-Chicago School theorists also voice criticisms from “inside” the model; in particular, they criticize the Chicago
School’s conception of efficiency. They argue that efficiency is
not as neutral309 or as easily applied310 as its proponents contend. Post-Chicago adherents also charge that it relies on a
static rather than dynamic market,311 it focuses excessively on
the long-run effects of practices,312 it fails to incorporate nonquantifiable goals,313 and it ignores the problem of consumer
free-riding.314 Finally, proponents contend that the Chicago
School does not adequately consider such concepts as market
imperfections,315 externalities,316 and the problem of the “second
best.”317
308. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV.
213, 247 (1985).
309. See, e.g., Edward O. Correia, Antitrust and Liberalism, XL ANTITRUST
BULLETIN 99, 122 n.76 (1995) (noting the political value judgments underlying neutrality and the maximization of allocative efficiency); Fox, supra note 301, at 1158, 1168;
Eleanor M. Fox, The Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision Making: Antitrust as a Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 579-80 (1986) (assumptions underlie “simplicity” of economic models); Hovenkamp, supra note 308, at 235-36 (questioning “constant dollar welfare assumption” that the transfer of a dollar from a consumer to a
monopolist has no welfare implications); Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics: Reflections on Some Recent Relationships, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 12
(1980) [hereinafter Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics].
310. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 301, at 1158; Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 27 (1982); Pitofsky, supra note
301, at 1065-66.
311. See Symposium: Post-Chicago Economics, 63 ANTITRUST LAW J. 445, 445
(1995) [hereinafter Symposium]; Hovenkamp, supra note 308, at 256-60. Hovenkamp
notes that this weakness leads to a failure to adequately recognize strategic behavior,
or behavior designed to injure competitors. See id. at 256, 260-83.
312. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 308, at 247, 264-84.
313. See, e.g., John J. Flynn & James F. Ponstoldt, Legal Reasoning and the Jurisprudence of Vertical Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis
in the Resolution of Antitrust Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1125, 1133 (1987).
314. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 308, at 244.
315. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 301, at 1160 & n.88 (noting “malfunctions” caused
by “monopoly, the absence of information, and government regulation”).
316. See, e.g., id. at 1160 n.88 (noting that externalities are costs imposed but not
borne by a company, such as pollution, and that they lead to “inefficiently high” output
because consumers buy too much of a product whose price does not reflect its full cost);
Hovenkamp, supra note 308, at 244.
317. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 301, at 1160 n.88 (observing that “an apparently
second best solution may be no solution at all” because corrective action in one market
does not necessarily improve resource allocation); Lawrence A. Sullivan, Book Review:
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Post-Chicago School analysis is heavily fact-oriented, with
less deference to economic theory.318 Advocates from the School
also are skeptical that the market will correct imperfections
and thus see a greater need for judicial intervention.319 Imperfect information is one reason for this skepticism.320 Some PostChicago commentators also have emphasized the danger to
competition from a firm’s raising its rivals’ costs.321
Presenting the mirror image of the Chicago School, the
Post-Chicago School would defend the range of restraints considered under the Rule of Reason. Commentators in the School
would, however, take issue with the overriding emphasis on
competition encompassed in the factors of the Rule, and would
contend that other goals should be taken into account.322
5. Applying the sources
By reference to these four sources, this Article will determine whether courts should consider various factors in a Rule
of Reason analysis. How are the sources to be weighed? A consistent conclusion (for or against the inclusion of a factor) resulting from the application of the sources will lead to an easy
answer. Divergent conclusions will be more difficult, and will
Trade Regulation, Cases and Materials, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1214, 1220-21 (1975)
(“Given the persistence of other deviations (other monopolies, cartels, tariffs, and distorting taxes), there is no basis for assuming that doing away with any one or more deviations from optimality would improve efficiency at all. A priori, it is just as likely to
do the opposite . . . .”).
318. See, e.g., Sullivan, Post-Chicago Economics, supra note 302, at 672.
319. See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Chicago Takes It on the Chin: Imperfect Information Could Play a Crucial Role in the Post-Kodak World, 62 ANTITRUST LAW J. 193, 193
(1993) [hereinafter Lande, Chicago Takes It on the Chin]; Steven C. Salop, Kodak as
Post-Chicago Law and Economics, C847 ALI-ABA 27, 30 (1993); Symposium, supra
note 311, at 446.
320. See, e.g., Lande, Beyond Chicago, supra note 13, at 6-9; Lande, Chicago Takes
It on the Chin, supra note 319, at 193, 197-98 (noting that imperfect information can
create market power and can affect competition in “entire markets”).
321. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Recent Developments in Economics that Challenge Chicago School Views, 58 ANTITRUST LAW J. 645, 647-48 (1989); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs To
Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986) (introducing two-step analysis to
determine existence of anticompetitive effects: whether conduct of challenged firm increases costs of competitors and whether this enables the firm to exercise monopoly
power); Lande, Beyond Chicago, supra note 13, at 3-5.
322. See, e.g., Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics, supra note 309, at
2-3 (noting that “only competitive effects” (which “usually means efficiency effects”) are
relevant under the Rule of Reason and that consequently “Reason” is “becoming blind
to other social consequences”).
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be resolved by analyzing the relative significance of the sources
and the capacities of courts.323
The legislative history, as supplemented by the common
law, is the most important source. Regardless of what philosophical school one adheres to, proper interpretation begins
(though it obviously does not end) at the beginning—with the
framers of the Sherman Act. So if the legislative history and
common law disapprove of a factor, the odds are against its inclusion. Where these sources are neutral (i.e., where the actors
did not consider a particular factor), strong support must come
from the other sources and the capacities of courts. For if the
sources provide only lukewarm support for, and courts cannot
analyze, a particular factor, then the inclusion of the factor in a
Rule of Reason analysis would not elicit confidence in the
analysis undertaken by antitrust courts. This Article now turns
to the application of the sources.
B. Anticompetitive Effect
Each of the four sources provides support for the courts’
consideration of anticompetitive effect as an element of a Rule
of Reason analysis.
1. Legislative history
Achieving “full and free competition”324 was the primary
goal of the framers of the Sherman Act.325 This focus on competition pervaded the draft bills and amendments that the framers considered. For example, Senator Sherman’s first bill declared invalid all agreements that tend to prevent “full and free
competition.”326 Additionally, an amendment introduced by
Senator Reagan defined a trust, in part, as a combination “[t]o
prevent competition.”327 The framers’ debate returned repeat-

323. The capacities of courts are discussed below. See infra Part III.
324. S. 3445, 50th Cong. (1888).
325. The Sherman Act framers proclaimed the norm of free competition “too selfevident to be debated, too obvious to be asserted.” THORELLI, supra note 218, at 226
(citation omitted).
326. S. 3445, 50th Cong. (1888). Similar language appears in the resolution by
which Senator Sherman directed the Finance Committee “to inquire into . . . control . . .
[of] trusts.” See 19 CONG. REC. 6041 (1888).
327. 21 CONG. REC. 1772 (1890); see also S. 3510, 50th Cong. (1888) (bill introduced by Sen. Cullom (R-Ill.)) (directed against combinations “to prevent full and free
competition,” to limit trade, or to “increase or reduce the price” of goods).
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edly to the theme of allowing the unfettered operation of competition. They bemoaned that trusts “prevent competition
and . . . restrain trade,”328 “destroy[] legitimate competition,”329
“interfer[e] with competition,”330 and “hinder, interrupt, and
impair the freedom and fairness of commerce.”331
Executive speeches mirrored legislative pronouncements on
competition. President Grover Cleveland, in his third annual
message to Congress on December 6, 1887, lamented the
“strangl[ing]”332 of competition by trusts, “which have for their
object the regulation of the supply and price of commodities.”333
President Benjamin Harrison, in his first annual message on
December 3, 1889, decried trusts to be “dangerous conspiracies
against the public good”334 because they were organized “to
crush out all healthy competition.”335 In fact, the antitrust
plank of the Democratic Party Platform in 1888 railed against
trusts that “rob the body of our citizens by depriving them of
the benefits of natural competition.”336
To be sure, the competition of 1890 is not the competition of
1999. In particular, the Sherman Act framers’ views of competition were not infused with the neoclassical conceptions that
underlie today’s notions of efficiency.337 In addition to an emphasis on increased output and lowered price resulting from
competition, the Sherman Act framers’ conception included a
concern for protecting small businesses against mammoth

328. 21 CONG. REC. 2460 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman); see also 21 CONG.
REC. 2459 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman) (noting the courts’ “vigorous[]” use of
judicial power to “subvert[]” trusts whose “plain tendency is to prevent competition”).
329. Id. at 4100 (statement of Rep. Mason (R-Ill.)).
330. Id. at 4102 (statement of Rep. Fithian (D-Ill.)).
331. Id. at 2558 (statement of Sen. Pugh).
332. 19 CONG. REC. 9 (1887).
333. Id.
334. 2 THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS 1790-1966, at
1639 (F. Israel ed., 1966).
335. Id.
336. T. MCKEE, THE NATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND PLATFORMS OF ALL POLITICAL
PARTIES 1789-1905, at 235 (1906). The Republican Party platform also addressed
trusts, declaring its opposition to combinations that “control arbitrarily the condition of
trade” and recommending the enactment of legislation that would “prevent the execution of all schemes to oppress the people by undue charges on their supplies.” Id. at
241.
337. See John J. Flynn, The Reagan Administration’s Antitrust Policy, “Original
Intent” and the Legislative History of the Sherman Act, 33 THE ANTITRUST BULL. 259,
272-73 (1988).
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trusts.338 Indeed, one can even conceive of the framers viewing
the process of competition itself as being significant.339 Further
complicating the mapping to today’s environment, the framers
generally did not distinguish between injuries to competitors
and injuries to consumers.340
Despite the inexact congruity between conceptions of competition a century apart, the initial threshold of anticompetitive effect examined by courts today is a logical extrapolation
from the framers’ discussions of competition. That other economic constructs could have developed similarly consistent
with the debates does not lessen the support today’s analysis of
anticompetitive effect garners from the legislative history. Cementing the consonance between the two competitions are the
overlapping building blocks of price and output. At the foundation of microeconomic inquiry today, the blocks were also central to the framers’ debate. Of the two, the framers tended to
focus on price.341
Draft bills explicitly accentuated the factor of price. Senator
Sherman’s original bill invalidated “all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations . . . designed, or
which tend, to advance the cost to the consumer”342 of imported
or domestic goods. An amended version of the bill contained a
clause allowing consumers who were “put to additional cost by
the advancing of the price”343 of goods to recover their damages.
Another amendment to the bill defined a trust, in part, as a
combination “to increase or reduce the price of merchandise or

338. See 21 CONG. REC. 3147 (1890) (statement of Sen. George) (explaining that
the “great evil” at which the Act was directed was the “crush[ing]” of “small men engaged in competition with [trusts]”); id. at 2460 (statement of Sen. Sherman) (promoting rights of individuals “as against associated and corporate wealth and power”); 20
CONG. REC. 1458 (1889) (statement of Sen. George) (contending that defensive alliances of farmers and laborers should not be covered by bill).
339. See Fox, supra note 301, at 1169, 1174-76, 1191.
340. See I AREEDA, supra note 248, ¶ 103c, at 52-53 (noting that contemporary
distinctions between the two types of injury are “the product of a century of economic
analysis that had not yet occurred when the Sherman Act was passed”; moreover, the
divisions between competitors and consumers were more blurred a century ago than
they are today).
341. Some Sherman Act framers recognized that a reduction in output affects
price. See 21 CONG. REC. 2460 (1890) (statement by Sen. Sherman) (“The price to the
consumer depends upon the supply, which can be reduced at pleasure by the combination.”).
342. S. 3445, 50th Cong. § 1 (1888).
343. S. 3445, 50th Cong. (as amended, Jan. 25, 1889).

CAR-FIN.DOC

1265]

4/5/00 7:24 AM

THE REAL RULE OF REASON

1311

commodities”344 or to enter into an agreement by which the
price of a good could be “establish[ed] or settle[d].”345
Debate also focused on the trusts’ power to affect price.
Senator Sherman referenced pricing in explaining its scope:
“All [the bill] says is that the people producing or selling a particular article shall not make combinations to advance the price
of the necessaries of life.”346 The Senator honed in on the powers of trusts to affect price:
[the trust] can control the market, raise or lower prices, as
will best promote its selfish interests, reduce prices in a particular locality and break down competition and advance
prices at will where competition does not exist. . . . Such a
combination is far more dangerous than any heretofore invented, and, when it embraces the great body of all the corporations engaged in a particular industry in all of the States of
the Union, it tends to advance the price to the consumer of any
article produced.347

Other framers lamented the trusts’ control over prices.
They emphasized that the trusts “increase beyond reason the
cost of the necessaries of life and business. . . . They regulate
prices at their will, depress the price of what they buy and increase the price of what they sell.”348 Trusts “enhance the price
of commodities to the people beyond an honest profit.”349 The
universal reach of the trusts was deplored: “There is scarcely
any article of prime necessity in this country as to which the
people do not complain that its price has been enhanced by
these combinations.”350 And again: “the trusts which control the
markets on sugar, nails, oils, lead, and almost every other article of use in the commerce of this country have advanced the

344. S. 1, 51st Cong. (as amended, Mar. 25, 1890).
345. Id.; see also id. (other definitions include “[t]o fix a standard or figure
whereby the price to the public shall be in any manner controlled or established” and to
agree to keep the price of a good at a “fixed or graduated figure”).
346. 20 CONG. REC. 1458 (1889).
347. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (emphasis added).
348. Id. at 1768 (statement of Sen. George); see also id. at 3147-48 (statement of
Sen. George).
349. Id. at 4102 (statement of Rep. Fithian).
350. Id. at 2647 (statement of Sen. Vance). Even the few Senators who were not
convinced of the benefits of competition and low prices recognized the goals of the bill.
See id. at 2729 (statement of Sen. Platt) (“[T]his bill proceeds upon the false assumption that all competition is beneficent to the country, and that every advance of price is
an injury to the country.”)
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cost of such articles to every consumer.”351
Although discussed less frequently than price, output—in
particular, the trusts’ reduction of it—also occupied the framers’ attention. An amendment to the bill under debate defined a
trust, in part, as a combination “[t]o limit or reduce the production . . . of merchandise or commodities,”352 or to enter into an
agreement “not to manufacture, sell, dispose of, or transport”353
any good. A House bill defined a trust as a combination “for the
purpose of . . . limiting the production, increasing or reducing
the price of merchandise or commodities, or preventing competition.”354 Debate among the congressmen continued this theme.
Senator Sherman bemoaned that trusts could reduce, “at
pleasure,”355 the supply of a product. A member of the House of
Representatives protested that trusts aim “to repress, reduce,
and control the volume of every article that they touch, so that
the cost to consumers is increased while the expenditure for
production is lessened.”356 Trusts were viewed as “the latest
and most perfect form of combination among competing producers to control the supply of their product, in order that they
may dictate the terms on which they shall sell in the market.”357
In short, the framers recognized the adverse effects on price
and output brought about by trusts and sought to promote unbridled competition. Today’s courts, by requiring plaintiffs to
demonstrate an anticompetitive effect, preserve the framers’
focus on competition. More specifically, contemporary courts’
focus on price and output as indicators of anticompetitive effect
draws direct support from the framers’ intent. The initial
threshold of anticompetitive effect is firmly ensconced in the
351. Id. at 4101 (statement of Rep. Heard (D-Mo.)). The beef industry in particular
drew the wrath of several Representatives. See id. at 4098 (statement of Rep. Taylor
(R-Ohio)) (“The beef trust fixes arbitrarily the daily price of cattle, from which there is
no appeal, for there is no other market. The farmers [are able to save] from one-third to
half of the former value of their cattle and yet beef is as costly as ever.”); id. at 4091
(statement by Rep. Henderson (R-Iowa)) (same); id. at 2640 (statement of Sen. Spooner
(R-Wis.)) (lamenting the sugar trust, whose object “is to keep up to consumers the price
of sugar” and the beef trust, which has maintained at the “war rate” the price of beef to
consumers).
352. S. 1, 51st Cong. (as amended Mar. 25, 1890).
353. Id.
354. H.R. 11401, 50th Cong. (1888).
355. 21 CONG. REC. 2460 (1890).
356. Id. at 4101 (statement of Rep. Heard (D-Mo.)).
357. Id. at 4092 (statement of Rep. Wilson (D-W.Va.)).
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legislative history.
2. Common law
A bit further removed from contemporary understandings
of competition were the common law courts. These courts typically focused on the effect of agreements on the contracting
parties and emphasized the tendency of an agreement to limit
competition rather than an actual effect on competition.358 So
even if a combination reduced prices, the combination’s ability
to raise prices would lead courts to invalidate the arrangement.359 The reverse also held true: courts upheld price-fixing
by parties that could not affect the market as a whole.360 Moreover, common law decisions often depended on the facts of the
cases.361 Consequently, the common law “present[ed] a picture
of great confusion and intermingling of ideas.”362
Despite these caveats, common law courts invalidated
trusts that restricted competition363 or injured the public.364
Agreements to control supply or production, for example, were
usually held to be unenforceable,365 as were agreements to divide territories.366 Courts also linked the concepts of competi358. See, e.g., Richardson v. Buhl, 43 N.W. 1102, 1111 (Mich. 1889); Atcheson v.
Mallon, 43 N.Y. 147, 149 (1870); Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio 434 (N.Y. 1848); Central
Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666, 672 (1880).
359. See, e.g., Buhl, 43 N.W. at 1111 (Champlin, J., concurring) (discounting a
combination’s reduction of the price of an article and stating that “[t]he fact exists that
it rests in the discretion of th[e] [combination] at any time to raise the price to an exorbitant degree”).
360. See Hearn v. Griffin, 2 Chitty 407, 408 (1815).
361. See 1 A. EDDY, THE LAW OF COMBINATIONS §§ 301-03, at 207 (1901).
362. THORELLI, supra note 218, at 50; see also id. at 36.
363. See Craft v. McConoughy, 79 Ill. 346, 350 (1875); Nebraska v. Nebraska Distilling Co., 46 N.W. 155, 161 (Neb. 1890).
364. See Chicago Gas-Light and Coke Co. v. People’s Gas-Light and Coke Co., 13
N.E. 169, 174-75 (Ill. 1889); Skrainka v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo. App. 522, 527 (1880);
Leslie v. Lorillard, 18 N.E. 363, 366 (N.Y. 1888); New York v. North River SugarRefining Co., 7 N.Y.S. 406, 415 (Sup. Ct. 1889); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Carlisle, Brightly’s N.P. 36, 40 (Ct. of Nisi Prius 1821); see generally THORELLI, supra note
218, at 18.
365. See, e.g., I KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 220, § 3.6, at 92
(citing sources); Santa Clara Valley Mill and Lumber Co. v. Hayes, 76 Cal. 387 (1888);
India Bagging Ass’n v. B. Kock & Co., 14 La. Ann. 168 (1859); Arnot v. Pittston & Elmira Coal Co., 68 N.Y. 558 (1877); Emery v. Ohio Candle Co., 24 N.E. 660 (Ohio 1890);
Central Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666 (1880); McBirney & Johnston White
Lead Co. v. Consolidated Lead Co., 8 Ohio Dec. Reprint 762 (Super. Ct. 1883); Cousins
v. Smith, 33 Eng. Rep. 397 (Ch. 1807).
366. See Chicago Gas Light & Coke Co., 13 N.E. 169; Morris Run Coal Co. v. Bar-
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tion and monopoly, refusing to enforce restraints that “destroyed all competition and created a monopoly.”367
Other distinctions drawn by common law courts, although
phrased differently from their present-day counterparts, may
be viewed as consistent with today’s emphasis on an adverse
effect on competition. For example, early common law courts
invalidated general restraints, which affected the market as a
whole, but upheld a subset of partial restraints (those that
were reasonable). That the general/partial divide did not precisely trace a contemporary notion of anticompetitive effect (a
few general restraints eventually were upheld and some partial
restraints were found unenforceable) does not negate a substantial overlap with contemporary notions of anticompetitive
effect.
Yet another distinction that laid a foundation for anticompetitive effect was that between internal restraints (affecting
only the parties to the agreement) and external restraints (affecting third parties). Courts tended to uphold internal restraints that did not affect competition as a whole, but refused
to enforce external restraints.368
Because of the common law courts’ concern with the contracting parties to an agreement, the courts’ emphasis on the
tendency of an agreement rather than its effect, and the absence of a consistent common law rule,369 any attempts to map
the common law onto contemporary notions of competition
must be made with caution. Nonetheless, the courts’ refusal to
enforce general restraints, external restraints, and agreements
that adversely affected competition or the public provides support for contemporary courts’ consideration of anticompetitive
effect as an element of today’s Rule of Reason analysis.
3. Chicago School
The Chicago School would support a court’s consideration of

clay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173 (1871).
367. Craft v. McConoughy, 79 Ill. 346, 350 (1875); see also Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. at
672 (because the clear tendency of the agreement at issue was “to establish a monopoly, and to destroy competition, . . . courts will not aid in its enforcement”); see generally THORELLI, supra note 218, at 30, 39.
368. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
369. See, e.g., I AREEDA, supra note 248, ¶ 302, at 3; S. CHESTERFIELD OPPENHEIM
ET AL., FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS: CASES, TEXT, AND COMMENTARY 4-5 (4th ed. 1981);
1 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 27, § 8.01[2], at 8-9.
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anticompetitive effects. Chicago School proponents champion
efficiency, defined in terms of competition, as the sole goal of
the antitrust laws. Accordingly, a practice that does not have
an adverse effect on competition or efficiency obviously should
lie outside the realm of antitrust analysis. This conclusion is
buttressed by the range of restraints the Chicago School removes—because they arguably cannot have an anticompetitive
effect—from the realm of Rule of Reason analysis: tying arrangements, exclusive dealing agreements, and territorial, customer, and other vertical restrictions.370 Similarly, those restraints left standing for review—mergers to a high market
share and cartel-facilitating restraints—have obvious anticompetitive effects.371 The Chicago School’s overriding focus on
competition renders anticompetitive effect a vital element of a
Rule of Reason analysis.
4. Post-Chicago School
The Post-Chicago School differs from the Chicago School in
treating efficiency as only one goal, rather than the sole goal, of
the antitrust laws. Most Post-Chicagoans do not claim that
there is no role for efficiency;372 rather, they posit other roles
besides efficiency.373 Therefore, the School would view the
threshold of anticompetitive effect (a prerequisite to a finding
of inefficiency) as a sufficient but not necessary factor in the
continuation of the Rule of Reason analysis.374 That is, where
an anticompetitive effect is present, the School would encourage the court to proceed to analyze other factors. But where an
anticompetitive effect is absent, the School would not necessarily shut down the inquiry, because other goals could be threatened even in the absence of an anticompetitive effect. There-

370. See Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements, supra note 91, at 135, 151-52, 16869; Posner, Chicago School, supra note 27, at 929; Posner, Exclusionary Practices, supra note 293, at 508.
371. See Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements, supra note 91, at 153, 168. Further
supporting this conclusion, the “filters” developed by Judge Easterbrook to limit the
instances of a full-fledged Rule of Reason analysis include standard indicators of anticompetitive effect: market power, harm to consumers (tied to a defendant’s profits), and
whether the evidence is consistent with a reduction in output. See Easterbrook, Limits
of Antitrust, supra note 293, at 17-35.
372. See Fox, supra note 301, at 1140, 1174-75; Pitofsky, supra note 301, at 1075.
373. See supra notes 3034-307 and accompanying text.
374. See, Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 321, at 214, 250-51, 253-66 (setting
forth test to determine likelihood of anticompetitive effects).
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fore, within a Rule of Reason inquiry, the Post-Chicago School
would support the use of the factor of anticompetitive effect.
That they would envision a broader Rule of Reason analysis
that would be triggered by predicates other than anticompetitive effect does not negate the useful role played by anticompetitive effect.
C. Procompetitive Justifications
The sources also support courts’ consideration of a defendant’s procompetitive justifications as an element of the Rule of
Reason analysis. The legislative history, Chicago School, and
Post-Chicago School all would endorse the factor, and the
common law would be neutral.
1. Legislative history
Throughout the debates on the Sherman Act, the framers
made it clear that they did not wish to penalize all restraints of
trade. Senator Sherman emphasized that the Act would cover
“unlawful combinations to prevent competition”375 but not “lawful combinations in aid of production.”376 The bill would “not in
the least affect combinations in aid of production where there is
free and fair competition.”377 Senator Sherman explained that
the Act would not apply to partnerships, which were “an aid to
production.”378 Similarly, corporations were “the most useful
agencies of modern civilization”379 that “have enabled individuals to unite to undertake great enterprises only attempted in
former times by powerful governments.”380 The Act also would
not “interfere in the slightest degree” with “voluntary associations made to affect public opinion to advance the interests of a
particular trade or occupation”381 such as farmers’ associa375.
376.
377.
378.

21 CONG. REC. 2456 (1890).
Id.
Id. at 2457.
Id. Senator Sherman elaborated:

The right to combine the capital and labor of two or more persons in a given pursuit with a community of profit and loss under the name of a partnership is open
to all and is not an infringement of industrial liberty, but is an aid to production. . . . [W]hile [a partnership] is a combination, it does not in the slightest degree prevent competition.

Id.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 2562 (statement of Sen. Sherman).
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tions382 or laborers.383 The House also engaged in limited debate
regarding a defendant’s quality justifications.384
Restraints today do not fall neatly into the bifurcated categories contemplated by the framers—restrictions imposed by
mammoth trusts, on the one hand, and defensive combinations
by small businesses struggling to compete, on the other. For
example, in which category would vertical restraints by midsized companies, which often limit intrabrand competition in
the hopes of increasing interbrand competition, belong? In
which category would a local hospital’s refusal to deal with a
doctor fall? An unfair competition claim between two rivals? An
association standard? Today’s antitrust restraints are more
nuanced than the dichotomy envisioned by the Sherman Act
framers. That said, the framers’ desire not to punish parties
who took actions promoting (the framers’ conception of) competition must be considered in any analysis of competitive effects.385 In order to know, then, if the anticompetitive effect of a
restraint is justified, a court following the guidance of the legislative history must allow the defendant to introduce its procompetitive justifications.
2. Common law
The common law preceding the Sherman Act did not examine a defendant’s procompetitive justifications. The focus of the
common law courts was on the contracting parties themselves
and the benefits that would inhere to these parties by the enforcement of agreements. As one court explained: “The only
reason ever assigned in support of . . . restrictions [not to compete] is, that they are necessary or useful to the party with
382. “Farmers’ Alliances and farmers’ associations . . . are not business combinations. They do not deal with contracts, agreements, etc., . . . And so the combinations of
workingmen to . . . get their fair share in the division of production, are not . . . included in the words or intent of the bill . . . .” Id.
383. See id. at 2561 (statement of Sen. Teller) (“[W]e can not deny to the laborers
of the country the opportunity to combine either for the purpose of putting up the price
of their labor or securing to themselves a better position in the world.”).
384. See id. at 5954 (statement of Rep. Morse (D-Mass.)) (manufacturers should
have the right to set the price of their goods to ensure “a high grade and uniform quality of goods” which would help the purchaser determine “what he is buying and what to
depend upon”).
385. The dichotomy considered by the framers also could be viewed as supporting
exemptions from the antitrust laws for certain categories of restraints. This conclusion
does not diminish the support for considering procompetitive justifications under the
Rule of Reason.
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whom the contract is made as a protection to him in the prosecution of his business.”386 Similarly, a partial restraint not interfering with the interests of the public at large would be upheld where it “affords a fair protection to those in whose favor
it is made.”387 Again, contracting parties that pursued their
own interests provided the “just cause or excuse”388 necessary
to protect their behavior.389 As one commentator put it, where
the public was not “serious[ly] inconvenience[d]”390 by the parties’ control of the market, the combination would be sustained
as long as “the advantages of the combination to the parties
thereto seemed to be of a legitimate character.”391
Common law courts did not focus on the benefits of agreements for the public as a whole, nor did they hint at contemporary indicators of procompetitive effect, such as increased output or decreased price. Even analyzing common law decisions
on their own terms does not alter the analysis. The courts, for
example, did not examine an agreement’s tendency to produce
procompetitive effects. Although they examined a tendency toward anticompetitive effects, the absence of such a tendency
did not equate with a finding of procompetitive effects. In short,
the focus of common law courts on the parties themselves neither supports nor proscribes the consideration of procompetitive justifications in today’s Rule of Reason analysis.
3. Chicago School
Just as the Chicago School’s focus on efficiency and competition requires the plaintiff to show anticompetitive effects, it
also allows the defendant an opportunity to offer procompetitive justifications for the restraint.392 On its most fundamental
level, consideration of the justifications for an agreement is
consistent with a focus on allocative efficiency.393 That is, courts
can best judge whether a restraint will contribute to the opti-

386. Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Pin. 123, 132 (Wis. 1851); see THORELLI, supra note 218,
at 48 n.144.
387. Skrainka v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo. App. 522, 527 (1880).
388. Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598, 613 (1889),
aff’d, A.C. 25 (1892).
389. See THORELLI, supra note 218, at 34.
390. 1 EDDY, supra note 361, § 303, at 207.
391. Id.
392. See Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note 293, at 17.
393. See BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 291, at 91-104.
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mal allocation of resources in society by taking into account
justifications designed to show a positive effect on competition
in the market as a whole.
The Chicago School also would offer substantial deference
to the proffered justifications. The “incommensurability of the
stakes,”394 as Judge Easterbrook has put it, is one explanation
for such deference. If a court errs by invalidating an act that
promotes competition, the argument goes, “the benefits may be
lost for good.”395 But, if the court errs by allowing a practice
harmful to competition, “the welfare loss decreases over
time”396 since monopoly prices eventually attract entry by other
firms.397 Another rationale for the Chicago School’s deference to
a defendant’s procompetitive justifications is the beneficial nature of most forms of cooperation.398 In short, the Chicago
School would welcome the defendant’s procompetitive justifications in determining the effect of a restraint on competition.
4. Post-Chicago School
As in the discussion of the Post-Chicago School’s view on
anticompetitive effects, the discussion of procompetitive effects
is similarly constrained. The School would consider more than
just competitive effects. But within an efficiency analysis, and
after the showing of an anticompetitive effect, the School would
allow the defendant to offer procompetitive justifications.399
Similar to the analysis for anticompetitive effect, the defen394. Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note 293, at 2.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. See BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 291, at 133 (noting that “mistaken rules of law” may prevent efficiency where, for example, other paths to efficiency
“are too expensive, but a market position that creates output restriction and higher
prices will always be eroded if it is not based upon superior efficiency”); Easterbrook,
Limits of Antitrust, supra note 293, at 15-16 (“A beneficial practice may reduce the
costs of production for every unit of output; a monopolistic practice imposes loss only to
the extent it leads to a reduction of output.”).
398. See Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note 293, at 15.
399. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 321, at 277-82 (“[W]e think it would
not be unreasonable to leave defendants with the burden of proving measurable, specific, countervailing efficiency justifications in specific exclusionary rights cases in
which plaintiffs have proved actual or probable competitive injury.”). See also Robert
Prentice, Vaporware: Imaginary High-Tech Products and Real Antitrust Liability in a
Post-Chicago World, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1163, 1196 (1996) (citing ABA Antitrust Section,
Monograph No. 18 (Nonprice Predation Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act) (1991))
(recommending assessment of efficiencies as factor in determining whether certain
nonprice behavior is predatory).
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dant’s showing of procompetitive justifications would be a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for the Rule of Reason
analysis to continue to the next step. That is, the presence of a
legitimate justification would allow the court to continue the
inquiry. But even if a legitimate justification is offered, that
may not save the restraint if it infringes other, nonefficiency
goals. For example, Robert Pitofsky has contended, in discussing the exclusion of efficiencies in merger litigation, that an
“occasional loss of efficiency as a result of antitrust enforcement can be tolerated and is to be expected if antitrust is to
serve other legitimate values.”400 The sufficiency of procompetitive justifications in the Rule of Reason analysis—particularly
in the strand focused on competitive effects—counsels in favor
of its inclusion.
D. Reasonable Necessity or Less Restrictive Alternatives
The sources provide only precarious support for the factors
of reasonable necessity and less restrictive alternatives. Of the
two sources that provide the most direct feedback on the factors, one (the common law) would support both factors and the
other (the Chicago School) would not support either. The other
two sources would be relevant only at the margins: the legislative history is neutral on the issue, and the Post-Chicago
School would provide, at most, limited support for the factors.
1. Legislative history
Because the Sherman Act framers envisioned only two
types of combinations—trusts preventing competition and
small businessmen defending themselves—they never addressed (or implicitly provided fodder for or against) the issues
of reasonable necessity or less restrictive alternatives. Stepping
back to the framers’ era and confronting them with the issue
still would not provide guidance. The framers likely would say
that the competition-limiting trusts were not pursuing legitimate objectives, thus making the inquiry of reasonable necessity irrelevant. The framers also would presume that the restraints adopted by combinations of small businessmen to
counteract the trusts were reasonably necessary.
The same would hold true for the less restrictive alternative

400. Pitofsky, supra note 301, at 1074.
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analysis. Again, because the trusts were not pursuing a legitimate objective, the framers would find that the inquiry into
less restrictive alternatives was irrelevant. On the other hand,
they would not second-guess restraints adopted by combinations of farmers or laborers that would foster competition and
allow them to compete more effectively against the trusts. In
short, the legislative history of the Sherman Act is neutral on
the factors of reasonable necessity and less restrictive alternatives.
2. Common law
The common law would support the factors of reasonable
necessity and less restrictive alternatives. Whether or not
common law courts enforced a restraint depended in large part
upon whether the restraint was reasonably necessary.401 This
test was articulated most explicitly in Horner v. Graves,402
which advised courts to focus on “whether the restraint is such
only as to afford a fair protection to the interests of the party in
favour of whom it is given, and not so large as to interfere with
the interests of the public.”403 The Horner court continued:
“Whatever restraint is larger than the necessary protection of the
party, can be of no benefit to either, it can only be oppressive;
and if oppressive, it is, in the eye of the law, unreasonable.”404
Other cases confirm the common law courts’ emphasis on
reasonable necessity. The seminal case of Nordenfelt emphasized the reasonableness of the restraint.405 Even an arrangement designed to prevent competition among the contracting
parties was upheld because the parties used “proper means,”406
or, more particularly, “provisions reasonably necessary for
[their] purpose.”407 Courts applied an initial version of the Rule
401. See, e.g., Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co., [1894]
A.C. 535.
402. 7 Bing. 735, 131 Eng. Rep. 284 (C.P. 1831).
403. 131 Eng. Rep. at 287.
404. Id. (emphasis added). Even if the common law courts focused on the reasonable necessity of a restraint for parties (rather than competition), the analysis still provides support for use of the factor in today’s Rule of Reason analysis.
405. See Nordenfelt, [1894] A.C. at 565 (holding that a restraint is reasonable if it
“afford[s] adequate protection to the party in whose favour it is imposed, while at the
same time it is in no way injurious to the public”); see also Skrainka v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo. App. 522, 527 (1880).
406. Collins v. Locke, 4 A.C. 674, 685 (1879).
407. Id.
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of Reason by finding a restraint reasonable “if it is not larger—
more extensive—than the necessary protection of the parties
requires.”408
The above discussion also reveals support for the factor of
less restrictive alternatives. A direction to enforce only restraints that are no larger than necessary is but another way of
saying that there are no less restrictive alternatives. Stated
positively, a restraint that is broader than necessary, by definition, has less restrictive alternatives.409 In conclusion, the
common law would support the factors of reasonable necessity
and less restrictive alternatives.
3. Chicago School
The Chicago School would not support an inquiry into
whether a restraint is reasonably necessary or whether there
are alternatives less restrictive of competition. The School
would withhold its support because of the administrative difficulties of examining these factors and the “inhospitality tradition of antitrust.”410
In contrast to a targeted inquiry into price or output, determining a restraint’s reasonable necessity or less restrictive
alternatives threatens to bog down a court with unknowable
and fact-intensive matters. These matters include whether hypothetical substitute restraints could achieve the defendant’s
objectives, whether to second-guess the defendant’s intentions
and rationales for business decisions, and the necessity of particular restraints. Therefore, inquiries as to reasonable necessity and less restrictive alternatives could be resolved only on a
case-by-case basis, with little guidance provided to businesses,
future potential defendants, and antitrust courts.
The “inhospitality tradition” articulated by the Chicago
School supports this conclusion. According to this tradition,
judges cast a wary eye on defendants’ business practices, “always wondering how firms are using [them] to harm consumers.”411 If the defendant cannot convince the judge that its practices are an essential feature of competition—and often, it will
408. THORELLI, supra note 218, at 52 (noting also that the restraint must not be
“obviously injurious to the interests of the public”).
409. This assumes, of course, that the less restrictive alternatives would protect
the parties as effectively as the restraint at issue.
410. Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note 293, at 4.
411. Id.
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not, as the “gale of creative destruction”412 known as competition “produces victims before it produces economic theories and
proof of what is beneficial”413—the judge prohibits the practice.
A judge knowingly or unknowingly following this tradition
will inquire suspiciously whether a restraint is reasonably necessary. The court will second-guess the means of attaining the
objectives, and often find that the restraint really was not necessary. The analysis based on less restrictive alternatives
would be even worse. After the fact, a judge can always unearth such an alternative, and this project would take precedence over the inquiry as to whether the alternative would as
effectively achieve the defendant’s goals.414 Because the third
prong of the Rule of Reason analysis would give courts unbridled discretion to invalidate practices that they mistrusted and
because of the indeterminacy of the inquiries introduced by the
factors, the Chicago School would proscribe examination of the
inquiries of reasonable necessity and less restrictive alternatives.
4. Post-Chicago School
The Post-Chicago School would provide a modicum of support for the factors of reasonable necessity and less restrictive
alternatives. Generally speaking, the School would support
such fact intensive inquiries.415 Whether a restraint is reasonably necessary would be a factor the court would utilize in determining the sufficiency of the defendant’s procompetitive justifications. Similarly, the presence of less restrictive
alternatives would be a factor providing information on the inquiry regarding competition. On the other hand, the two inquiries are little more than sideshows. For competition is only
one of multiple goals the School would champion. For example,
in the pursuit of goals such as the dispersion of power or the
promotion of competition as process, the factors are besides the

412. JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAN CAPITALISM SURVIVE? 24 (1978), quoted in
Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note 293, at 5.
413. Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note 293, at 5.
414. See id. at 9 (“The alternatives may be more costly, but the defendant will not
be able to show the amount of the difference. Because alternatives exist, the explanation for a particular practice may appear a too-clever effort to avoid the customary legal
rules.”).
415. See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
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point.416 And even within the competition inquiry, the goals
would play a more tangential role than the key factors of anticompetitive and procompetitive effects. In short, the PostChicago School would provide, at most, limited support for the
factors.
E. Balancing
The sources provide slightly stronger support for balancing.
The Chicago School would endorse a very limited type of balancing, and the Post-Chicago School would approve of broader
balancing. The legislative history and the common law appear
neutral on the factor. Altogether, then, the sources would provide more support for balancing than for the factors of reasonable necessity and less restrictive alternatives, but less support
than was accorded to anticompetitive and procompetitive effects.
1. Legislative history
Similar to the reasonably-necessity or less-restrictivealternative analysis, balancing finds neither support nor opposition in the legislative history. According to the Sherman Act
framers, the association at issue was either an “unlawful combination[] to prevent competition”417 or a “lawful combination[]
in aid of production.”418 It was not a mixture of the two. It did
not lean toward one more than the other. It was one or the
other. The association was either a trust that prevented competition or a combination of small businesses or farmers not covered by the Act. It simply did not cross the minds of the framers that a restraint could have both anticompetitive and
procompetitive effects. Therefore, a contemporary court’s balancing of anticompetitive and procompetitive effects garners
neither support nor opposition from the legislative history.
The conclusions relating to balancing and the factors of rea416. One could imagine an inquiry as to whether there are alternatives less restrictive of these other noncompetition goals, but such explorations are outside the
realm of today’s (most broadly conceived) Rule of Reason analysis, and threaten to impose additional layers of complexity that lie beyond the scope of this Article.
417. 21 CONG. REC. 2456 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
418. Id. (statement of Sen. Sherman); see also id. at 2457 (statement of Sen.
Sherman) (“It is said that this bill will interfere with lawful trade, with the customary
business of life. I deny it. It aims only at unlawful combinations. It does not in the least
affect combinations in aid of production where there is free and fair competition.”).
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sonable necessity and less restrictive alternatives are not surprising given the task that confronted the framers. The framers
focused primarily on issues such as the constitutionality of the
Sherman Act.419 To the extent they explored the reasonableness
of restraints, they endeavored to delimit the types of restraints
that would fall within, or outside of, the Act.420 Their canvas
contained but two water colors—the evil trusts and the defensive alliances of small businessmen. Exploring gradations between the two polarities was thus not only useless, it was beyond contemplation. Moreover, the framers understood that the
courts would play a significant role—as they already had in developing the common law—in distinguishing between reasonable and unreasonable restraints.
2. Common law
Common law courts did not balance the anticompetitive and
procompetitive effects of restraints. Because they focused on
classifying the restraint in certain categories—general or partial, external or internal, unreasonable or reasonable421—they
did not contemplate that restraints could contain elements of
the contrasting categories. Just to pick one example, a restraint
could not be both general and partial. The emphasis by common law courts on the tendency of a combination to restrict
competition, as opposed to its effect, confirms this observation.
This tendency, to the extent it existed, weighed in the direction
of a restriction of competition. To the extent it did not exist, it
leaned toward no such restriction. That is, the absence of such
a tendency did not lean in the direction of a beneficial effect on
competition. So the focus on tendency, in reality, replaced the
competing paradigm of balancing. In the common law setting,
where courts discounted actual beneficial effects, such as a
lowering of price, and treated as dispositive the potential to
harm competition, balancing was beyond the realm of possibilities.

419. See supra note 230.
420. See 21 CONG. REC. 2562 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman) (noting that Act
does not interfere with farmers’ organizations, which “are not business combinations”
and “are not affected in the slightest degree [by the Act], nor [are] they included in the
words or intent of the [Act]”).
421. See supra notes 271-274 and accompanying text.
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3. Chicago School
Expansive balancing, requiring a consideration of efficiency
and nonefficiency factors, would be anathema to the Chicago
School. In contrast to their esteemed efficiency formulas, which
Chicago School proponents contend are as uncontroversial as
they are easy to apply, balancing introduces everything the
Chicago School deplores—judicial discretion, indeterminacy,
and a lack of guidance for businesses and future defendants.
Judge Bork, for example, has argued that courts should not
consider goals other than consumer welfare because the adoption of non-economic approaches “would create uncertainties
that the courts would not long tolerate”422 and that would be
replaced by rigid rules.423
Judge Easterbrook has gone further, criticizing the balancing called for by the contemporary Rule of Reason. Easterbrook
has contended that the formulations articulated by Justice
Brandeis in Chicago Board of Trade424 are “empty.”425 Judges
“cannot do what such open-ended formulas require [because
w]hen everything is relevant, nothing is dispositive.”426 Easterbrook laments that the formulation fails to assist businesses in
planning their conduct and results in costly litigation burdened
by endless discovery.427
With regard to vertical restraints, in particular, Easterbrook deems “pointless”428 the balancing of interbrand and intrabrand competition: “There is no ‘loss’ in one column to ‘balance’ against a ‘gain’ in the other”429 because a reduction in
rivalry among a manufacturer’s dealers on price is only the
“tool” employed by the manufacturer to attain enhanced com-

422. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 291, at 87.
423. See id. (“Area after area has been taken over by harsh rules, and sometimes,
as in the law of requirements contracts, the Court has pointed to the need for certainty
as justifying a rigid rule that was, admittedly, not the best resolution of the economic
considerations.”) (citation omitted).
424. Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); see supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
425. Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note 293, at 12.
426. Id.
427. See id. at 12-13 (“Litigation costs are the product of vague rules combined
with high stakes, and nowhere is that combination more deadly than in antitrust litigation under the Rule of Reason.”). The same point is made by Judge Posner. See Posner, Per Se Legality, supra note 300, at 14-18.
428. Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note 293, at 13.
429. Id. at 14.
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petition on service.430 He further notes that courts cannot determine the level of increased interbrand competition that will
justify various levels of reduction in intrabrand competition.431
However, even given all of the above, there is room for a
limited type of balancing in the Chicago world—balancing
along the lines of the net effect of a restraint on output, for example. Certain restraints will fall “on a continuum between efficiency and restriction of output”432 and the court must determine “which is the more probable effect.”433 Determining a net
effect on competition is the type of inquiry “familiar to
courts.”434 This type of balancing accords with today’s Rule of
Reason analysis, where the restraint’s anticompetitive and procompetitive effects constitute the first two steps of the analysis.
Therefore, the Chicago School would support a limited type of
balancing, but only in those (few) cases in which there is an anticompetitive effect and balancing could take place along a narrow continuum such as output.
4. Post-Chicago School
The Post-Chicago School would embrace balancing; it would
consider anticompetitive and procompetitive effects in determining an outcome on an axis of efficiency or competition,
while also considering other factors in the equation.435 In “tiebreaker” situations, nonefficiency factors could make the difference.436 Thus, proponents of the School would examine the
effect of the restraint on, for example, concentration in the
market, a competitive process, or individual freedom. While
430. See BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 291, at 290 (“The manufacturer
shares with the consumer the desire to have distribution done at the lowest possible
cost consistent with effectiveness. That is why courts need never weigh the opposing
forces of lessened intrabrand and heightened interbrand competition.”); Easterbrook,
Limits of Antitrust, supra note 293, at 13-14; Lopatka, supra note 13, at 58 (“[A] vertical restraint imposed by a single manufacturer does not impede competition in a relevant antitrust sense when a brand is not a market. . . . A restraint on rivalry among
dealers is not a reduction in intrabrand competition that needs to be offset by an increase in interbrand competition.”); Posner, Per Se Legality, supra note 300, at 18-21.
431. See Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note 293, at 14.
432. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 291, at 85.
433. Id. Similarly, when courts decide whether to interfere with a monopoly, they
are to weigh “gains in destruction of monopoly power” against “losses in efficiency.” Id.
at 79.
434. Id. at 85.
435. See, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 301, at 1073.
436. See id. at 1067 n.44.
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recognizing that a multifactored morass helps neither the
courts nor the parties, the School nonetheless would support
balancing that considers at least a restraint’s anticompetitive
and procompetitive effects.
III. THE CAPACITIES OF COURTS
Naturally following Part II, which explored what courts
should do, comes Part III, which looks to what courts can do.
This Part supplements Part II, particularly for those factors of
the Rule of Reason analysis for which the sources provide only
lukewarm support. Part III determines the capacities of courts
as a matter of both hypothesis and practice. The underlying focus of this Part, like the focus of the Rule of Reason itself, is
competition.437
Before getting into the details of each of the factors, a brief
comment on the burden-shifting concept. As a matter of procedure, the delineation and application of predictable and orderly
burdens, shifting between the parties, is a task that courts can
perform. Further, it is a task that courts can do better than the
competing alternative: general balancing from the outset of
each case. A shifting of burdens, in contrast, puts the parties
on notice as to the most significant factors and the order in
which they will be considered. And it assists the courts for
similar reasons: predictability, consistency, and legitimacy.438
The application of the burden-shifting concept has had
benefits in practice. It fosters judicial efficiency: the courts can

437. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984); see also, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (“The Sherman Act was designed
to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. . . . [T]he policy unequivocally laid down by the
Act is competition.”). Although the term “competition” does not have one precise meaning, courts typically have looked to the effect of a restraint on output, price, and, to a
lesser extent, quality. See, e.g., NCAA, 468 U.S. at 99, 109 n.38; Broadcast Music, Inc.
v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979); United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08
(1972); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993); Tunis Bros. Co. v.
Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 728 (3d Cir. 1991); Wilk v. American Med. Ass’n, 895
F.2d 352, 359 (7th Cir. 1990).
438. The Supreme Court’s decision in California Dental Ass’n v. Federal Trade
Commission, 119 S.Ct. 1604 (1999), renders the burden-shifting approach even more
compelling. In that case, the Court found that an association’s restrictions on certain
types of advertising were subject to more than “quick look” scrutiny but less than the
“fullest market analysis” of the Rule of Reason. California Dental, 119 S.Ct. at 1617. In
calling for “an enquiry meet for the case,” id. at 1618, the Court provided no guidance
on the level of scrutiny to be applied or the order in which the analysis would proceed.
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dispose of those cases with no anticompetitive effect or procompetitive justification before engaging in the time-consuming
and costly balancing analysis. In addition, it reduces errors by
preventing courts from being swayed by plaintiffs who cannot
demonstrate an anticompetitive effect but who nonetheless focus on the defendant’s alleged lack of procompetitive justifications.439 Of course, a burden-shifting approach is only as defensible as the factors composing the construct. It is to these
inquiries that this Article now turns.
A. Anticompetitive Effect
As much as any inquiry in the field of antitrust law, courts
can analyze the building blocks of anticompetitive effect.
1. Output
Courts can determine a restraint’s effect on output.
Whether a restraint has resulted in an increase or a decrease of
(or has had no effect on) output is a matter that a court can
analyze. With the benefit of a developed record, a court can determine if the number of suppliers or products in a market has
risen,440 remained unchanged,441 or decreased.442 The court also
439. See Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537,
547 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding procompetitive justifications “unnecessary” where plaintiff
“has not carried its own initial burden” of showing anticompetitive effect); Calculators
Hawaii, Inc. v. Brandt, Inc., 724 F.2d 1332, 1338-39 (9th Cir. 1983) (reversing court that
“addressed and disconnected [the defendant’s] business justification for the [challenged
practice] without ever having assessed the impact upon competition”); Patel v. Scotland
Mem’l Hosp., No. 3:94CV00284, 1995 WL 319213, at *1 n.4 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 1995)
(finding plaintiff’s argument that defendants “have failed to set forth any procompetitive justifications for their actions” to be “without merit” because plaintiff failed
to carry its initial burden of showing anticompetitive effect); Jim Forno’s Continental
Motors, Inc. v. Subaru Distribs. Corp., 649 F. Supp. 746, 754 (N.D.N.Y. 1986) (rejecting
argument that “no allegation of anticompetitive effect is necessary if the challenged
action has no ‘procompetitive’ effect”).
440. See, e.g., Kumar v. National Med. Enters., Inc., No. 93-16841, 1994 WL
659031, at *2 (9th Cir. Nov. 22, 1994); Lie v. St. Joseph Hosp., 964 F.2d 567, 570 (6th
Cir. 1992); Oksanen v. Page Mem’l Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 709 (4th Cir. 1991); Guyon v.
Chinese Shar-Pei Club, No. 89-15483, 1990 WL 121080, at *2 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 1990);
Registered Physical Therapists, Inc. v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., No. 86-C0076J, 1988 WL 125788, at *7 (D. Utah Sept. 6, 1988); Mays v. Hosp. Auth., 596 F.
Supp. 120, 122 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Merkle Press Inc. v. Merkle, 519 F. Supp. 50, 53 (D.
Md. 1981).
441. See, e.g., Sitkin Smelting & Ref. Co. v. FMC Corp., 575 F.2d 440, 447 (3d Cir.
1978); Minnesota Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Unity Hosp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 694, 707
(D. Minn. 1998); Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 814 F. Supp. 1254, 1265 (W.D. Pa. 1992).
442. See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm’n v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447,
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can determine if the defendant’s market share increased after
implementing the restraint.443 The manifestations of output are
readily observable and calculable.
This conclusion comes with two caveats. First, a court
might not be able to measure output in every case. For example, the restraint may not have had time to take effect. Or the
plaintiff may not have been able to discover such information.
Or such information is not readily ascertainable. Granted. That
the effect on output cannot always be calculated does not diminish the significance of the many instances in which it can
be determined and in which it provides crucial information on
the effects of a restraint.
Second, it is not possible for economists, let alone courts, to
distinguish precisely between the effects of a restraint and the
effects of a number of other potential causes for observed results: macroeconomic factors, developments in the market unrelated to the defendant, or changes made by the defendant
unrelated to the restraint, just to name a few. And not knowing
which factors are responsible for a change in output could lead
to deceptive conclusions. At a minimum, it will often lead only
to guarded conclusions. In the end, however, even if the tracing
of precise lines of causation is not possible, the examination of
the effect on output is helpful and usually will be consistent
with other indicators of competitive effect, such as price.
2. Price
Like output, courts can examine the price of a good affected
by a restraint. Whether the price has risen or fallen is an uncomplicated matter of reading the (developed) record. Consequently, courts have had no trouble in observing a restraint’s
lack of effect on price444 or noting its effect either in raising445 or

459 (1986); NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984); National Soc’y of Prof’l
Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-95 (1978); Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 1992).
443. See New York v. Anheuser-Busch, 811 F. Supp. 848, 859 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (increased market share after implementation of territorial restraints “is evidence of the
procompetitive effects of the restraint and the resulting increase in consumer preference for the product”); Posner, Per Se Legality, supra note 300, at 26 (“[I]f the defendant’s output or market share rises as a result of the restraint, then, on balance, the
restraint must promote consumer welfare and economic efficiency.”).
444. See, e.g., Oksanen v. Page Mem’l Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 709 (4th Cir. 1991);
Guyon v. Chinese Shar-Pei Club, No. 89-15483, 1990 WL 121080, at *2 (9th Cir. Aug.
21, 1990); Sitkin Smelting & Ref. Co. v. FMC Corp., 575 F.2d 440, 447 (3d Cir. 1978);
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lowering446 price.
But again, like the inquiry regarding output, the examination of price may not be measurable in certain settings. Moreover, the effects of the restraint—as opposed to other, unrelated factors—on price may not be precisely traceable.
Nonetheless, the courts can make, and have made, efforts to
distinguish the effects of the restraint from other factors. As an
initial matter, courts have appropriately required plaintiffs to
show market power by focusing on increased pricing not in the
defendant’s products, but in the overall context of the market
or with reference to competitors’ pricing.447 They also have distinguished the effect of the restraint at issue from extraneous
factors such as legislation, investment, costs, inflation, and advertising expenditures.448 And again the caveats, in the end, do
not overcome the conclusion that courts can analyze the effect
of a restraint on price.
3. Other factors
Courts may find other factors indicative of anticompetitive
effect more difficult to measure than output or price. For example, quality is not as readily ascertainable. Nonetheless, the
courts have been able to determine whether a restraint adversely affected quality.449 Whether more consumers buy a

Advanced Health-Care Servs., Inc. v. Giles Mem’l Hosp., 846 F. Supp. 488, 493 (W.D.
Va. 1994); Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 814 F. Supp. 1254, 1265 (W.D. Pa. 1992); Mays v.
Hospital Auth., 596 F. Supp. 120, 122 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
445. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984); Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 624 F.2d 1342, 1353 (5th Cir. 1980).
446. See, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 65 (1998); Seaboard Supply Co. v. Congoleum Corp., 770 F.2d 367, 375 (3d Cir.
1985).
447. See, e.g., Southern Card & Novelty, Inc. v. Lawson Mardon Label, Inc., 138
F.3d 869, 877 (11th Cir. 1998); Doctor’s Hosp. v. Southeast Med. Alliance, Inc., 123
F.3d 301, 310 (5th Cir. 1997); Levine v. Central Fla. Med. Affiliates, Inc., 72 F.3d 1538,
1552 (11th Cir. 1996); Godix Equip. Export Corp. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 948 F. Supp.
1570, 1582 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
448. See Levine, 72 F.3d at 1552 (noting insufficiency of increased prices in managed care plan without information on fees charged by providers not in the plan, resource costs, and inflation); Anheuser-Busch, 811 F. Supp. at 865-66 (the “cumulative
effect” of legislation, inflation, and investment “diminish the portion of any price increase” attributable to the restraint; moreover, the increase in the defendant’s sales
confirmed the reasonableness of price increases).
449. See, e.g., Southern Card, 138 F.3d at 877; Sitkin Smelting & Ref. Co., 575
F.2d at 447; Minnesota Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Unity Hosp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 694,
707 (D. Minn. 1998); Advanced Health-Care Servs., 846 F. Supp. at 493 & n.7; Miller,
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product is one way of making this determination, though,
again, differentiation of causation is inexact. In general, even if
less objective manifestations of anticompetitive effect present
slightly greater difficulty for courts, the conclusion still holds
that courts can analyze anticompetitive effect, in particular,
the primary building blocks of price and output.450
An examination of the cases supports this conclusion. Of
the cases in which courts found that there was no anticompetitive effect, the overwhelming majority correctly analyzed this
factor.451 Of 427 such cases, only 3—less than 1%—should have,
most deferentially considered, found an anticompetitive effect.452 The courts in these three cases failed to recognize (at
least for purposes of motions to dismiss) the potential anticompetitive effect presented by an increase in costs453 or a decrease
in supply.454 Of the 28 cases in which courts discovered an anticompetitive effect, 9 (32%) should not have done so.455 The uni814 F. Supp. at 1265.
450. In addition to measuring actual anticompetitive effect, courts can measure
potential anticompetitive effect as revealed through market power. Courts can determine the markets in which products compete and calculate market share and other indicators of market power, such as barriers to entry. See, e.g., Midwest Underground
Storage, Inc. v. Porter, 717 F.2d 493, 499 (10th Cir. 1983); Godix Equip. Export Corp. v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 948 F.Supp. 1570, 1580-82 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
451. This Article deferentially examines the courts’ holdings. Where the result
could legitimately go either way, the decision is regarded as correct. In addition, the
determination of correctness does not presuppose a particular philosophy; that is, as
long as the court articulates the basis for its decision—be it a focus on competition or
on noneconomic factors (à la Post-Chicago School)—correctness is determined with reference to the paradigm selected. Because no courts, in applying the Rule of Reason,
have explicitly invoked noneconomic rationales for their decisions, the Article looks to
competition and treats decisions as incorrect only where the court flagrantly miscalculates the net effect on competition or on consumer welfare.
452. See Health First, Inc. v. Bronson Methodist Hosp., No. 1:89-CV-1191, 1990
WL 157372 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 20, 1990); Kling v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 626 F.
Supp. 1285 (C.D. Ill. 1986); Alpha-Sentura Bus. Servs., Inc. v. Interbank Card Ass’n,
No. HM 78-1549, 1979 WL 1706 (D. Md. Sept. 11, 1979).
453. See Health First, 1990 WL 157372, at *1, *4 (allegation that defendants’ conduct “tended to increase health care costs” could be broadly construed to allege anticompetitive effect in market of hospital services); Kling, 626 F. Supp. at 1291 (allegation by plaintiff that restraint would increase cost and decrease quality of health care
services).
454. See Alpha-Sentura Bus. Servs., 1979 WL 1706, at *3 (banking associations
denied credit card services to entire market of adult bookstores).
455. See Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1996); Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm. v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984); NASL v. NFL, 670
F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982); Eiberger v. Sony Corp., 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980); Smith v.
Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); United States v. North Dakota Hosp.
Ass’n, 640 F. Supp. 1028 (D.N.D. 1986); Cantor v. Multiple Listing Serv., 568 F. Supp.
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fying factor of these nine cases was the court’s focus on the effect of the restraint on a competitor—be it by focusing exclusively on the effect on the competitor456 or on intrabrand competition,457 or by emphasizing an overly narrow market.458 All
together, of the 455 cases examining anticompetitive effect,
courts correctly interpreted the factor in an impressive 443
cases (97%). Since 1990, only one court incorrectly examined
the factor.459 These incontrovertible figures support the hypothesis that courts can examine anticompetitive effect.
B. Procompetitive Justifications
The courts also can consider a defendant’s procompetitive
justifications. They can determine (1) whether the proffered
justification, if true, would promote competition, and (2)
whether there is evidence in the record to support the justification. First, courts can recognize justifications that limit freeriding,460 encourage dealer investment,461 foster market penetration,462 allow a new product to be developed,463 foster qual424 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Countrie Butcher Shoppe, Inc. v. Foodarama Supermarkets, Inc.,
No. 81-5336, 1982 WL 1909 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 1982); TV Signal Co. v. AT&T, No. CIV
70-6N, 1981 WL 2049 (D.S.D. Mar. 13, 1981).
456. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1319 (discussing effect of sanctions imposed by athletic conference on university); North Dakota Hosp. Ass’n, 640 F. Supp. at 1039 (purchaser harmed by hospital association’s rates); Cantor, 568 F. Supp. at 430 (association
rule had adverse impact on business of plaintiffs—2 out of 600 licensed real estate brokers in the market); Foodarama Supermarkets, 1982 WL 1909, at *3 (restrictive covenant had adverse effect on competitor); AT&T, 1981 WL 2049, at *5 (focusing on effect
of policy on plaintiff, who, incidentally, succeeded in competing in the market).
457. See Eiberger, 622 F.2d at 1081 (invalidating restraint by which party charged
fees for sales outside territories that had effect only on intrabrand competition).
458. See Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm. v. NFL , 726 F.2d at 1392-95 (focusing on effect of NFL rule in local market); NASL, 670 F.2d at 1259-61 (finding market
of “sports capital and skill”); Smith, 593 F.2d at 1183 (“market for players’ services”).
459. See Hairston, 101 F.3d 1315.
460. See, e.g., SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 969, 972 (10th Cir.
1994); Western Trails, Inc. v. Camp Coast to Coast, Inc., Civ. A. No. 90-2063 (HHG),
1994 WL 773361 (D.D.C. Jun. 16, 1994); Gemini Concerts, Inc. v. Triple-A Baseball
Club Assocs., 664 F. Supp. 24, 27 (D. Me. 1987); Net Realty Holding Trust v. Franconia
Properties, Inc., No. 82-0318-A, 1983 WL 1786, at *7 (E.D. Va. Jan. 20, 1983).
461. See, e.g., New York v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 848, 876 (E.D.N.Y.
1993).
462. See, e.g., Newberry v. Washington Post Co., 438 F. Supp. 470, 475 (D.D.C.
1977).
463. See, e.g., National Bancard Corp. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 605 (11th
Cir. 1986); Southtrust Corp. v. Plus Sys., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1517, 1524 (N.D. Ala.
1995); National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass’n, 507 F. Supp. 1113, 1123
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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ity,464 and advance other procompetitive objectives.465 Second,
they can comb the record to find evidence of the justification—
documentation to that effect, for example. They also can locate
evidence of procompetitive effects. For the same reasons mentioned above, courts can observe a reduction in price or an expansion in output. Courts also can recognize the flip sides of
these propositions—that certain alleged justifications really are
not procompetitive or that there is no evidence that supports
the justifications.466
Courts must be careful. The key to the determination, of
course, is whether the proffered justification has a beneficial
effect on competition. The dangers here are that a court either
does not credit a defendant’s legitimate justification or approves an explanation that does not promote competition. The
likelihood of either danger occurring should be rare. As long as
it is plausible that the restraint will promote competition,
courts should not dismiss the justification. Even if courts view
antitrust defendants askance, and consider justifications to be
nothing more than post-hoc rationalizations, that does not
mean that these courts will find that there is no procompetitive
justification. Nor should the reverse hold: courts typically will
not be blinded by an explanation that does not really benefit
competition since they can distinguish between a benefit to
competition and one inhering solely to the defendant.
Courts’ consideration of procompetitive effects conforms to
these conclusions. The courts found that the restraint in question had a procompetitive effect in 34 cases. Although the context varied—in 20 cases, the courts conducted balancing;467 in
464. See, e.g., Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998); Servicetrends, Inc.
v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1042, 1066 (N.D. Ga. 1994); Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 919 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
465. See, e.g., Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru, 858 F.2d 792, 799 (1st Cir. 1998) (preventing parts shortages); Northeastern Educ. Television v. Educational Television Ass’n,
758 F. Supp. 1568, 1578 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (increasing diversity of output); Net Realty
Holding Trust v. Franconia Properties, Inc., No. 82-0318-A, 1983 WL 1786, at *8 (E.D.
Va. Jan. 20, 1983) (promoting comparison shopping); Jetro Cash and Carry Enters.,
Inc. v. Food Distrib. Ctr., 569 F. Supp. 1404, 1416 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (same); Gunter Harz
Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass’n, 511 F. Supp. 1103, 1117 (D. Neb. 1981) (preserving integrity of game).
466. See infra notes 467-474 and accompanying text.
467. Three of the balancing cases barely found a procompetitive justification to
weigh against an anticompetitive effect. See Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Memorial
Park Cemetery Ass’n, 666 F.2d 1130, 1140 (8th Cir. 1981); Cantor v. Multiple Listing
Serv., 568 F. Supp. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); TV Signal Co. v. AT&T, No. Civ.70-6N, 1981
WL 2049 (D.S.D. Mar. 13, 1981).
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3, they determined whether the restraint was reasonably necessary; and in 11, they summarily found the restraint to be
reasonable or unreasonable—the result was the same. In every
one of these 34 cases, the court reached the correct conclusion
on the factor and was not blinded by the defendant’s explanation. Even if the court ultimately struck down the restraint, it
first found that the restraint had a procompetitive effect.
Consideration of cases in which courts found no procompetitive effect—and therefore invalidated the restraint—confirms
that courts can analyze this factor and that they do not improperly ignore procompetitive justifications. Of the 14 cases in
which courts found no procompetitive effect, this finding—
again, most deferentially considered—was correct in 13 cases.
The courts correctly found that there was no evidence to support the procompetitive effect;468 that the proffered justification
was not legitimate because it questioned the necessity of competition;469 that there was no viable free-riding justification;470
or that the defendant explained its justification in the wrong
market.471 The only case that misconstrued this factor was
Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.,472 which found that the NFL draft
of college players was procompetitive only “in its effect on the
playing field.”473 The Smith court thus ignored a fundamental
goal to which the draft contributed—competitive balance. This
goal allows the NFL to put out a better product that competes

468. See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1022, 1024 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 65 (1998); In re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass’n, 955 F.2d 457, 471-72 (6th Cir. 1992);
Wilk v. American Med. Ass’n, 895 F.2d 352, 361 (7th Cir. 1990); Barber & Ross Co. v.
Lifetime Doors, Inc., 810 F.2d 1276, 1280 (4th Cir. 1987); Twin City Sportservice, Inc.
v. Charles O. Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1291, 1304 (9th Cir. 1982); Countrie Butcher
Shoppe, Inc. v. Foodarama Supermarkets, Inc., No. 81-5336, 1982 WL 1909, at *4 (E.D.
Pa. Oct. 14, 1982).
469. See Federal Trade Comm’n v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 462-64
(1986); NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 114-20 (1984); National Soc’y of Prof’l
Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-95 (1978); United States v. Capitol Serv.,
Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 153 (E.D. Wisc. 1983), aff’d, 756 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1985); Mardirosian v. American Inst. of Architects, 474 F. Supp. 628, 648-49 (D.D.C. 1979).
470. See Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 675 (7th
Cir. 1992).
471. See International Wood Processors v. Power Dry, Inc. 593 F. Supp. 710, 722
(D.S.C. 1984).
472. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
473. Id. at 1186. Earlier in its opinion, the court had conceded that “[s]ome form of
player selection system may serve to regulate and thereby promote competition in what
would otherwise be a chaotic bidding market for the services of college players.” Id. at
1181.
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more effectively against other forms of entertainment; in short,
to enhance interbrand competition.474 The Smith case aside,
courts’ consideration of procompetitive effect, in particular
their correct analysis of the factor in 47 out of 48 cases (98%),
provides cogent support for the conclusion that courts can analyze procompetitive effects.
C. Reasonable Necessity or Less Restrictive Alternative
The third stage of the Rule of Reason analysis calls for at
least one of two determinations. This Section concludes that
the courts cannot do one: the search for less restrictive alternatives to the restraint.475 The Section further concludes that the
other—examining whether the restraint is reasonably necessary—would benefit from a shift in the burden of production
from plaintiffs having to show that the restraint is not reasonably necessary to defendants being required to show that it
is reasonably necessary. Given the sources’ lukewarm support
of the factors, these conclusions tilt the balance as to the propriety of the factors.
1. Less restrictive alternatives
Courts cannot determine whether a restraint has alternatives that are less restrictive of competition for three reasons.
First, in conducting such an examination, the courts’ focus
shifts naturally to whether an alternative restraint exists and
whether this restraint is less restrictive of competition. The
court does not focus on whether such a restraint would achieve
the defendant’s objectives as well as the current restraint or
whether it would attain all—as opposed to some—of the objectives. The neglect of the link between the alternative restraint
and the defendant’s objectives is an ominous sign.476
474. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 119-20 (1984) (“The hypothesis
that legitimates the maintenance of competitive balance as a procompetitive justification under the Rule of Reason is that equal competition will maximize consumer demand for the product.”).
475. Of course, courts perform an analysis based on less restrictive alternatives in
other fields, such as constitutional law. In antitrust law, however, it is difficult enough
to determine whether an actual restraint promotes the defendant’s goals. Determining
whether a hypothetical restraint would achieve the goals is a not workable test. Moreover, it is arguably more defensible to allow a more activist judicial role to protect constitutional norms such as freedom of speech than to second-guess business judgments
and intervene in the marketplace.
476. See Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1396-97
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Second, and compounding this problem, courts can always
find a less restrictive alternative. Unlike the defendant, who
presumably decides in advance whether a particular restraint
will achieve its objectives, a court looks post hoc at the restraint and its effects, and can always tinker at the margins. It
can opine that a manufacturer should have had a few more
dealers, that an exclusive dealing agreement should have foreclosed a little less of the market, that an association’s rule
should have had a little less of an effect on a competitor. The
“imaginations of lawyers could [always] conjure up some
method”477 of achieving the defendant’s objectives that would
have a marginally lesser effect on competition.478 As a result,
courts would second-guess legitimate business judgments made
by defendants.479
Third, and relatedly, courts looking for a less restrictive restraint will, in effect, conduct a least-restrictive-alternative
analysis.480 The only type of restraint that will not have a less
restrictive alternative is the least restrictive alternative. Any
other restraint, by definition, will have a less restrictive alternative. So in looking for less restrictive alternatives, the courts
actually are penalizing the defendants for not using the least
restrictive alternative.481 Courts that promise that they are
searching only for less (and not least) restrictive alternatives
are only deceiving themselves. This is not constitutional law;482
whether a restraint is the least restrictive alternative leads the
court on a wild goose chase not appropriate in antitrust law.483
(9th Cir. 1984); Cantor v. Multiple Listing Serv., 568 F. Supp. 424, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
477. American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1249 (3d Cir.
1975).
478. See id.; see also Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 303
(2d Cir. 1979).
479. See American Motor Inns, 521 F.2d at 1249-50.
480. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Sylvania court explained the dangers of an analysis based on least restrictive alternatives: such a rule “would place an
unreasonable and impractical burden on a manufacturer desiring to impose some vertical restraint in order to promote its position vis-à-vis its competitors.” Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 694 F.2d 1132, 1138 n.11 (9th Cir. 1982).
481. The only conceivable difference between the terms results when there exists
a range of alternatives less restrictive than the restraint at issue. Then, the least restrictive alternative would be different from marginally-more-restrictive “less restrictive alternatives.” Stating this distinction demonstrates its irrelevance.
482. See NFL v. NASL, 459 U.S. 1074, 1079 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
denial of cert.) (“The antitrust laws impose a standard of reasonableness, not a standard of absolute necessity.”).
483. This Article does not dispute that, properly applied, the less restrictive alter-
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In practice, the courts’ consideration of the factor confirms
that they should abandon all inquiry—as a separate step in the
burden-shifting analysis or as a factor in balancing—as to
whether the restraint at issue has less restrictive alternatives.
Only one court has disposed of a case because no less restrictive alternative could be shown.484 Three courts considered the
factor in their balancing analysis,485 and three did so in concluding that a restraint was not unreasonable.486 Of the seven
cases, the court in the case for which the factor was dispositive
and the courts in the three balancing cases misanalyzed the
factor. Thus, courts in only 3 out of 7 cases (43%) correctly determined whether there were less restrictive alternatives.
The one case in which the factor was dispositive illustrates
the danger of the analysis. The court in Hairston v. Pacific 10
Conference487 relied on the absence of less restrictive alternatives in addressing an athletic association’s imposition of sanctions on a university that committed violations in recruiting
football players.488 The court found that the university’s inability to participate in bowl games satisfied the threshold of anticompetitive effect, and that the punishment of football programs that violate the conference’s amateurism rules had
procompetitive effects.489 The court concluded that the plaintiffs
failed to show “that the [association’s] procompetitive objectives
could be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner.”490
The court’s opinion was flawed.
First, the court never should have reached the third stage
of the burden-shifting analysis. There was no anticompetitive
effect. The court cursorily found such an effect despite its failnative analysis would be useful. After all, who could be against a test that allows the
defendant to achieve all of its procompetitive objectives while having a less restrictive
effect on competition? The recommendations of this Article, however, take into account
courts’ capacities. The Article draws conclusions based not on best-case-keep-ourfingers-crossed scenarios but on today’s courts, warts and all.
484. See Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1996).
485. See Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm. v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.
1984); NASL v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982); Cantor v. Multiple Listing Serv.,
568 F. Supp. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
486. See Barry v. Blue Cross of California, 805 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1986); Foster v.
Maryland State Sav. and Loan Ass’n, 590 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Hennessey v.
NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977).
487. 101 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1996).
488. See id. at 1317.
489. See id. at 1319.
490. Id.
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ure to define the scope of the relevant market in which the restraint had an effect and to cite any adverse effect on competition, as opposed to one competitor.491 But it is the court’s discussion of less restrictive alternatives that raises a red flag.
Most fundamentally, the court never examined whether a less
restrictive alternative would promote the defendant’s goals. It
rested its conclusion on the plaintiffs’ failure to provide evidence supporting their claim that the penalties imposed were
disproportionate.492 Even most broadly considered, this inquiry
addresses only a range of penalties related to the actual restraint; it does not implicate other alternatives. As for the objectives themselves, the court graced them with only one sentence.493 As an example of a court conducting a less restrictive
alternative analysis without analyzing other alternatives and
without examining the link between the restraint and the defendant’s objectives, Hairston warns of the difficulties of the
less restrictive alternative analysis.
The three courts that examined the factor of less restrictive
alternatives in their balancing analysis did not fare any better.
In Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL (“Raiders”),494 a central factor in the court’s affirmance of a jury verdict that the NFL’s relocation rules were unreasonable was the
contention that the NFL’s “goals can be achieved in a variety of
ways which are less harmful to competition.”495 The court concluded that the League’s consideration of objective factors in
determining whether franchises could relocate would be more
“closely tailored” to its goals.496 It never explained, however,
how the consideration of objective factors would have a less restrictive effect on competition. In fact, after lauding the benefits of a less restrictive alternative analysis,497 the court never
actually admitted that the consideration of objective factors
was a less restrictive alternative at all.
In NASL v. NFL,498 the court invalidated the NFL’s cross491. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1319. Moreover, the court had stated, earlier in its
opinion, that the plaintiffs had failed to show an anticompetitive effect. See id. at 1318.
492. See id. at 1319.
493. See id.
494. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
495. Id. at 1396.
496. Id. at 1397. The factors the court mentioned were population, economic projections, facilities, regional balance, fan loyalty, and location continuity. See id.
497. See id. at 1395.
498. 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982).
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ownership rules based in part on the existence of less restrictive alternatives. The court found, for example, that any conflict of interest between the sports leagues in selling broadcast
rights could be remedied “by removing cross-owners from [the
NFL’s] broadcast rights negotiating committee.”499 Similarly,
the court rejected the NFL’s argument that the rules were necessary to prevent the disclosure of confidential information to
the rival league because there were “less restrictive means”500
of attaining the goal. Yet the court incorrectly focused on the
existence of less restrictive alternatives rather than whether
the alternatives would achieve the NFL’s objectives.501 It did
not show how removing owners from the broadcast rights
committee achieved, at a minimum, the proffered goals outside
this sphere—such as preventing conflict in the sale of game
tickets.502 Nor did the court explain how preventing the disclosure of confidential information could be achieved by “less restrictive means” that it did not even describe.503
In Cantor v. Multiple Listing Service,504 the court invalidated a real estate association bylaw that prevented members
from posting signs from other organizations on property that
was for sale. The court devoted one sentence of its opinion to
the defendant’s objectives, and summarily noted that the objectives could be achieved by requiring the posting of association
signs “no less conspicuously” than other signs.505 The court
never explained how its alternative was less restrictive of competition as a whole or how such an alternative would promote
the defendant’s objectives.
Three courts did not botch the less restrictive alternative
analysis, but the role of the analysis in their opinions is not
clear. In Hennessey v. NCAA,506 the court upheld a bylaw of the
NCAA that limited the number of assistant football and basketball coaches that institutions could employ.507 The court did

499. Id. at 1261.
500. Id.
501. The court also misstated the governing law on the burden of production by
requiring the NFL to “come forward with proof” of such alternatives. Id.
502. See id.
503. See id.
504. 568 F. Supp. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
505. Id. at 431.
506. 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977).
507. See id. at 1141.
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not discern any effects of the bylaw, given its recent enactment,
but it concluded that the restraint would achieve the NCAA’s
objectives.508 The court correctly rejected plaintiffs’ proffered
less restrictive alternatives (a longer grace period before the
application of the bylaw and a compensation limit for
coaches).509 In Barry v. Blue Cross of California,510 the court
upheld an arrangement by which the Blue Cross reimbursed
physicians that participated in a particular insurance package
at a higher rate.511 The court found that the restraint had no
anticompetitive effects, that it had procompetitive effects in
lowering prices, and that a less restrictive alternative suggested by the plaintiff—reimbursing nonparticipating doctors
at the same rate that participating doctors received—was not a
viable alternative since it would not have achieved the objective of encouraging doctors to join the insurance package.512 Finally, in Foster v. Maryland State Savings and Loan Ass’n,513
the court upheld a practice of a savings and loan association to
charge lenders a fee if they employed attorneys other than the
association’s own counsel. After finding the restraint to be, at
most, “de minimis”514 and reasonable, the court rejected plaintiffs’ claimed less restrictive alternatives. In particular, the
court noted that the association had already—unsuccessfully—
tried the suggested alternative of relying on borrowers’ counsel.515
2. Reasonable necessity
A court can, on the other hand, examine whether a restraint is reasonably necessary to achieve the defendant’s objectives. And it must make this assessment, as irrelevant procompetitive justifications having nothing to do with the
restraint cannot be permitted to blind the court.516 Even so, the
508. See id. at 1153-54.
509. See id. at 1154. The grace period did not “support[] the objective” of the bylaw
and the compensation limit was not “less [of] a restraint” than the bylaw at issue. Id.
510. 805 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1986).
511. See id. at 867.
512. See id. at 872-73.
513. 590 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
514. Id. at 933.
515. The court explained that many attorneys employed by the borrowers were
inexperienced, unqualified in the field at issue, and overly concerned with completing
the sale. See id. at 934.
516. See Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1577 n.31
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analysis of reasonable necessity would benefit from a shift in
the burden of production. Better to let the defendant prove that
the restraint is reasonably necessary than to have the plaintiff
prove it is not.
The standard of “reasonable necessity” ensures that courts
can analyze this factor. For starters, courts can determine
whether a defendant is pursuing legitimate procompetitive objectives.517 They also can determine whether a particular restraint is sufficiently connected to the goal to be “reasonably
necessary.” They need not decide whether the restraint is the
most effective means to achieve the objective. They need not
examine whether there are less restrictive alternatives to the
restraint. Nor do they have to prove that a restraint is, a priori,
a logical predicate without which the objective could not be
achieved. They only have to decide the easier inquiry of
whether the restraint is reasonably required to attain the objective. Courts can do this. And they have. For example, courts
have found to be reasonably necessary restraints that had the
tendency to (and that did) create a product that would not otherwise have been available and that improved service to customers.518 Further, a court invalidated a restraint that did not
appear necessary to promote servicing coverage for customers.519 Despite courts’ capacity on this issue, they would benefit
from a shift in the burden of production.
A restraint’s necessity can best be addressed by the defendant. The defendant is most familiar with its chosen objectives,
its capacities, the types of (successful and unsuccessful) restraints that it has used in the past, and the market in which
the restraint is applied.520 In contrast, plaintiffs’ knowledge of
(11th Cir. 1983) (the standard of reasonable necessity “helps to illuminate both the
manufacturer’s motive in imposing the restrictions and the effects of the restriction on
competition overall”); Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 483 F. Supp. 750,
758 (D. Md. 1980) (“A poor fit between means and ends suggests that the avowed purpose is merely a pretext.”), aff’d, 638 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1981).
517. See supra notes 460-465 and accompanying text.
518. See infra notes 526-529 and accompanying text.
519. See infra note 530 and accompanying text.
520. See SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 961, 969 (10th Cir. 1994)
(describing association’s reason for adopting and maintaining restraint); Justice v.
NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983) (noting reason for restraint and link to objectives); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758, 767 (D. Del. 1981)
(explaining reason for restraint), aff’d, 691 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1982); Gunter Harz
Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass’n, 511 F. Supp. 1103, 1117-21 (D. Neb. 1981)
(noting relationship between restraint and objectives); Newberry v. Washington Post
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such information is at best secondhand. Shifting the burden to
the defendant thereby benefits the courts, which obtain better
and more reliable information.521
Shifting the burden to the defendant has three other benefits. First, it emphasizes whether the restraint is necessary to
achieve the defendant’s objectives, rather than necessary in
comparison with other alternatives. The defendant would be
more likely than the plaintiff to explain the link between the
restraint and the objectives (or be unable to persuasively justify the link)522 and less likely to examine other alternatives.523
Second, allowing the defendant to prove a positive makes
more sense than requiring the plaintiff to prove a negative. It
is an easier project to determine what is reasonably necessary
than to prove what is not. How could a party ever prove this
negative? Naturally, by putting forward alternatives that are
necessary. And, chances are, those alternatives would supposedly be less restrictive of competition. It is much more straightforward and reasonable to allow the defendant to show what is
reasonably necessary than to set the plaintiff off on a hunt of
no finite duration to show what is not reasonably necessary.
Third (and relatedly), courts’ misapplication of this factor
supports the burden shift and reveals the difficulty courts have
had with proving the negative. Stated bluntly, no court has accurately observed the effect of the plaintiff’s satisfaction of the
factor.524 The courts seem not to have noticed that proving this

Co., 438 F. Supp. 470, 475 (D.D.C. 1977) (describing purpose of objective and market in
which restraint operated).
521. Because the plaintiff’s proof of anticompetitive effect precedes the defendant’s
showing, the burden shift would be less consequential than the one proposed by Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein as part of a “stepwise” approach. See Joel I. Klein,
Point: A “Stepwise” Approach for Analyzing Horizontal Agreements Will Provide a
Much Needed Structure for Antitrust Review, ANTITRUST 41, 42 (Spring 1998) (if
agreement directly limits competition, “the burden shifts to the defendant to proffer a
procompetitive justification”).
522. See Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1578 (11th
Cir. 1983) (finding that defendant presented “no evidence” demonstrating that use of
restraint was “important to the goal of improved service coverage”).
523. See, e.g., SCFC, 36 F.3d at 969; Broadcast Music, 527 F. Supp. at 769-72;
Gunter Harz, 511 F. Supp. at 1117-21; Newberry, 438 F. Supp. at 475. For an argument
that assigning the burden to the party with lower costs of proof “economizes on both
direct costs and error costs,” see Thomas R. Lee, Pleading and Proof: The Economics of
Legal Burdens, 1997 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 17.
524. The court in Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 65 (1998), explained that “if [the] steps [of the burden-shifting construct],” including the plaintiff’s burden to show that the restraint was not reasonably necessary,
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factor leads to the opposite result of proving either of the prior
two factors. That is, if the plaintiff cannot meet the initial burden of demonstrating an anticompetitive effect, he loses; and if
the defendant cannot meet the second burden of showing procompetitive justifications, then she loses. But if the plaintiff
cannot prove the third factor—that the restraint is not reasonably necessary—then he does not lose. Rather, the case proceeds to balancing.525 The case is only disposed of at the third
stage if the plaintiff can show that the restraint is not reasonably necessary. Then, the plaintiff wins.
Although six courts have considered the reasonable necessity of restraints, none disposed of them in the context presented in this Article and recently articulated by some courts—
the third stage of the burden-shifting analysis. As a result, the
courts that explained incorrectly the effect of the plaintiff’s
demonstration of the third factor did not actually apply the factor. In any event, the conclusion that courts can determine reasonable necessity is confirmed by reference to the cases. Each
of the six courts (100%) correctly analyzed the factor. Courts
correctly found restraints to be reasonably necessary where
they created a product that would not otherwise have been
available,526 where they increased market penetration and improved service to customers,527 and where they furthered professional528 or amateur529 athletic endeavors. A court also
found, as part of a balancing analysis, that a defendant failed
to show that its territorial restraints were reasonably neces-

are met, then the court proceeds to balancing. To the contrary, if the plaintiff satisfies
its burden at the third stage, it wins.
Similarly, the court in United States v. Brown University, 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir.
1993), was misguided in finding that in order “[t]o rebut” the defendant’s demonstration of procompetitive justifications, the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the restraint
is not reasonably necessary.” Id. at 669. But again, the plaintiff need not demonstrate
such; if it does not make this showing, then the court balances. Two other courts veered
off track in following the court in Brown. See, e.g., Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp.,
79 F.3d 1358, 1368 (3d Cir. 1996); Yeager’s Fuel, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light
Co., 953 F. Supp. 617, 657 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
525. See VII AREEDA, supra note 3, ¶ 1507, at 397.
526. See SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994); Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758 (D. Del. 1981).
527. See Newberry v. Washington Post Co., 438 F. Supp. 470 (D.D.C. 1977).
528. See Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass’n, 511 F. Supp.
1103 (D. Neb. 1981).
529. See Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983).
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sary to promote servicing of its product.530
Despite the failure to consider the restraints in the context
of the third stage of the Rule of Reason analysis, the cases still
confirm the benefits of shifting the burden to the defendants to
show reasonable necessity. The courts benefitted from defendants’ explanations of how various restraints would be effective
means of serving consumers,531 preventing free-riding,532 and
preserving amateurism533 and the integrity of a sport.534 For
example, the court in Gunter Harz, in upholding a restraint
prohibiting the use of particular equipment, considered expert
testimony proffered by the defendants that revealed the necessity of the restraint and adverse consequences that had already
resulted from the use of the equipment to be prohibited.535 Such
evidence naturally is revealed more by the defendant showing
the necessity of the restraint than the plaintiff demonstrating
the opposite. It is noteworthy that many of the courts that have
required a restraint to be reasonably necessary have explicitly
rejected the analysis of whether the restraint was the least restrictive alternative.536
Thus, courts can examine whether a restraint is reasonably
necessary, but they would benefit from a shift in the burden of
production from the plaintiff proving it is not necessary to the
defendant proving it is. Taken with the elimination of the less
restrictive alternative analysis as a factor in the Rule of Reason, this Article proposes that the third stage be merged into
the second. The new second stage would require the defendant
to prove that the restraint is reasonably necessary to achieve a

530. See Graphic Products Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir.
1983).
531. See Broadcast Music, 527 F. Supp. at 767.
532. See SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 969 (10th Cir. 1994).
533. See Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 382.
534. See Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass’n, 511 F. Supp.
1103, 1117-21 (D. Neb. 1981).
535. See id. at 1118-21.
536. See Broadcast Music, 527 F. Supp. at 769 (“[T]he test is not whether the defendant deployed the least restrictive alternative. Rather the issue is whether the restriction actually implemented is ‘fairly necessary’ . . . .”) (quoting American Motor
Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1248-49 (3d Cir. 1975)); Consolidated
Farmers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Anchor Sav. Ass’n, 480 F. Supp. 640, 653 (D. Kan. 1979)
(“So long as the defendants’ actions are reasonable, they need not constitute the ‘least
restrictive alternative’ available.”) (citation omitted); Newberry v. Washington Post
Co., 438 F. Supp. 470, 475 (D.D.C. 1977) (citation omitted) (restraint was not “the least
restrictive alternative imaginable, but such a showing need not be made”).
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legitimate procompetitive objective.
D. Balancing
1. Theory
Can the courts balance anticompetitive and procompetitive
effects? The odds are against them. For courts rarely will be
able to sum up a restraint’s net effect on output or price. By no
stretch can we be assured of the results of balancing with
mathematical exactitude. It is no surprise, then, that courts
are not confident that they can tackle balancing under the Rule
of Reason, calling it a task that is “extremely awkward to apply,”537 that lacks an analytical framework,538 and that is “beyond judicial capabilities.”539
But that is not to say it cannot be done. Or that the checklist of factors cited by courts from the landmark case of Board
of Trade of Chicago v. United States,540 often cited by courts to
show their incapacity, cannot be ordered to comport with today’s Rule of Reason analysis. The Court in Board of Trade
recommended that courts consider
the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed;
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable[,
as well as] [t]he history of the restraint, the evil believed to
exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, [and] the
purpose or end sought to be attained.541

537. New York v. Anheuser Busch, 811 F. Supp. 848, 872 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (“Competitive effects are not susceptible to any kind of numerical valuation, making the
Court’s task a daunting one.”); see also National Bancard Corp. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779
F.2d 592, 597 (11th Cir. 1986) (the Rule of Reason is “a time-consuming process that
entails significant costs” and is hampered by “the general lack of judicial expertise in
sophisticated economic analysis as well as the lack of certainty that such case law produces”).
538. See Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1568 n.10
(11th Cir. 1983) (also noting the “exceedingly general nature” of the factors cited in the
Chicago Board of Trade analysis).
539. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 230 n.11
(D.C. Cir. 1986); see also Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343
(1982) (citation omitted) (“Judges often lack the expert understanding of industrial
market structures and behavior to determine with any confidence a practice’s effect on
competition.”).
540. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
541. Id. at 238.
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Although courts throw up their hands in despair when confronted with such a seemingly orderless litany,542 the checklist,
on closer analysis, is not so intimidating.
Most of the factors in the Board of Trade checklist are consistent with an examination of the effect of a restraint on interbrand competition. Several factors conform with the initial
burden in today’s Rule of Reason analysis of demonstrating anticompetitive effect: the actual effect of the restraint (akin to
actual adverse effect in today’s analysis), the probable effect
(akin to market power), and the condition before and after the
imposition of the restraint (generally corresponding with anticompetitive effect). The defendant’s proof of procompetitive justifications is mirrored most closely in the factor of the Board of
Trade checklist addressing the “purpose or end sought to be attained,” and it also encompasses the reason for adopting the restraint and the evil believed to exist.
Having addressed the first two factors of today’s Rule of
Reason analysis, what factors from the Board of Trade test are
left? First, the nature of the restraint, which today’s courts
consider in placing the restraint into a particular category that
governs, among other things, whether they will apply the Rule
of Reason or per se treatment. Second, courts consider the
“facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied”
in their examinations of the relevant market. Third, the history
of the restraint and “facts peculiar to the business” that are unrelated to the market are relevant in determining the reasonable necessity of the restraint. Thus, the impenetrable Board of
Trade checklist is brought down to size.
But we are still left with balancing. How can courts do it?
Doesn’t it require the comparing of apples (e.g., an increase in
interbrand competition) and oranges (e.g., a decrease in intrabrand competition)? This Article does not pretend to offer
the secret to successful balancing. Rather, it offers only a modest reminder that, in analyzing the effects of a restraint, courts
should be riveted on the effects on consumers and interbrand
competition. While the legislative history may be consistent
with other—namely, noncompetition—goals for the antitrust
laws, and while some (in particular, members of the PostChicago School) have argued that such goals should be in-

542. See, e.g., Visa, 779 F.2d at 597; Itek, 717 F.2d at 1568 n.10.
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cluded in the Rule of Reason analysis,543 even these proponents
must recognize the significance of the consumer in the analysis.
Relatedly, there can be no doubt that the consumer benefits
from an increase in interbrand competition. Remembering and
applying these simple maxims will add substantial credibility
to courts’ balancing. There will, of course, always be cases at
the margins where it will not be self-evident whether a restraint would increase consumer welfare or interbrand competition. But judging from the nearly five hundred Rule of Reason
cases in the modern era, in which the overwhelming majority of
courts found no restraint on competition, let alone an unreasonable restraint, such cases should be few and far between.
Moreover, not all cases in which courts utilize balancing
will be difficult. Courts should have no problem, for example,
invalidating an association standard that provides, at most, a
marginal benefit for consumers while substantially raising
price or restricting output. Nor should they have difficulty with
an exclusive dealing arrangement that forecloses nearly all of
the relevant market. On the other hand, courts should uphold
such an arrangement that forecloses a small percentage of the
market but that reduces free-riding. They also should uphold a
vertical restraint that enhances investment, quality, or output.544
And any concerns about balancing should be diminished by
the paucity of such cases. Only 4% of cases in the modern era
have balanced, with only 6 cases in the past 10 years,545 and 1
case in the past 4 years.546
As an aside, it should be noted that there must be some
method for the court to consider anticompetitive and procompetitive effects when both are present. Now, other types of balancing can be postulated. A narrower test than the current
balancing, for example, may look only to the net effect of the
restraint on output. But such an approach will not solve most
cases since the competitive effects of restraints do not usually

543. See supra notes 304-07 and accompanying text.
544. The 1997 revisions to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines provide support for
the conclusion that courts can balance, particularly in their consideration of both efficiencies and adverse competitive effects resulting from mergers. See Department of
Justice & Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“4. Efficiencies”)
(1997 Revision).
545. See infra note 548 and accompanying text.
546. See infra note 549 and accompanying text.
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manifest themselves so clearly as to lead to a “net result.” Additionally, other, broader tests can be imagined by which the
parties are free to introduce any concerns they feel relevant.
Yet such tests would be characterized by administrative unworkability and a lack of guidance for the parties, courts,
scholars, and future defendants. There also could be broader
tests that focus primarily on other delineated goals—such as
the dispersal of power or the promotion of competition as process. But it is still not clear how such tests would mesh with the
goal of consumer welfare. Could a little consumer welfare be
sacrificed for other objectives? How much? What if consumer
welfare and the other goals tilt in different directions? Although such a construct is not inconceivable, this Article would
not recommend such an approach unless and until it becomes
clear what role and significance would be accorded to each of
the goals in the analysis and how the various goals would interrelate.547 Even beneficial ends would do more harm than
good without direction to the courts as to how they are to be
weighed.
Like it or not, balancing is with us. And as long as we do
not expect mathematical precision—which, in any event, is impossible—balancing is not necessarily a bad thing. It is essential, however, that the stages preceding balancing be faithfully
applied. No skipping to balancing because of some overriding
political goals. Or because we want the court to have discretion
to rely on its “gut feeling” to arrive at the right result. Balancing should occur only in the rarest of cases. And when it does
occur, the brooding omnipresence of consumers and interbrand
competition should serve as a beacon to courts, guiding them in
the right direction.
2. The cases
Before exploring the instances in which courts have conducted balancing, it is worth pausing to reflect on the infrequency with which courts in the 1990s have decided Rule of
Reason cases by balancing anticompetitive and procompetitive
effects. Of the 20 cases in the modern era in which courts con-

547. In addition, pursuing the goal of consumer welfare often will promote nonefficiency goals. See, e.g., Phillip Areeda, Introduction to Antitrust Economics, 52
ANTITRUST L.J. 523, 534-35 (1983); Brodley, supra note 292, at 1021.

CAR-FIN.DOC

4/5/00 7:24 AM

1350 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999
ducted balancing, only 6 were decided in the last 10 years,548
and only 1 of these was decided in the last 4 years.549 In short,
as we enter the twenty-first century, courts almost never balance.
Further diminishing the significance of balancing, the
courts could have disposed of 10 of the 20 cases in which they
balanced simply by finding that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a significant anticompetitive effect. In seven cases, the
courts explicitly found that there was no adverse effect on competition.550 In three other cases, they could have found a lack of
anticompetitive effect.551 For the 10 cases in which balancing
was unnecessary, the courts in 9 cases concluded, consistent
with the absence of anticompetitive effect, that the procompetitive effects outweighed the anticompetitive effects.552 In one
548. See Eleven Line, Inc. v. North Tex. State Soccer Ass’n, No. CA-3-95-CV-3120R, 1998 WL 574893 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 1998); NBA v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069
(S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995); Servicetrends, Inc. v. Siemens Med.
Sys., Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1042, 1066 (N.D. Ga. 1994); New York v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
811 F. Supp. 848, 873 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Williamson v. Sacred Heart Hosp., No. 8930084-RV, 1993 WL 543002, at *50 (N.D. Fla. May 28, 1993); Eureka Urethane, Inc. v.
PBA, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. Mo. 1990).
549. See Eleven Line, Inc., 1998 WL 574893.
550. See Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru, 858 F.2d 792, 797, 799 (1st Cir. 1988) (finding
defendant’s market share was “miniscule,” there was no demonstrated “actual anticompetitive effect” in the tied product market, and “the tie shows no more than trivial
effects”); National Bancard Corp. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 605 (11th Cir.
1986) (defendant “does not possess market power”); Plueckhahn v. Farmers Ins. Exch.,
749 F.2d 241, 247 (5th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff failed to demonstrate “substantial adverse
effect”); Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 811 F. Supp. at 873 (defendant lacks market power because of its “relatively small market share, [the] lack of entry barriers and the intense
price competition”); Sacred Heart Hosp., 1993 WL 543002 at *50 (noting defendant’s
“small share” of market and the absence of any “detriment to competition”); Net Realty
Holding Trust v. Franconia Properties, Inc., No. 82-0318-A, 1983 WL 1786, at *7 (E.D.
Va. Jan. 20, 1983) (noting “very slight” anticompetitive effect because only a fraction of
1% of the relevant market was affected); Jetro Cash and Carry Enters., Inc. v. Food
Distrib. Ctr., 569 F. Supp. 1404, 1416 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (noting restraint “simply does not
have a significant adverse effect on competition”).
551. See Servicetrends, Inc. v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1042, 1065
(N.D. Ga. 1994) (exclusive dealing arrangement foreclosed only 32 to 38% of relevant
market); Cantor v. Multiple Listing Serv., 568 F. Supp. 424, 430-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(finding anticompetitive effect because of “substantial adverse impact on plaintiffs’
businesses” where plaintiffs were two out of more than six hundred licensed real estate
brokers in the market); Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 919 (W.D. Pa. 1981)
(anticompetitive effects were “not severe” and the affected doctors “almost certainly
[would] have access” to facilities in relevant market).
552. See Grappone, 858 F.2d 792; National Bancard, 779 F.2d 592; Plueckhahn,
749 F.2d 241; Siemens, 870 F. Supp. 1042; Anheuser-Busch, 811 F. Supp. 848; Sacred
Heart Hosp., 1993 WL 543002; Net Realty Holding Trust, 1983 WL 1786; Jetro Cash
and Carry Enters., 569 F. Supp. 1404; Robinson, 521 F. Supp. 842.
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case, however, the court concluded that the anticompetitive effects predominated even though it should have found that
there was no anticompetitive effect at all.553
The courts’ success in balancing was related to the type of
restraint at issue. The courts correctly decided cases involving
vertical nonprice restraints. However, they often did not reach
the right result when addressing rules of associations or restraints imposed by a supplier on a purchaser.
In addressing vertical restraints, courts generally arrived
at the correct result. They appropriately found that vertical integration in the newspaper industry—an industry in which a
defendant likely would not restrict output because of its dependence on advertising revenues, which benefit from high circulation resulting from low prices—had procompetitive efficiencies that outweighed any anticompetitive effect resulting
from the elimination of a potential competitor;554 that territorial restraints that encourage investment, promotion, and improved servicing outweighed limited intrabrand effects caused
by territorial restrictions;555 and that a defendant with a seventy percent market share failed to show that territorial restraints were sufficiently justified and reasonably necessary to
achieve objectives of servicing and market penetration that
would outweigh its anticompetitive effects.556 Fact scenarios
falling most broadly in the realm of vertical restraints confirm
this conclusion, as courts correctly analyzed cases involving exclusive dealing agreements,557 tying arrangements,558 and refusals to deal.559
553. See Cantor, 568 F. Supp. 424.
554. See Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., 727 F.2d 692, 701, 704 (8th Cir. 1984).
555. See Anheuser-Busch, 811 F. Supp. at 875-77.
556. See Graphic Products Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1577-78
(11th Cir. 1983). Although the court in Itek found that there was no evidence in the record demonstrating that the restraint was reasonably necessary to achieve the defendant’s objectives, another record could have revealed the defendant’s need for territorial restrictions to ensure that servicers were spread out, thereby enhancing servicing
and increasing market penetration.
557. See Servicetrends, Inc. v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1042, 1066
(N.D. Ga. 1994) (finding no substantial foreclosure based on foreclosure of less than
38% of market and justifications for restraint).
558. See Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru, 858 F.2d 792, 799 (1st Cir. 1988) (procompetitive justifications of tying arrangement by which automobile distributor required dealers to take relatively inexpensive spare parts kits outweighed “trivial” anticompetitive
effects).
559. See Williamson v. Sacred Heart Hosp., No. 89-30084-RV, 1993 WL 543002, at
*50 (N.D. Fla. May 28, 1993); (procompetitive benefit of allowing consumers the choice
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Cases under the expansive heading “unfair competition”
presented a problem for courts. Two of these cases, dealing
with restrictive covenants, were correctly analyzed. One court
found that the procompetitive benefits of enhanced comparison
shopping resulting from a market limited in location and hours
outweighed an “insignificant” anticompetitive effect.560 A second court held that a restrictive covenant requiring certain occupants in a mall to operate as department stores served legitimate purposes such as preventing free riding561 that
outweighed the minimal anticompetitive effect in a fraction of
one percent of the relevant market.562
The courts in the other two cases in the category, those in
which purchasers complained of actions taken by suppliers,563
both balanced incorrectly. In United States v. North Dakota
Hospital Ass’n,564 a purchaser challenged the actions of nonprofit hospitals and a hospital association in billing customers
based on their actual costs rather than granting discounts.565
The hospitals, with average operating margins 2 to 3% above
cost, refused to grant discounts, which did not cover the hospitals’ costs, and which required patients to absorb the costs of
the discounts when the plaintiff, a governmental agency, ran
out of money, as it repeatedly had in past years.566 The court’s
balancing under the Rule of Reason was flawed in a number of
respects: (1) it failed to define a market; (2) it found anticompetitive harm even where the plaintiff actually received discounts and did not suffer an “adverse effect on . . . price”;567 and

of an additional HMO outweighed effect of exclusion of doctor, who, in any event, “was
a highly effective competitor”); Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 919 (W.D. Pa.
1981) (by creating a high-quality staff, hospital contributed to “[v]igorous competition”
among hospitals, thereby raising level of care for the public, and outweighing any anticompetitive effects suffered by doctor who was denied staff privileges at hospital).
560. Jetro Cash and Carry Enters., Inc. v. Food Distrib. Ctr., 569 F. Supp. 1404,
1415-16 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
561. The free riding concern was that, once the mall was operating, a department
store could be tempted to subdivide and survive because of consumer traffic generated
by other department stores in the mall.
562. See Net Realty Holding Trust v. Franconia Properties, Inc., No. 82-0318-A,
1983 WL 1786, at *7-*8 (E.D. Va. Jan. 20, 1983).
563. This Article groups the cases with horizontal restraints because of the adverse impact on competitors; the cases could also be viewed as refusals to deal.
564. 640 F. Supp. 1028 (D.N.D. 1986).
565. See id. at 1030-31, 1039.
566. See id. at 1031, 1038.
567. Id. at 1039.
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(3) it failed to adequately consider the restraint’s procompetitive effects in creating a standardized reimbursement system,
thereby facilitating cost comparison and protecting other patients and buyers “from having to absorb the costs of granting
discounts”568 to the plaintiff.569 The court summarily concluded
that the “anticompetitive harm of [the restraint] outweigh[ed]
the procompetitive benefits.”570 The court should have come to
the opposite conclusion based on the presumed lack of market
power, absence of harm suffered by the plaintiff, and significant procompetitive benefits.571
In the second case, TV Signal Co. of Aberdeen v. AT&T,572
the defendant telephone company enforced a policy of attaching
a maximum of one cable per telephone pole to the detriment of
the plaintiff cable television company.573 The court’s opinion invalidating the restraint is flawed for three reasons. First, the
court provided no support for its conclusory definitions of product and geographic markets and failed to examine the restraint’s effect on competition. Second, it misconstrued injury
to the plaintiff—even assuming that harm suffered by the
plaintiff could demonstrate anticompetitive effect—by downplaying the plaintiff’s success in entering the market and
extraneously claiming that its success came “in spite of”574 defendant’s policy. Third, the court ignored the defendant’s justifications, cryptically claiming that the justifications “cannot
sanitize”575 the restraint “when they travel in company with a
significant anti-competitive purpose and effect.”576 The AT&T
court should have decided the case either by finding no anticompetitive effect or at least considering the procompetitive
justifications, which would have outweighed any perceived
anticompetitive effect.
Association rules presented the context in which courts bal568. Id. at 1038.
569. See id. at 1039.
570. Id.
571. The court also noted that the reimbursement method proposed by IHS “is inherently anticompetitive” because it “removes the financial incentive for price competition and cost containment.” See id. at 1039.
572. No. Civ.70-6N, 1981 WL 2049 (D.S.D. Mar. 13, 1981).
573. See id. at *2; see also TV Signal Co. v. AT&T, 617 F.2d 1302, 1305 (8th Cir.
1980).
574. AT&T, 1981 WL 2049, at *5.
575. Id.
576. Id.
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anced most frequently. In such cases, the courts correctly found
that two association restraints did not violate the antitrust
laws. One court upheld an interchange fee imposed by an association of financial institutions that allowed the operation of a
credit card system that would not otherwise have been possible.577 A second court sustained an employment policy of an insurance company group that limited conflicts of interest and
did not have a substantial adverse effect on competition.578 A
court also correctly struck down a rule adopted by an association of cemetery owners that limited the preparation of the
foundation for grave markers and monuments to the cemetery
owning the lot.579 This court based its decision upon a finding
that the policy prevented grave memorial companies and
neighboring cemeteries from competing in the foundation
preparation market, thereby “limit[ing] consumer choice.”580
On the other hand, a court incorrectly invalidated a bylaw
of a real estate multiple listing service that allowed only one
type of sign to be posted on a property for sale.581 The court
found that the “adverse impact on plaintiffs’ businesses”582
outweighed the justifications of distributing commissions
among members of a service that benefitted home buyers.583
Given that the plaintiffs were only two of over six hundred licensed real estate brokers in the market, it is difficult to see
how there was any adverse effect on competition, let alone an
effect sufficient to outweigh procompetitive justifications.584
The court’s decision also was plagued by the less restrictive alternative analysis.585
Rules of sports leagues seem to have presented unparal577. See National Bancard Corp. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 601-02, 605
(11th Cir. 1986).
578. See Plueckhahn v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 749 F.2d 241, 247 (5th Cir. 1985).
579. See Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Memorial Park Cemetery Ass’n, 666 F.2d
1130, 1136, 1140 (8th Cir. 1981).
580. Id. at 1138, 1139.
581. See Cantor v. Multiple Listing Serv., 568 F. Supp. 424, 427-28 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
582. Id. at 430.
583. See id. at 426, 431 (association compilation of home listings provides purchasers with “a ready source of information”).
584. Even if injury to a competitor were the relevant inquiry, there would be no
anticompetitive effect here: the plaintiffs were not excluded from the association, they
only were restricted in the type of sign they could post.
585. See Cantor, 568 F. Supp. at 431 (opining that association could have required
brokers to display their association signs “no less conspicuously” than other signs).
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leled difficulties for the courts. Such rules occur in a unique
setting. Unlike most associations, which are made up of competitors, individual sports teams generally are not economic
competitors.586 Rather, the competition that takes place on the
playing field is of a contrary variety—no team has an economic
interest in vanquishing all the other teams. Rather, teams
benefit when the league has competitive balance and the sporting contests are close, thereby maximizing fan interest. Restraints such as the draft, the salary cap, cross-ownership
rules, and relocation guidelines thus help the leagues compete
in a sports and entertainment market by putting out the best
product possible.
Treating sports leagues as associations of competitors often
leads to undesirable results. Admittedly, some courts arrive at
the correct result. One court correctly found that a sports
league’s tools for competitive balance (the draft, right of first
refusal, and salary cap) have procompetitive effects that outweigh any anticompetitive effects.587 Another court found that a
bowling association’s ability “to administer the sport of professional bowling”588 by adopting and enforcing product standards
outweighs any anticompetitive effect on a particular product
adversely affected by application of the standards.589 Another
court correctly held that a soccer association’s strict rules on
player registration—which led to an 80% decrease in the number of teams playing indoor soccer in a particular area—
decreased options for consumers and was an unreasonable restraint.590
But other courts treated league rules with excessive hostility. In Los Angeles Memorial Commission Coliseum v. NFL
586. Courts have recognized this reality. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468
U.S. 85, 101 (1984); Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 598-99
(7th Cir. 1996) (“cooperation is essential” for a sports league: “a league with one team
would be like one hand clapping”); Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm. v. NFL (“Raiders”), 726 F.2d 1381, 1391 (9th Cir. 1984) (“the NFL teams are not true competitors,
nor can they be”).
587. See NBA v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d, 45 F.3d
684 (2d Cir. 1995). Because the NBA court held that the nonstatutory labor exemption
covered the restraints at issue, the court’s cursory Rule of Reason analysis was dicta.
588. Eureka Urethane, Inc. v. PBA, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 915, 933 (E.D. Mo. 1990).
589. See id. at 933.
590. See Eleven Line, Inc. v. North Tex. State Soccer Ass’n, No. CA-3-95-CV-3120R, 1998 WL 574893, at *3, *4-*5 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 1998); Eleven Line, Inc. v. North
Tex. State Soccer Ass’n, No. CA-3-95-CV-3120-R, 1997 WL 135684, at *1-*3 (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 12, 1997).
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(“Raiders”),591 the Ninth Circuit invalidated the NFL’s relocation rules that required approval by three-fourths of the member clubs before a franchise could relocate to another team’s
home territory.592 The court hypothesized that less restrictive
alternatives could have achieved the League’s objectives of
achieving financial stability, recovering expenditures invested
in stadiums and other facilities, and promoting fan loyalty.593
The court thus recommended the incorporation of objective factors into the relocation decision.594 The Raiders decision is
flawed. First, the court trumpeted the effect of the relocation
rules on intrabrand competition while downplaying the crucial
benefits for interbrand competition. League rules that prevent
teams from moving at will into each other’s territory and that
increase fan loyalty and financial stability promote consumer
welfare.595 The court failed to recognize the undeniable net
benefit of the rules for consumers. Second, the court unwittingly illustrated the dangers of a less restrictive alternative
analysis in showing that a court, post hoc, can always come up
with a restraint that appears a little less restrictive even as it
fails to link the alternative to the defendant’s objectives.
In NASL v. NFL,596 the court invalidated the NFL’s “crossownership” rule that was designed to prevent owners of NFL
franchises from holding an ownership interest in another “major team sport” such as baseball, basketball, hockey, or soccer.597 The court found that this rule had an anticompetitive effect in what it found to be a market of “sports capital and
skill.”598 Although the court recognized various procompetitive
benefits of the rule—preventing dilution of goodwill, avoiding
disruption of NFL operations, and preventing inter-league collusion—it summarily found that these were “not substantial”599
and that they were “clearly outweighed by [the rule’s] anticompetitive purpose and effect.”600 The court’s conclusion that the
591. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
592. See id. at 1384-85.
593. See id. at 1396-97.
594. See id. at 1397.
595. See id. at 1394 (“In the early days of professional football, numerous franchises failed and many changed location in the hope of achieving economic success.”).
596. 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982).
597. Id. at 1255.
598. Id. at 1259.
599. Id. at 1261.
600. Id.
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rule’s “net effect is substantially to restrain competition, not
merely competitors”601 was more a blanket assertion than a
reasoned conclusion. Again, the court took its eye off the ball of
enhancing interbrand competition: the court never even considered whether the consumer would benefit from the rule. The
court also demonstrated the pitfalls of a less restrictive alternative analysis. In rejecting the NFL’s proffered justifications
of maintaining undivided loyalty and preventing the disclosure
of confidential information, the court erroneously put the burden on the NFL to show the absence of less restrictive alternatives and failed to connect the alternatives it hypothecated
with the defendant’s goals.602
Summing up, in five out of twenty balancing cases—or
25%—the courts came to the wrong result. But a simple reminder to focus on consumers and interbrand competition
would have led to correct balancing by the courts. First, an emphasis on interbrand competition would ensure that courts uphold arrangements that do not have an anticompetitive effect.
By following this simple reminder, the Cantor, North Dakota
Hospital Ass’n, and AT&T cases would have come out the other
way. Second, by also eliminating the less restrictive alternative
test, the Raiders and NASL cases likely would have come out
differently, as the NFL’s rules appeared to be reasonably necessary to achieve the recognized procompetitive objectives.
Despite a few mistakes, courts can balance. They generally
can weigh the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of a
restraint and arrive at a defensible result. Keeping the focus on
interbrand competition and the effect on the consumer will
provide even greater legitimacy for the balancing analysis.603
E. Taking Stock
It is time to synthesize the results of what courts should do
and what they can do. The first inquiry necessarily comes first.
For if the courts should not (according to whatever criteria we
deem sufficient to make the determination) examine a particular factor, then it is simply irrelevant whether they can exam601. Id.
602. See id.
603. That the conclusion as to balancing is strengthened by the heeding of the reminder distinguishes the inquiry as to less restrictive alternatives. For there is no
modest hint that can be offered that would have led the Raiders and NASL courts, for
example, to conduct a correct less restrictive alternative analysis.
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ine the factor. Stated differently, a court’s mandate precedes its
capacity.
1. Anticompetitive effect
Each of the inquiries converges in the conclusion that
courts should and can examine anticompetitive effect. The four
sources—the legislative history, common law, Chicago School,
and Post-Chicago School—all support consideration of the factor. Moreover, as a matter of theory, courts can assess the factor, and in practice, they correctly analyzed it in 97% of the
cases. This obviously is a beneficial result: there cannot be a
viable Rule of Reason case today without an adverse effect on
competition. In short, it is beyond debate that anticompetitive
effect should be a factor in the Rule of Reason analysis.
2. Procompetitive justifications
It is also clear that courts should consider a defendant’s
procompetitive justifications. Three of the sources—the legislative history, Chicago School, and Post-Chicago School—support
its consideration, and the fourth, the common law, is neutral.
In addition, as a matter of hypothesis, courts can examine procompetitive justifications, and they have done so correctly in
98% of the cases. Courts should consider a defendant’s procompetitive justifications as an element of the Rule of Reason.
3. Reasonable necessity/less restrictive alternatives
The factors of reasonable necessity and less restrictive alternatives bear tenuous support in the sources. Only one
source—the common law—would provide substantial support
for consideration of the factors, while one—the Chicago
School—would proscribe such consideration. The other two factors would be of marginal significance: the legislative history is
neutral, and the Post-Chicago School would provide, at most, a
limited endorsement.
Given this indeterminacy, we must look to the capacities of
courts to resolve the issue. As a matter of theory, courts can determine whether a restraint is reasonably necessary, and in
practice, 100% of the courts correctly analyzed this factor. Further supporting the inclusion of this factor is its critical role in
ensuring a link between the restraint and the defendant’s proffered justification. There must be some way to dismiss the

CAR-FIN.DOC

1265]

4/5/00 7:24 AM

THE REAL RULE OF REASON

1359

loftiest of objectives that are not connected with the restraint
at issue, and demonstrating reasonable necessity is a compelling way to do so.
The factor of less restrictive alternatives suffers a different
fate. As a matter of theory, courts cannot examine the factor.
And in practice, they have not accurately examined it, reaching
the correct conclusion in only 43% of the cases. Because courts
cannot examine the factor of less restrictive alternatives, and
because the sources provide, at most, limited support, the factor should be eliminated from the Rule of Reason analysis.
Such an omission would not have significant consequences, in
particular because the inquiry into reasonable necessity forges
the link between the restraint and the defendant’s justifications.
4. Balancing
The sources provide some support for balancing as a factor
in the Rule of Reason analysis. While the legislative history
and common law are neutral, the contemporary schools would
endorse (very different types of) balancing. The Chicago School
would promote a limited type of balancing—akin to a calculation of the net effect of the restraint on output. The PostChicago School, in contrast, would carve out a significant role
for balancing that would incorporate the myriad goals championed by the members of the Post-Chicago School. With the key
building blocks of legislative history and common law neutral
on the issue, the sources provide only limited support for balancing.
Although the confidence level on this factor is not as high as
with others, courts can conduct balancing. They are capable of
weighing a restraint’s anticompetitive and procompetitive effects, and as long as precision is not expected, they generally
can balance. The results of the cases provide some support, as
courts in 75% of the cases correctly balanced. Keeping the focus
on the consumer and interbrand competition would increase
the rate of success. (In fact, all of the cases would have been
decided correctly if the courts had adequately heeded these
guideposts.) In short, courts should continue to balance in the
finite subset of cases in which it is necessary, but they must do
so cautiously and continually focus on the effect of the restraint
on the consumer and on interbrand competition.
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IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISCONNECT AND THE
MODIFICATION
A large divide, or “disconnect,” separates courts’ and parties’ conceptions of a Rule of Reason analysis, on the one hand,
from what courts actually do, on the other. Everyone assumes
that the Rule of Reason calls for balancing. But courts typically
dispose of a case under the Rule at a prior stage, typically when
the plaintiff fails to demonstrate a significant anticompetitive
effect. In addition to discovering the disconnect, this Article
recommends a modification in the current Rule of Reason
analysis, eliminating courts’ consideration of less restrictive alternatives and shifting the burden of production on a restraint’s reasonable necessity from the plaintiff to the defendant. What consequences would result from the recognition of
the disconnect and the proposed modifications? For the parties,
the consequences would include fewer cases and more focused
litigation. For the courts, the consequences would be judicial
opinions more consistent with the outcomes of cases and less
post hoc second-guessing of legitimate business judgments.
A. Parties
1. Fewer cases
First and foremost, plaintiffs would be most affected by discovering the disconnect. In the modern era, courts dismissed
84% of Rule of Reason cases because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a significant anticompetitive effect. Plaintiffs’ realization
of this reality should counsel caution and decrease the number
of antitrust lawsuits.604 If plaintiffs knew the importance of the
initial threshold of demonstrating a significant anticompetitive
effect, and if they realized the frequency with which courts
have found that an injury to a competitor is not an injury to

604. Admittedly, the number of Rule of Reason cases currently brought is cabined
by the expense of such a lawsuit and by the plaintiffs’ limited chances of success. See,
e.g., Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Making Sense of the Rule of Reason: A New Standard for
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1755, 1761-63 (1994). To the extent the
plaintiff under the construct advocated by this Article has to prove anticompetitive effect (which will in most instances require a showing of market power), the expense will
continue to dissuade some potential plaintiffs. And to the extent that plaintiffs bring
cases alleging a per se violation in addition to a claim under the Rule of Reason, the
discovery of the disconnect would have marginally less profound consequences.
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competition, then they might conclude that an antitrust lawsuit is not the wisest course of action. Similarly, their recognition of the infrequency of balancing would remove from their
calculations their visions—in sprinting to the courthouse—of
balancing their concrete injury against the defendant’s supposedly pretextual justification. In some cases, plaintiffs could
pursue other litigation, alleging, for example, state-law claims
of breach of contract, unfair competition, or business torts. In
other cases, they could devote their resources to competition
rather than litigation. The realization of the disconnect would,
in effect, eliminate from plaintiffs’ decisionmaking calculus the
tool of balancing.605
Supporting this result, the proposed modification of eliminating courts’ consideration of less restrictive alternatives
would remove another instrument from the plaintiff’s arsenal.
No longer could a plaintiff pontificate on hypothetical alternatives that a defendant could have implemented that would
have affected them less directly.606 This modification, combined
with the removal of the incentive for plaintiffs to ponder the
benefits of balancing from the start of the case, could reduce
the number of antitrust lawsuits.
Skeptics would argue that the plaintiff would not be affected by the disconnect. Every plaintiff would believe that, despite the early dismissal of most of their compatriots’ lawsuits,
their suit is different. They can demonstrate an unreasonable
restraint. Although this may be true for a small subset of plaintiffs, rational-actor plaintiffs should vary their conduct according to their recognition of what courts actually do. For these
plaintiffs—presumably a larger category—the disconnect would
matter and could change their conduct. Moreover, rational actors recognizing the disconnect would continue to bring plausible antitrust cases.607 But it would primarily be the cases in
which there is obviously no adverse effect on competition that
would not be pursued.
605. Such a recognition also could increase the likelihood (and decrease the magnitude) of settlement.
606. Shifting the burden of proving reasonable necessity from the plaintiff to the
defendant should not have a marked effect on the plaintiff’s decision to file suit.
607. There is always the chance that the recognition of the disconnect will have an
overbroad impact, with plaintiffs not bringing potentially meritorious antitrust cases.
Yet because of the relative paucity of cases that are meritorious and because plaintiffs
presumably have a general idea as to the merits of their case, this effect should not be
substantial.
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If this hypothesis is correct, substantial benefits would follow. Courts would face fewer potentially-complex-but-frivolous
antitrust lawsuits and thus be able to devote needed resources
where they would be more useful. They might even be able to
spend more time on the more legitimate antitrust cases they do
consider. In addition, defendants would not be confronted with
as many onerous lawsuits, thereby reducing their legal expenditures (the benefit of which, at some point, could filter down to
the consumer), and, more significantly, encouraging them to
take actions that could benefit competition.608 In short, to the
extent that litigation concerning practices that clearly do not
have an anticompetitive effect is diminished, courts, defendants, and consumers would benefit.
2. More focused litigation
In addition to fewer antitrust lawsuits, those brought would
be better litigated. As the parties’ knowledge of the type of
analysis actually used by courts increases, so does the likelihood that all of the participants will speak the same language
and address the same tests from opposite perspectives. Although parties might address balancing issues, they would
start at the beginning. Anticompetitive effect comes first in order and importance. A summary judgment brief or a jury instruction would start by examining the effect of the restraint
on the market. And the opposing party would address the same
issue from the diametric perspective. The court (or jury) would
then benefit from having two presentations focused directly on
the relevant issues. The same would hold for demonstrating a
procompetitive objective and a reasonably necessary restraint.
Assuming such showings could be made in a particular case,
courts would no longer have to divine actual adverse effect,
market impact, or procompetitive justifications without the input of the parties. In short, the most significant issues in litigation under the Rule of Reason would be addressed in an efficient and effective manner.

608. If a reduction in the number of suits would lead defendants to pursue competition-preventing acts, they still would remain subject to challenge, and the plaintiffs
presumably would clear the initial threshold when challenging anticompetitive restraints.
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B. Courts
The benefits anticipated for the parties will carry over to
the courts. As discussed above, a decrease in the number of
suits would benefit the courts, as would a more direct focus by
the parties on the factors most relevant to the Rule of Reason
analysis.
The effect of recognizing the disconnect admittedly would
be less profound for the courts than for the parties. Although
courts are fond of reciting the language of balancing whenever
they are confronted with a case under the Rule of Reason, they
do not proceed directly to such balancing. In the overwhelming
majority of cases, the courts begin their Rule of Reason analysis by examining the plaintiff’s initial burden of demonstrating
a significant anticompetitive effect. They generally reach balancing only at the end of a process that ensures that there are
competitive effects to be weighed on both sides of the scale.
But even if the bridging of the disconnect does not have significant consequences in the results of Rule of Reason cases, it
should increase the clarity (and perhaps legitimacy) of antitrust courts by bringing their actions into conformity with their
language. Courts that discuss balancing as the intended course
of action but then do not conduct balancing invite questions by
the plaintiff who never gets to present her arguments relating
to balancing; by attorneys for the parties, who are not certain if
the courts will practice what they say or what they do; and by
all who have an interest in the courts’ legitimacy that results in
part from the expectations created by their language.
Articulating the burden-shifting approach, as recent courts
have done more frequently,609 has a number of benefits, from
implicitly nudging the court to the correct application of the
Rule of Reason, to sharing with the parties the construct the
court will in fact apply, to inviting argument on the relevant
factors. Additionally, such an approach fosters judicial efficiency, as courts often will be able to dispose of a case before it
is faced with the consuming and costly process of balancing.610
609. See, e.g., Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997);
K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1995);
Flegel v. Christian Hosp., 4 F.3d 682, 688 (8th Cir. 1993); Nationwide R.A.C. Sales, Inc.
v. Ford Motor Co., No. C 96-2877 FMS, 1997 WL 88399, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 1997);
Ginzburg v. Memorial Healthcare Sys., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 998 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
610. As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent in California Dental Ass’n v. Federal
Trade Commission, 119 S.Ct. 1604, 1624 (1999), a burden-shifting approach
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Following the burden-shifting approach recommended by this
Article would provide even greater assistance to courts, which
would amass more helpful information on the link between the
restraint and the justification, and which would withdraw from
the distracting goose chase of less restrictive alternatives.
Finally, modifying the Rule of Reason construct would bring
the courts further into line with the history and theory underlying the antitrust laws. Requiring the plaintiff first to show a
significant anticompetitive effect, then the defendant to show
that the restraint is reasonably necessary to achieve legitimate
procompetitive objectives, and then to balance is a logical, supportable, and legitimate analysis. In particular, the collapsing
of the second and third stages of the current Rule of Reason
analysis minimizes confusion and second-guessing. In short,
recognizing the disconnect and making a couple of modifications to the Rule of Reason promises benefits for courts and
parties alike.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has surveyed the universe of Rule of Reason
cases in the modern era to determine what courts presently do.
It has explored the legislative history, common law, and contemporary schools of antitrust philosophy to determine what
courts should do. It has examined what courts can do. Finally,
it has identified some of the benefits that would flow from the
recognition of the disconnect and a modification to the Rule of
Reason analysis.
First, the Article has found that courts rarely conduct the
balancing that everyone thinks they do. Out of the 495 cases
decided in the modern era under the Rule of Reason, courts in
only 20 (4%) of the cases balanced the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects. Most of the cases (84%) were disposed of on
the ground that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a significant
anticompetitive effect.
Second, the Article has concluded that most of the factors in
today’s Rule of Reason analysis are supported by the legislative
reflects a gradual evolution within the courts over a period of many years. That
evolution represents an effort carefully to blend the procompetitive objectives of
the law of antitrust with administrative necessity. It represents a considerable advance, both from the days when the [Federal Trade] Commission had to present
and/or refute every possible fact and theory, and from antitrust theories so abbreviated as to prevent proper analysis.
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history of the Sherman Act, the common law preceding the Act,
and contemporary schools of antitrust philosophy—the Chicago
School and Post-Chicago School. These sources provide potent
support for courts’ consideration of anticompetitive effect and
procompetitive justifications. On the other hand, the remaining
factors—balancing, reasonable necessity, and less restrictive
alternatives—have more tenuous support, magnifying the significance of the inquiry into the capacities of courts.
Third, confirming the results from the application of the
sources, courts, as a matter of theory and practice, can examine
anticompetitive effect and procompetitive justifications. Distinguishing among factors for which the sources provide only attenuated support, the capacities of courts (1) recommend the
inclusion of the inquiry as to whether a restraint is reasonably
necessary, (2) cautiously endorse balancing, and (3) reject an
analysis based on less restrictive alternatives. Further, the capacities of courts recommend shifting the burden of producing
evidence of reasonable necessity from the plaintiff (to show its
absence) to the defendant (to show its presence). The Article
thus proposes collapsing the second and third stages of the current Rule of Reason analysis, requiring the defendant to prove
that a restraint is reasonably necessary to achieve a legitimate
procompetitive objective.
Finally, a recognition of the disconnect between what courts
actually do and what everyone thinks they do promises benefits
for parties and for the courts: fewer meritless antitrust lawsuits, increased settlements, more effective litigation, and enhanced judicial legitimacy. Turning to the prescriptive recommendations, abandoning the analysis based on less restrictive
alternatives and shifting the burden on reasonable necessity
would only amplify these trends.
In conclusion, the Rule of Reason generally works. But it
can work better. It can be brought more into line with the legislative history, common law, contemporary schools of antitrust
thought, and capacities of courts. It can be reconciled with
what courts applying it actually do. Then, the Rule of Reason
would be even stronger. It would enhance judicial legitimacy
and would focus the parties’ attention on the relevant issues.
Finally, it would allow parties, scholars, and courts all to talk
the same language and to pursue the goals of antitrust law together, rather than from opposite sides of the disconnect.

